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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

DENNIS F. THOMPSON explores a neglected dilemma of governmental secrecy. Governments cannot be held accountable for policies and practices they keep secret, but some policies and practices cannot be fully public without undermining their efficacy. Among the instances he considers are Clinton's Task Force on Health Care Reform, covert drug operations, gays in the military, physician-assisted suicide, and the misuse of the National Security Council.

WILLIAM C. BANKS and JEFFREY D. STRAUSSMAN point out that contrary to the Framers' plan, the president as commander in chief has acquired the equivalent of his own warmaking and spending power for military interventions. The presidential overreaching is illustrated through an analysis of U.S. involvement in Bosnia.

ALAN J. KUPERMAN challenges the traditional assessment of the U.S. decision to supply Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan Mujahedin resistance during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s. He exposes the bureaucratic politics behind this decision, rejects as myth the popular notion that the Stingers forced Soviet withdrawal, and examines how the CIA's faulty implementation contributed to long-term threats to U.S. national security.

JAMES FOWLER draws on interviews with State Department officials and recently declassified documents to analyze the role of the United States in South Korea's democratization, concluding that U.S. public pressure on the Korean government played a critical role in determining the timing of the transition.

RALPH NUNEZ and CYBELLE FOX provide the most current snapshot of family homelessness in America. Looking at ten diverse cities, this study examines demographics, housing, education, and income histories of homeless families within the context of changing social policies.

CHARLES HILL reviews Warren Christopher's book, *In the Stream of History*, on his years as secretary of state. Hill finds Christopher's solid record of service to the country marred by his involvement with President Clinton's avoidance of key foreign policy challenges and evasion of responsibility for failures in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

CONFERENCE

Political Science Quarterly will be cosponsoring a conference
at Columbia University on 25 October 1999
on the impact of welfare reform on homelessness.

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Democratic Secrecy

DENNIS F. THOMPSON

Sunshine laws, the Freedom of Information Act, investigative journalism, and a robust First Amendment ensure that U.S. citizens have access to more information about public officials and public agencies than ever before in history. Yet even in what may be the most open national government in the world, secrecy persists. According to the Information Security Oversight Office, which keeps watch over the U.S. government's secrets, more than 3½ million new secrets are created each year.[1] That works out to almost 10,000 new secrets a day. No doubt many more secrets were not even recorded. Until recently, even the rules and criteria for classifying and declassifying secret information were themselves secret. There are now two million officials in government and another one million in private industry with the authority to classify documents. Many of these are what are called derivative classifiers, who without signing their own names can declare their own document classified just because it quotes from another originally classified document.[2]

Government secrecy certainly has not been ignored. Many scholars and reformers have examined it critically, and government bodies have investigated the problem. A bipartisan national Commission on Government Secrecy headed by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recently concluded that a massive "culture of secrecy" has spread with little oversight throughout the government during the past eighty years, and has seriously eroded our democratic process.[3] Nevertheless, most of the literature on government secrecy neglects the fundamental democratic values underlying the problem and focuses instead on the

[1] Information Security Oversight Office, *Report to the President, 1995* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1996), ii.

[2] *Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy*, Pursuant to Public Law 236, 103rd Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997).

[3] Ibid.

DENNIS F. THOMPSON is Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy in the Department of Government and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. His most recent book is *Democracy and Disagreement* (with Amy Gutmann).

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laws and policies that regulate secrecy, patterns of abuses by individual officials, or particular practices such as executive privilege and national security.[4] When writers examine fundamental values, they usually pose the problem as a conflict between secrecy and democracy.[5]

This article seeks to show that for a limited but significant class of public policies there is a fundamental conflict of values that is not readily resolvable and that creates a continuing problem for government secrecy in a democracy. The conflict is not primarily between secrecy and democracy but arises within the idea of the democratic process itself. Some of the best reasons for secrecy rest on the very same democratic values that argue against secrecy. The democratic presumption against secrecy (and in favor of publicity) can be defended, but not so simply as is usually supposed.

The conflict involves this basic dilemma of accountability: democracy requires publicity, but some democratic policies require secrecy. The first horn is familiar enough: the policies and processes of government must be public in order to secure the consent of the governed. At a minimum, democracy requires that citizens be able to hold officials accountable, and to do that citizens must know what officials are doing, and why. But the second horn points to the fact that some policies and processes, if they were made public, could not be carried out as effectively or at all. These policies and processes may well be ones to which citizens would consent if they had the opportunity. The most familiar examples are in foreign policy and law enforcement. If the Dayton negotiations on Bosnia had been open to the press and all the terms of the final agreement fully disclosed, the leaders would almost certainly not have been able to reach an agreement. Or if the plans for a sting operation to catch drug dealers were revealed even after it took place, the safety of informers and future operations of a similar kind would be jeopardized.

The dilemma of accountability may be thought of as a political version of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Just as physicists can't measure a particle's position and momentum at the same time (because the process of measuring the position disturbs the momentum), so citizens cannot evaluate some policies and processes because the act of evaluating defeats the policy or undermines the process.

Faced with this dilemma, democrats might seem to have only two alternatives: abandon the policy or sacrifice democratic accountability. The first alter-

[4] Itzhak Galnoor, ed., *Government Secrecy in Democracies* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Donald C. Rowat, ed., *Administrative Secrecy in Developed Countries* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Kenneth G. Robertson, *Public Secrets: A Study of the Development of Government Secrecy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Mark J. Rozell, *Executive Privilege: The Dilemma of Secrecy and Democratic Accountability* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994); Daniel P. Moynihan, *Secrecy: The American Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); and David Vincent, *The Culture of Secrecy in Britain, 1832-1998* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[5] Francis E. Rourke, *Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). But see Sissela Bok, *Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 102–115, 171–190.

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native is sometimes the right one. In the Iran-contra affair during the mid-1980s, Lt. Col. Oliver North kept his actions and the policy of trading arms for hostages secret by giving misleading answers to Congress. A congressional counsel later challenged him by asking, "But these operations were designed to be secrets from the American people?" North responded: "I'm at a loss as to how we could announce it to the American people and not have the Soviets know about it. . . ."[6] But the trouble was that it was not only the Soviets who would have undermined the policy but also many Americans, including a majority in Congress. If one of the reasons that a policy cannot be made public is that it would be defeated in the democratic process, then the policy should be abandoned.

Even the second alternative—sacrifice the accountability—may be appropriate in exceptional circumstances. President John Kennedy did not tell the American people during the Cuban missile crisis that in order to get Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba, he agreed to remove American missiles from Turkey.[7] Nor through most of the nuclear era did most Americans, including most members of Congress, know much about critical elements of nuclear strategy; moral not only technical choices were made without public accountability.

But many policies that require secrecy to be effective do not lend themselves to either of these alternative strategies; we usually do not want to give up either the policy or the accountability. So in practice, we try to compromise by moderating the secrecy—by lifting the veil of secrecy just enough to allow for some degree of democratic accountability. In general, this strategy is more difficult and should be employed with more caution than is usually assumed. The dilemma of accountability is often inescapable, and in any choice between secrecy and publicity, publicity should have ultimate priority. The basic reason is that in any balancing of these values, there should be enough publicity about the policy in question so that citizens can judge whether the right balance has been struck. Publicity is the pre-condition of deciding democratically to what extent (if at all) publicity itself should be sacrificed.[8]

This dilemma can be seen more clearly by considering two general ways in which secrecy may be moderated—ways in which the veil of secrecy may be penetrated. In each case we need to ask what kind of democratic accountability this makes possible and whether it is sufficient. This approach is intended to broaden the discussion of government secrecy to include some forms that are common enough in the life of public officials but neglected in the literature.

[6] David Nacht, "The Iran-Contra Affair" in Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, eds., *Ethics and Politics*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1997), 57–66.

[7] Graham T. Allison and Lance M. Liebman, "Lying in Office" in ibid., 49–53.

[8] For discussions of the publicity principle, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 95–127; and David Luban, "The Publicity Principle" in Robert E. Goodin, ed., *The Theory of Institutional Design* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 154–198.

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Temporality: When Is the Veil Lifted?

The first way in which secrecy may be moderated involves its temporal dimension. We moderate the secrecy by making it temporary: lift the veil in time for citizens to judge the policy or process. The main question we should ask is: What if any democratic accountability is lost by the delay?

Consider the case of the ill-fated Clinton administration's Task Force on National Health Care Reform, which in early 1993 brought some 500 experts together in four months of meetings to design a comprehensive plan to guarantee health care. For much of that time, the meetings were closed, and even the identities of the experts were kept secret. The administration argued that this kind of process allowed participants to take more risks at the earlier stages of the formulation of policy and that it reduced the chance that a well-grounded policy (which could later win public approval) would be rejected early simply because it was unpopular with special interests.[9] The courts eventually disallowed the secrecy.[10]

But the administration did not ask citizens or their representatives to consider whether the secrecy was justified for this purpose. It is difficult to argue that the secrecy served the overall cause of health care reform very well. In the end, the health care plan failed—no doubt for many reasons. But it should have been clear that public support for any plan would ultimately be harder to achieve if the policy makers did not show that they were responding to criticisms and taking into account diverse interests in the process of formulating the plan.

This is not only a political but also a moral point: the less that citizens know about a policy, the less accountable the government is for the policy. Further, the less meaningful is the consent citizens give to it, the less justifiable is the use of state power to enforce it. Thus even temporary secrecy can block citizens from knowing about critical phases of the process in which the policy is adopted and thereby diminish both accountability and consent.

Temporary secrecy does not of course always diminish accountability. Sometimes it can enhance the democratic process, and there is even some information that is made public but that should be kept temporarily secret. For example, the exit polls conducted by the news media during an election reveal the likely results before some citizens have had a chance to vote and thereby may influence their decisions in ways that seem inappropriate. This kind of publicity distorts the process of accountability.

So how should we decide whether temporary secrecy is justified or not? Is there a general principle that might help officials and citizens focus their inevitable arguments about particular cases? Any such principle should have two

[9] For contemporaneous editorial comments on the secret deliberations, see "Health Team Needs Breathing Room," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 31 March 1993; and "Let's All Be Health Care Insiders," *New York Times*, 13 March 1993.

[10] The first federal court ruling was *American Association of Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., v. Clinton*, Civil Action No. 93-0399, 11 March 1993, 813 F. Supp. 82, 1993 U.S. Dist.

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parts: a secret is justified only if it promotes the democratic discussion of the merits of a public policy; and if citizens and their accountable representatives are able to deliberate about whether it does so.

The first part of the principle is simply a restatement of the value of accountability. The second part is more likely to be overlooked but is no less essential. Secrecy is justifiable only if it is actually justified in a process that itself is not secret. First-order secrecy (in a process or about a policy) requires second-order publicity (about the decision to make the process or policy secret).

The requirement of second-order publicity is a sensible resolution of the dilemma of accountability for many cases, but there are some kinds of cases it does not handle well. The first are policies or practices in which the accountability is essentially context-sensitive. These are cases in which the controversial element of the policy is specific to the case, cannot be revealed without undermining the policy, and has irreversible effects. In such cases, giving advance approval of the general type of the policy or counting on retrospective review are not adequate forms of accountability.[11]

It seems perfectly acceptable for a city council to approve the use of unmarked police cars while keeping the specific times and locations secret. But consider the case of a covert operation run by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Texas in the late 1980s. The DEA routinely allowed local police officials to claim that they had seized illegal drug shipments, even though the shipments were brought into the country by DEA's own undercover agents.[12] The practice was designed to protect the identity of the agents who were acting as middlemen for South American drug traffickers and to allow the investigations to continue, but to stop the drugs from reaching distributors in the United States. The practice was evidently effective and became public only after reporters began to have suspicions about the inflated numbers of drug arrests. DEA officials argued that the practice was carefully limited and had been effective in serving an important goal that Congress had approved in general terms. But the absence of any prospective accountability for the method (as distinct from the goal) of the policy is still troubling. If we believe that this and similar undercover operations are necessary, we have an unresolved conflict between secrecy and accountability in all cases of this kind.

Transparency: How Thick Is the Veil?

The other general type of case that the proviso of requiring second-order publicity does not handle takes us to the other dimension of secrecy—transparency (how thick the veil is). Here the problem is that publicizing the practice or policy, making it explicit even in general terms, tends to undermine it. These are cases

[11] On the difficulties with these forms of accountability, see Dennis F. Thompson, *Political Ethics and Public Office* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 22–31.

[12] Associated Press, "U.S. Looking Into Undercover Drug Manipulation," *New York Times*, 29 November 1988.

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in which second-order publicity about a policy would destroy its first-order efficacy. Democratic accountability requires transparency, but some policies and process require obscurity.

The form of secrecy at issue here, rarely discussed in the literature, is partial: it lies somewhere between deep concealment and full disclosure. Such secrets are not completely concealed because their content may be widely known or could be widely known. But their content is not made explicit, and its not being made explicit is necessary for the policy's being effective. We might think of such partial secrets as tacit silences: things that are better left unsaid. There are at least three kinds.

Excuses and Nonenforcement

The first kind of partial secret or tacit silence can be illustrated by the feature of the administration of the criminal law. Jeremy Bentham once proposed a scheme that he thought would maximize both the deterrence and humanitarian aims of the criminal justice system.[13] As a good utilitarian, he did not like capital punishment, but he thought that the threat of capital punishment was sometimes necessary to deter serious crimes. His solution: the law should prescribe death by poison for certain crimes; the poison would be given to the convicted criminal in public, and after he collapsed and was carried away, he would be given an antidote. The criminal would of course have to be told that the penalty for revealing this secret was death by poison—without any antidote. The same would go for the officials who were in on the secret.

Like many of Bentham's schemes, this is not the most sensible solution to the problem, but it reveals in an only slightly more extreme form some features in the administration of our contemporary criminal justice system that many legal scholars and jurists defend. This is the phenomenon of what is called "acoustic separation"[14] (or in terms of the metaphor here it could be called "differential transparency").

On this view, most particular laws imply two kinds of rules: conduct rules, which tell citizens that if they engage in certain conduct, they will be punished in certain ways; and decision rules, which tell officials how to apply the conduct rules. In a system that is purely transparent, one that completely satisfies the publicity principle, the decision rules as well as the conduct rules would be known to all citizens. But in our current system, there is an acoustic separation between the citizens and officials: citizens hear only the conduct rules, not the decision rules. Following the metaphor of transparency, we could say: they can see through only the part of the veil that covers the conduct rules.

An example comes from the law of excuse—the excusing or mitigating factors that are considered in applying a law to a particular individual. "Ignorance

[13] Shirley Letwin, *The Pursuit of Certainty* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 173.

[14] Meir Dan-Cohen, "Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law," *Harvard Law Review* 97 (January 1984): 625–677.

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of the law is no excuse." Most people (and many officials) evidently believe that this is a prevailing rule in our legal system. They believe that the court decisions and statutes do not allow ignorance of the law as an excuse for breaking the law. But that does not seem to be the case. According to certain authoritative, though not widely publicized, commentaries, there are so many exceptions to the excuse that it hardly expresses a rule at all. Ignorance of the law is in fact quite often accepted as a legitimate excuse. You may be excused, for example, if the charge is based on a regulation instead of a statute, if the charge is based on an omission rather than an action, or if you relied on an authoritative source for your information even if the source was mistaken.[15]

These exceptions have developed because in many cases it is clearly unfair to punish someone who really did not know that he was breaking a law. We usually hold people morally responsible only for their intentional actions and therefore think that punishment is justified only if they knowingly or at least negligently commit an offense. But if it were generally known that one could avoid punishment by claiming ignorance of the law, some people would not only try to feign ignorance of the law, but also would have an incentive to cultivate legal ignorance.

Similar considerations apply to imposing penalties of many different kinds in administrative proceedings, whether the parties are citizens outside government or civil servants inside the agency. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) do not reveal exactly what kinds of excuses have worked well in the past. In many cases, the agencies simply do not enforce the rules when the violations fall beyond a certain (unpublicized) threshold. Complete transparency would require publicizing these thresholds, and other facts such as that the agency usually gives a warning, perhaps even two warnings, to violators of a particular rule before taking any further action. But both citizens and employees would be less likely to violate the rules in the first place if this fact were left somewhat unspecified.

Thus, publicizing the stricter conduct rule while obscuring the more lenient decision rule resolves what would otherwise be a difficult dilemma. It mitigates the conflict between two important values—deterrence and fairness. Although the acoustic separation is not complete—the veil does not totally obscure the decision rules to citizens—we should be glad (the proponents of acoustic separation say) that the decision rule is not more generally known. It is fortunate that the exceptions to the conduct rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse are not more widely publicized.

But if this concession to obscurity—this sacrifice of transparency—mitigates this conflict in the law, it exacerbates the more general democratic conflict in the dilemma of accountability. Differential transparency is not a desirable practice in a democracy, and should not be encouraged even if it is to some extent inescapable. It is undesirable for at least three reasons.

[15] Ibid., 645–48.

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One problem with acoustic separation is that it tends to be self-defeating over time. The rationale for the exceptions to general rules (like "ignorance of the law is no excuse") is that they make the law conform more closely to our ordinary notions of morality (in this case the principle that people should be punished only for intentional wrongdoing). But if the exceptions are developed over time in unpublicized cases by administrators and judges, they may begin to diverge from common morality, or at least citizens will have no assurance that they conform to it. Public deliberation seems to be a precondition for keeping the exceptions secret in the first place.

A second problem with acoustic separation is that because in practice it can never be complete, some citizens will penetrate the barrier and use the information, while other citizens cannot. Large corporations and individuals who can afford regularly to consult lawyers can use their inside knowledge of the decision rules to their advantage. The unfairness of this advantage is especially evident in the areas of tax and environmental law: the internal enforcement guidelines of the IRS or the EPA (what excuses are accepted, what levels of violation are ignored, what conduct triggers investigations) may not always be publicized; but some corporations and individuals can still find out what they are and use their knowledge to their own advantage.

Finally and more generally, any attempt in a democracy to send differential messages to different publics about general policies as fundamental as criminal justice is likely to miscarry. The audience with the most to lose or the most to gain usually gets the real message first, and the general public is the last to know. The American criminal justice system sends a different message to the public than it does to criminals, but with just the opposite effect from what Bentham or the advocates of acoustic separation intend. Similarly, the administrative law system may send a different message to well financed and well connected lobbyists than it does to ordinary citizens.

To convince the public that they are vigorously fighting crime, politicians enact popular get-tough measures on crime—longer prison terms, mandatory sentences, and capital punishment for more crimes. But without adequate institutional support for these measures (such as police and prosecutors to enforce the laws, judges and juries prepared to impose the sentences, and prisons to house adequately the convicted criminals), the measures are not likely to reduce crime and may even merely result in more plea bargains, more parole, and fewer convictions. The system tells the criminal on the street that, despite the public rhetoric, the actual risk of getting caught, let alone serving a long term, is not high. Acoustic separation—differential transparency—of this variety not only fails to promote genuine accountability but also defeats its own policy aims.

Compelled Silence

The second kind of case in which transparency is transgressed carries the partial secrecy of excuses and nonenforcement a step further. In those cases just examined, the discrepancy between what the law says and how it is enforced is par-

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tially secret or at least obscure, and therefore the prohibited practice is indirectly kept secret too. In the kind of case to be considered next, the law explicitly requires that the practice be secret, and the prohibited conduct becomes illegal only if it is revealed.

This is the current policy on gays in the military: the so-called "don't ask—don't tell" regulations proposed by the Clinton administration in 1993, endorsed by Congress, and upheld by the courts.[16] The military is no longer permitted to ask applicants for military service their sexual orientation and cannot investigate their sexual orientation unless they receive "credible information" about it from other sources. At the same time, gays are not permitted to disclose their orientation. They may go to gay bars, designate their partners on insurance forms, and take other similar actions; but they may not announce to anyone that they are gay. If they do, they are subject to discharge and other penalties.

Notice that this is different from laws that protect rights of privacy. In the policy on gays, the conduct is prohibited even if it takes place in private and even off-duty. To make clear that the law is not neutral on the question of the legitimacy of the conduct itself, the House added to the Pentagon order the statement "homosexual conduct in the military is unacceptable."[17]

Defenders of the policy describe it as a compromise between the needs of the military and the rights of a disadvantaged minority. Most if not all of the dangers that the military says homosexuality causes can be avoided if gays keep their orientation secret. The military presumably is worried that the presence of openly gay soldiers will make close-quarter living as on shipboard more difficult and create some ambivalence in the camaraderie that fighting units require. The rights of gays are also partially protected: they can serve in the military if they are discreet about what they say and what they do. Gays now serving in the military are better off than they were under the previous policy; and according to one report, most were indeed pleased by the new policy, though of course "their joy [had to be] savored quietly" in private.[18]

But as with many compromises, this one does not please most people on either side of the controversy. Those sympathetic to the military think that it undermines combat readiness, and those sympathetic to gays still find it discriminatory. Much could be said against the policy, but the relevant points here relate specifically to its lack of transparency.

Notice first, however, that the policy is not vulnerable to the objection that it breaches democratic accountability in the way that some similar policies might. For example, many government-financed hospitals and HMOs implicitly allow physician-assisted suicide, presumably with the tacit approval of their

[16] "Gay Rights in the Military: The Pentagon's New Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals in the Military," *New York Times*, 20 July 1993.

[17] Clifford Krauss, "With Caveat, House Approves Gay-Troops Policy," *New York Times*, 29 September 1993.

[18] Thomas L. Friedman, "Gay Rights in the Military," *New York Times*, 21 July 1993.

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doctors and most citizens of the community but contrary to existing law. The practice is tacitly permitted as long as no one talks about it openly, which means that most citizens or their representatives have not had a chance to vote for or against permitting the practice. In contrast, the "don't ask—don't tell" policy on gays in the military has been the subject of ample deliberation and has been openly endorsed in a democratic process. This was possible because the policy itself is public. The policy does not require that any of its essential features be secret, only the specific conduct of certain individuals. The policy thus seems to be an example of partial secrecy or nontransparency that is consistent with democratic accountability.

But the lack of transparency still creates problems for accountability. The policy inevitably leaves a great deal to the discretion of individual military officers to decide what is to count as "telling" and what is to count as "credible information" sufficient to launch an investigation. Given the nature of the policy, this discretion is likely to be exercised in private at least in the initial stages. But there have been accusations that some officers have abused this discretion by undertaking investigations without sufficient evidence. It would seem then that greater accountability, a degree of publicity at least within the government, is necessary. Yet the more public this process becomes (even within the military), the consequence is the same as if the accused himself did in fact "tell." He is now known to be gay. The lack of transparency brings about a deficiency in accountability—not for the policy itself but for its application.

The policy has further problems of accountability. The pressure toward silence drives not only homosexual activity underground but also activities and discussion about the effects of the policy. The secrecy the policy requires makes it harder to find out how the policy is actually working: whether for example it is discouraging gays from entering the military, how unpleasant it is making their life once in service, whether the suppression of gay identity is worse for military effectiveness than open toleration would be. Much of what citizens and legislators need to know in order to judge whether to continue the policy or to change it over time is not easily accessible, because so much of the operation of the policy lies behind a less than transparent veil.

Political Hypocrisy

One of the most common charges in contemporary political debate is hypocrisy, the alleged contradiction between what officials try to make the public believe about how they act and how they actually act. Hypocrisy involves pretending that one's "motives and intentions and character are irreproachable when [one] knows that they are blameworthy."[19] The force of the charge thus depends on the private conduct being less known, or at least less acknowledged, than the public conduct. Otherwise, the pretense would be obvious, and the charge would be one of simple inconsistency.

[19] Judith Shklar, *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 47.

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Accountability might seem to require exposure of hypocrisy, and under some conditions and to some extent it does. When an official is in charge of enforcement of drug policy but is addicted to crack, or when a politician opposes legislation to protect gays against discrimination but engages in homosexual activity, the exposure helps make a point that is relevant to citizens' judgment about how well the official is doing his or her job. But as the most astute analysts of hypocrisy have emphasized, anti-hypocrisy can often do more damage to the democratic process than the hypocrites do.[20] It focuses political debate too much on motives instead of actions, makes compromise more difficult, and can intensify class and racial antagonism. Some of these effects also undermine accountability itself.

If the partial secrecy that supports this individual hypocrisy is sometimes desirable, it is much less justified in the case of a more insidious form—institutional hypocrisy.[21] This form involves a disparity between the publicly avowed purposes of an institution and its actual performance or function. This disparity often develops over time as an institution comes to serve purposes other than those for which it was established. In some cases, no one is deceived and no harm is done to the democratic process. The Electoral College may have once been supposed to provide an additional forum for democratic deliberation, but most citizens today would be more than surprised if the electors decided to conduct a serious debate about the merits of the candidates and cast their votes according to their own best judgment.

But in other cases the divergence between the official purpose and the actual function is not so open and the consequences not so benign. In some—especially those involving almost any agency that can claim to be protecting national security—the institutional hypocrisy is often deeply deceptive. The National Security Council (NSC) is supposed to provide the president with an independent source of advice and control over the conduct of foreign policy. When it becomes a tool for evading congressional oversight, as it did in the Iran-contra affair, an appeal to its official purpose constitutes institutional hypocrisy that has serious consequences for the democratic process. Lt. Col. Oliver North and Admiral John Poindexter tried to justify their congressionally unauthorized use of the NSC by arguing that the Boland amendment banned only operational agencies from intervening in the conflict in Nicaragua. The NSC, they said, is merely a planning and advisory agency.[22] They thus exploited the official purpose of the institution while using it for illegitimate purposes. The disparity was part of the cause as well as the consequence of the damage to the democratic process.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Dennis F. Thompson, "Hypocrisy and Democracy" in Bernard Yack, ed., *Liberalism Without Illusions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 173–90.

[22] Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), 25–26, 33–37, 344.

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In the case of institutional hypocrisy, we should generally resolve the dilemma in favor of accountability and expose the partial secrets. Criticisms of systematic discrepancies between intention and action in governmental agencies can help set the agenda for institutional reform. The critics who charge a federal regulatory agency with serving the interests of the industries it is supposed to regulate more than the interests of the citizens it is supposed to serve can not only identify the need for reform but can indicate the form it should take. The long-term legitimacy of these and other such institutions depends on establishing more coherence between their official purposes and their actual practices.

But notice that the demand for exposure of institutional hypocrisy is not always consistent with the exposure of individual hypocrisy. Not only does the preoccupation with individual hypocrisy distract attention from the institutional form, it also may interfere with its exposure. Institutional hypocrisy and individual hypocrisy are not only distinct but often opposed. Institutional hypocrisy is sometimes made possible by the absence of individual hypocrisy.

Oliver North was not a hypocrite in any conventional sense. He did not believe that his motives or intentions were reproachable. He could not be accused of acting out of self-interest in any of its usual disreputable forms. He believed in his cause and believed that he was serving both his president and his nation in carrying out his scheme to trade hostages for arms to Iran and divert some of the proceeds to the contras in Nicaragua. He was not even trying to make himself appear better than he thought he was, since he believed that if most citizens fully understood what he was doing they would consider him a hero. Had North been a conventional hypocrite, he would not have been so successful in enlisting others in support of his cause and thereby in effecting the institutional hypocrisy that should count as his gravest wrong. His main moral fault was not that he failed to be true to himself, but that he failed to be true to those to whom he was accountable. In his individual sincerity, he created and sustained an institutional hypocrisy.

Thus, democratic accountability may be better served by paying less attention to the individual and more to the institutional form of hypocrisy. Both are in a sense partial secrets, and thus both create a potential dilemma of accountability; but the moral discrepancies in their individual conduct that officials refuse to acknowledge are often not so damaging as the functional divergences in institutional goals that they try to obscure.

CONCLUSION

Democratic accountability does not require unconditional publicity in the conduct of democratic government. Secrecy of various kinds is sometimes justified and even desirable in a democracy. But it is justified only under carefully specified conditions, which ensure that the secrecy itself is subject to democratic accountability.

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The first part of any justification requires second-order publicity: the decision to keep a decision or policy secret should be made publicly. Further, it may not be sufficient to have procedures for deciding whether particular decisions or practices should be public. It may also be necessary to design procedures for deciding whether decisions about these decisions should be public. (It is usually not necessary or desirable to carry this logic to some n^{th} order publicity.)

The requirement of second-order publicity takes care of most cases of temporary secrecy, but it does not handle so well the important but neglected cases of partial secrecy. The challenge here is to provide procedures for acknowledging partial secrets without undermining the policies they support. The only feasible solutions seem to be either to rely on representatives who can be trusted to review in private the policy and its application, or to conduct public debates in general terms without revealing the specific nature of the policy. That neither of these alternatives usually provides adequate democratic accountability is a further reason to seek ways to promote transparency in the design of the government institutions and the making of public policies.

The dilemma of accountability poses a choice between either abandoning a policy or weakening responsibility for it. The dilemma cannot always be resolved because it is inherent in the theory and practice of democratic government itself, or at least any democratic government in which citizens would wish to adopt policies that cannot be promptly disclosed or processes that are not fully transparent. But public officials and political institutions can diminish the damage to democratic accountability by making sure that temporary secrets do not become permanent and that partial secrets do not become total.*

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A New Imperial Presidency? Insights from U.S. Involvement in Bosnia

WILLIAM C. BANKS
JEFFREY D. STRAUSSMAN

In August 1995, President Bill Clinton caught a lucky break. A few days after Congress voted with veto-proof majorities to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia, the Croatian government launched an offensive against its dissident Serbian minority. Neither the Serb government in Belgrade nor Western nations responded, despite the fact that this Croatian operation was similar to the earlier Serbian "ethnic cleansing" that had received such negative attention in the Western news media. With the "clean" ethnic borders more or less in place, Serbia and Croatia appeared finally ready to move toward a settlement that had plagued the two countries since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. However, when the Serbs continued to attack Muslim military positions in Sarajevo, Clinton was able to advance his alternative to congressional pressure to lift the arms embargo to the Western allies—namely, air strikes against the Serbs. The air strikes had the dual impact of blunting the efforts to override the vote on lifting the arms embargo and providing the military muscle to bring the warring sides in the Bosnian conflict to the bargaining table.

After several weeks of U.S.-sponsored negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, the principals representing the three factions in Bosnia—Croats, Serbs, and Muslims—initialed a peace agreement on 21 November 1995. A few days after the formal signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Paris on 14 December, President Clinton ordered the deployment of more than 20,000 United States troops as part of a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000, which was charged with patrolling and enforcing a cease-fire and a zone of separation between the newly created semiautonomous entities

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in Bosnia—the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic Srpska. More or less lost in all the attention given to the Dayton settlement was a missing and essential element of the U.S. participation in IFOR: there was neither congressional authorization nor an appropriation in support of the deployment of U.S. ground forces to Bosnia. How could such a commitment of U.S. troops to enforce the peace in Bosnia have been made unilaterally by the president?

This article explains how the Bosnia commitment was made, and it assesses its legality. Part one provides a primer on the defense appropriations power, emphasizing the evolution from the original understanding of the Constitution to the practical executive dominance in the post-Korean War era. Part two describes the events from the breakup of Yugoslavia to the creation of IFOR in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Peace Accords. Part three assesses the funding dimensions of U.S. participation in IFOR. Part four notes the continuing U.S. presence in Bosnia and draws some lessons about the contemporary dynamics of the elected branches in planning and implementing national security operations.

A Primer on the Power of the Purse in National Security Affairs

In December 1995 hearings before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense regarding the U.S. commitment to Bosnia, Chairman Ted Stevens (R–AK) stated: "I oppose this deployment, but . . . it is [not] our prerogative here to debate . . . with the President. . . . The President has ordered the deployment . . . we have no way to prevent that."[1] If James Madison or Thomas Jefferson could have witnessed Senator Stevens's remarks, they would have been puzzled at this position taken by a member of the Senate and the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee that opposition to the commitment of U.S. forces to a military operation abroad is not even a question for the Congress to debate, much less decide.

Jefferson or Madison would say that Stevens put it exactly backwards: the president would propose the military operation, debate in Congress would follow, and, depending on the outcome of a vote in Congress, the president would begin the operation or not. In 1789, Jefferson wrote to Madison that "[w]e have already given . . . one effectual check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."[2]

Jefferson was referring, of course, to the Framers' decision to vest the power to declare war in the Congress. But he also was celebrating their strategy of cementing the congressional primacy over committing the nation to war through conferring on Congress the power of appropriating money for the ex-

[1] "Bosnia Costs and Funding Requirements," Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 104th Congress, 1st sess., 1 December 1995, S. Hrg. 104–286, 35.

[2] P. Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1895), 123.

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ercises of the war power, in the Spending, Army, Navy, and Necessary and Proper Clauses of the Constitution. The package of controls was completed in the Appropriations Clause and its prohibition on spending of public revenues without appropriation, and the Statement and Account Clause and its requirement of a periodic accounting of how public money is spent. Thus, the system put into place by the Framers separated the purse from the sword. The power of the purse supplemented the declaration power by allowing Congress to specify or restrict military spending ex ante. In the event that such controls failed, Congress was also given the power of supply, permitting Congress to determine through appropriations the magnitude and duration of U.S. involvement in military engagement.

The Framers' overarching national security objective was to make it difficult for the United States to engage in war. It was not that the Framers believed that the Congress would be more expert than the president in national security affairs. Rather, it was assumed that peace would more likely predominate if the Constitution placed obstacles in the path toward war. The Congress thus supplied a deliberative buffer to hasty action, while its role assured that the gravest decisions made by the nation would be made by those most accountable to the people. The process prescribed by the Framers in the Constitution, stated simply, requires presidents to request from Congress authority to commit the U.S. to a military operation where the use of force is likely. The commander in chief may act without congressional authorization only in defense of sudden attack or to effect a rescue of Americans.[3]

The history of how the United States made commitments to use military force abroad before 1950 was relatively consistent and mostly in keeping with the constitutional design outlined above. While there were occasional instances of unconstitutional engagements by commanders in chief, most involved minor skirmishes and none purported to usurp the congressional war power. The exceptional breach of the rules normally was based on a false claim of statutory authority and resulted in a contrite admission of error by the president.[4] Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt's pre-World War II sympathies toward the

[3] Although the "original understanding" of the Constitution is often obscure, the power to commit the nation to war, big or little, declared or undeclared, was clearly given to Congress. Only defensive actions where time does not permit deliberation by Congress may be lawfully conducted by the executive without congressional authorization. See Stephen Dycus, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, *National Security Law* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2d ed., 1997), 9–27.

[4] A Senate report stated: "[T]he practice of American Presidents for over a century after independence showed scrupulous respect for the authority of Congress except in a few instances." S. Rep. No. 797, 90th Congress, 1st sess., 1967, 23. While proponents of broad presidential power have developed various lists purporting to show instances in which the president has ordered military action without congressional authorization, these lists tend to mislabel an operation authorized by Congress, or the actions listed involve minor skirmishes with pirates or operations to rescue Americans abroad. See Frances Wormuth and Edwin Firmage, *To Chain the Dog of War: The Power of Congress in History and Law* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2d ed., 1989); Dycus, et al. *National Security Law*, 334–341.

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plight of Europe and his pre-declaration efforts to aid the allies were couched in the authorities Congress had granted. For example, Roosevelt answered the French appeal for military assistance this way: "Only the Congress can make such commitments."[5]

The constitutional design began to erode with President Harry Truman's unilateral commitment to send U.S. troops to fight a war in Korea. Commanders in chief following Truman cited their supposed independent constitutional authority (employing Korea as precedent) to deny the congressional primacy in initiating war, sometimes even denying that Congress is empowered to stop a president determined to act. They claimed that fast-breaking crises do not permit the luxury of congressional deliberation and cited the United Nations and other treaty-based obligations as authorization for their military actions. In addition, changes in the technology and speed of modern warfare have compromised the ability and perhaps the will of Congress to exercise its power over war before the use of force abroad. Precipitously, Congress has been relegated to the role of spectator in national security decision making.

As the actual power over national security shifted to the president after the Korean War and Congress increasingly ceded the initiative, the congressional role in deciding to commit the United States to war shifted from authorization to appropriations, from deciding in advance to grant the authority to act to ratifying or restricting ex post. The ex ante check on war making became an opportunity for ex post review and reaction. While some members of Congress carped about their subservience to unilateral executive decisions, occasionally national security commitments were influenced after the fact. In the Southeast Asia War, for example, appropriations restrictions were employed—first to limit the scope of the war through area and use restrictions, and later to bring it to an end.

In the waning years of the Southeast Asia War, Congress managed to beat back an already weakened President Richard Nixon and enact over his veto the War Powers Resolution (WPR) of 1973. Billed as a measure intended to restore congressional primacy in national security through requirements that the president consult Congress before and report to them after deploying troops where hostilities may be imminent, the WPR had no realistic chance of doing any such thing. First, the political compromises that shaped the final bill resulted in a statute that arguably enhanced rather than reined in presidential power. Second, once the weakened Nixon was gone, presidents since have routinely sidestepped its limited prescriptions while refusing to concede the act's constitutionality. Later attempts by Congress to curtail military operations through appropriations restrictions had mixed results, at best. These included U.S. operations in Angola through the Clark-Tunney Amendment, in Nicaragua through the Boland Amendments, and in Somalia through a compromise

[5] Edward Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1984* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), 246.

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measure arrived at with President Clinton.[6] At other times, members of Congress tried but failed to muster the votes to curtail a military operation that they may not have authorized.

One reason that the president has assumed the dominant role in making national security commitments is that contemporary situations may present crises unimaginable to the Framers that call for prompt action; both the speed and destructive capacity of weaponry may justify some presidential discretion to act unilaterally, not after deliberation by 535 representatives. Indeed, if the president fails to act in a high stakes, contemporary national security crisis, unilaterally or as part of a multinational force, he may fail to meet his independent constitutional obligations as commander in chief and as chief executive to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution. Although this justification for unilateral presidential action remains almost entirely hypothetical,[7] the possibility of such a crisis has facilitated the accretion of power to the president.

Another reason for presidential hegemony, however, has nothing to do with crises in a fast-moving world. Since Truman's move to deploy a massive force to Korea, Congress has demonstrated that it prefers not to take the risk of authorizing or forbidding risky national security ventures. If the president leads, Congress may remain silent and permit the president to act for the nation. Or, members may either applaud or chastise the president, short of making legislation, depending on how the operation pans out.

Today, national security commitments are not made pursuant to widely shared policy objectives. Indeed, allowing for the accretion of the power to the president over the past forty-five years, our nation's commitments of military forces are often not even made following policies clearly articulated by the president, much less those favored by the Congress. Instead deployments are made, no-fly zones are enforced, bombing raids are executed, peace is enforced—all generally following a pattern of vague, shifting, and imprecise policies, shaped to avoid alienating any important domestic or foreign constituency. A by-product of this process of nonpolicy making is the avoidance of accountability. What has developed is a sort of game, honed during the years of wrangling over the war in Southeast Asia and U.S. support for the Nicaraguan contras, now played with considerable skill by executive and legislative players.

In the contemporary crucible of the defense appropriations process, the policy questions of whether the United States should engage in this or that military operation become fiscal questions: How much should be spent in furtherance of an activity for which a commitment has already been made by the president? Thus, the national security commitments made by the United States in

[6] Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, 107 Stat. 1475–77, §8151 (1993).

[7] The Constitution permits unilateral presidential action only to repel a sudden attack or to rescue Americans held abroad. Other unilateral uses of military force by the president in an emergency are best viewed as unlawful, permitting Congress to ratify the action after-the-fact if it believes the actions were justified. See Jules Lobel, "Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism," *Yale Law Journal* 98 (1989): 1385.

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the former Yugoslavia have been made following a familiar pattern: The president decides to undertake a national security operation, be it a humanitarian relief in a dangerous setting; participation in peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacemaking; or the removal of a tyrannical leader or regime from power. The president does not seek authorization from Congress nor seek a specific appropriation to fund the operation.

According to the Framers' theory of appropriation, the commander in chief should be disabled from beginning the military operation because he lacks the appropriated funds. In fact, he has customarily claimed and exercised discretion to spend from large, lump sum accounts and to spend reprogrammed, transferred, emergency, and contingency funds without prior specific appropriation from Congress. From Nixon's use of such accounts to finance hostilities in and over Cambodia during the war in Southeast Asia, to President Ronald Reagan's use of them to finance the contras in Nicaragua, to President George Bush's employment of them to fund Operation Desert Shield until Congress made a specific appropriation, modern presidents have exercised what has in fact become a presidential spending power in national security.

From Yugoslavia to IFOR

The collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 eventually reached Yugoslavia, which dissolved into five republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia. Attempts by the Yugoslav federal army to prevent the breaking away of Slovenia and Croatia precipitated the first hostilities in the region after the end of the cold war. In December 1991, the Muslim Bosnian president asked the European Community to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, an event that many expected to lead to civil war, given the religious and ethnic makeup of the region—44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat. In April 1992, shortly before formal recognition of the new state by the European Community and the United States, Serb and Yugoslav army forces seized over 70 percent of Bosnia's territory. Serb leaders stated that their goal was for all Serbs to live in either a small Serb-led Yugoslavia, or in a larger, independent Serbia. Serb attacks in the region were thus fashioned as "ethnic cleansing," and atrocities against civilian Muslims and Croats were reported in the international press. While Muslims and Croats also fought each other in the early rounds of the conflict, by March 1994, the Bosnian Croats and Muslims agreed to form a federation in Bosnia.

The response to Serbian aggression was effectively set in 1991, when NATO decided not to intervene in what it regarded as a Bosnian civil war. In August 1992, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution calling on nations to take "all measures necessary" to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo.[8] At about the same time, the Senate passed a resolution stat-

[8] United Nations Security Council Resolution 770, 13 August 1992.

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ing that no U.S. military personnel should be introduced into hostilities without clearly defined objectives, and the House passed a resolution urging the Security Council to authorize measures, including the use of force, to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief.[9]

The U.S. response to the events in Bosnia evolved slowly and unevenly. In 1993, Clinton ordered U.S. participation in UN and NATO-sponsored relief operations and enforcement of a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. His actions were modest and did not carry a significant risk of the loss of or injury to U.S. personnel; nor did they risk political fallout or failure in the eyes of any large constituency at home. In effect, the United States would act only as part of a multilateral force; ground forces would not be used; and the United States would not take sides in the conflict. Although the president talked of seeking congressional "support," he sought no authorization or appropriation for these actions.

Congress then considered but failed to enact restrictions on military initiatives in Bosnia. In September 1993, Senator Robert Dole announced his intention to offer a provision stating that no additional U.S. forces should be introduced into Bosnia without prior approval from Congress. Congress acted in the fiscal 1994 Defense Department appropriation, stating the "sense of the Congress" that defense appropriations should not be expended for a deployment in support of a peace settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina "unless previously authorized by the Congress."[10] Clinton responded to the proposed restrictions by announcing that he would fight or ignore any attempts to interfere with his foreign policy prerogatives.

When air strikes were contemplated and then initiated in 1994, Clinton made no effort to seek congressional authorization. Instead, he simply noted in a report to Congress that U.S. forces "participate in these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief."[11] He further noted that the air strikes were "to support NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone . . . as authorized by the U.N. Security Council."[12] Thus, the policy was made by the UN and NATO, not the United States, and the decision to commit the United States to the operation was made by the president, not Congress. The closest Congress came to making policy on Bosnia in 1994 was to say that if any of $12 billion in supplemental defense funds were spent on Bosnia, Department of Defense (DOD) operations were limited to "enforcement of the no-fly zone relating to Bosnia."[13]

Meanwhile, after considerable Western media attention and public revulsion at the scenes of genocide and stories of rape and barbaric prison camps

[9] S. Res. 330, 102d Congress, 2nd sess. (1992); H. Res. 554, 102d Congress, 2nd sess. (1992).

[10] Department of Defense, Appropriations Act for Fiscal 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–139, §8146, 107 Stat. 1476 (1993).

[11] William J. Clinton, 30 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 6 February 1994, 406.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Pub. L. No. 103–211, §302, 1994.

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wrought by Serbian aggression, Congress voted in 1994 in "sense of the Congress" resolutions to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia to permit the Muslim government to defend itself more effectively. As the Defense Department appropriation and authorization bills were passed in the fall of 1994, the most that Congress could distill from its debates on the role of the United States in Bosnia was another nonbinding provision stating the "sense of Congress" that no U.S. funds should be spent on implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia "unless previously authorized by the Congress."[14] In 1995, when Congress eventually required that the arms embargo be lifted, Clinton vetoed the bill, asserting that a U.S. decision to lift the embargo would cause the European allies to withdraw their forces from the conflict and, thus, actually make conditions more difficult for the Bosnian Muslims. In his veto message, the president berated Congress for attempting "to regulate by statute matters for which the President is responsible under the Constitution."[15]

As the negotiations toward a peace accord proceeded in Dayton in late summer and fall of 1995, Clinton indicated to Senate Majority Leader Dole that he would welcome a "strong expression of support" from Congress before committing U.S. forces to the implementation of an accord. While at first he phrased his request as one for "authorization," it was soon modulated to a request for "support" or "approval," all the while maintaining his "constitutional prerogatives in this area." In the weeks before and after the signing of the Dayton accords and leading up to the actual deployment of U.S. forces on 20 December 1995, both houses debated whether to support the introduction of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia. The House passed two measures: a nonbinding resolution stating that such forces should not be deployed without congressional approval, and then a flat-out prohibition of the deployment. In the Senate, the debate was heavily influenced by presidential candidate Dole's statements that the president had the authority to deploy the force to Bosnia. After the Dayton accords were reached, the Senate declined to approve the House prohibition, and it narrowly defeated a resolution expressing opposition to sending troops to Bosnia. As the peace agreement was being readied for signature in Paris, the Senate passed an unusually worded resolution that supported the troops but doubted whether it was wise to send them. Next, the House passed a nonbinding resolution expressing "serious concern and opposition to the President's policy," although it also expressed confidence that the U.S. forces would excel at their task.

On 15 December 1995, the day after the peace agreement was signed in Paris, the UN Security Council authorized the multilateral NATO-led implementation force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Based on his presumed authority under the Constitution and treaties, Clinton ordered the deployment of 22,000 U.S. ground troops to Bosnia, a decision he explained in a letter to

[14] Department of Defense, Appropriations Act for FY 1995, Pub. L. No. 103–335, §8100 (1994).
[15] 31 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (11 August 1995), 1439.

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Congress on 21 December as being based on his "constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive."[16] Clinton vetoed the overall defense package a few days later—the fiscal 1996 Defense Authorization Act, which contained limitations on the president's use of ground forces in Bosnia and on his discretion to secure funds from operational accounts to pay for unbudgeted contingency operations such as Bosnia. He managed to cause the objectionable provisions to be dropped from the bill that he eventually signed.

Funding U.S. Participation in IFOR

The chronology of U.S. involvement in Bosnia summarized in the previous section emphasized presidential-congressional relations in the conduct of national security policy. A more focused attention on the funding dimensions of U.S. participation in IFOR shows how the Framers' conception of the relationship between Congress and the president has been radically altered in the post-Korea era. What we find is that significant big-picture policy questions concerning the efficacy of U.S. military activities are in fact resolved through arcane and low-profile spending decisions.

Beginning in summer of 1995, the Clinton administration was searching for creative ways to finance U.S. involvement in implementing a Bosnia peace agreement. One idea was to replicate the pre-Gulf War fundraising approach—a voluntary fund for contributions from governments toward implementing the peace in Bosnia. This, it was thought, would finesse Republican opposition in the congressional budget process and would exploit NATO support for U.S. participation in implementing an eventual agreement. The foreign contributions idea was abandoned, perhaps when the administration recalled that the possibility of financing a national security operation by U.S. forces with donated third-party funds was effectively eliminated by Congress in 1990. In response to the prospect of a "huge defense slush fund"[17] permitting President Bush to bypass Congress in funding Operation Desert Shield, Congress repealed previous authority permitting such gifts to be given to fund the nation's defense outside the appropriations process. In its place, a Defense Cooperation Account was created, where any contributions to national security activities of the United States must be placed, while the spending of such funds is subject to the requirement of an appropriation.

With the lack of support in Congress for the line of credit approach to funding peace operations and the unavailability of open-ended discretion to spend gifts from foreign governments, the Clinton administration was back to square one on the challenge of how to finance the operation in Bosnia. The obvious

[16] 31 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (6 December 1995), 2144.

[17] Jefrey R. Smit and Ann Devroy, "Reduced Arms Sale to Saudis Discussed: Byrd Moves to Bar Pentagon 'Slush Fund,'" *Washington Post*, 21 September 1990.

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path—seek a prior, specific appropriation for the operation from Congress—was politically unpalatable, based on the fear that the funds might not be approved at all. More likely, Congress would attach conditions to the spending that the commander in chief would find unacceptable. As a senior Pentagon official said, funding Bosnia was part of "the dance" with Congress, "forcing them to do something they do not want to do, and do it in a timely fashion."[18] But how and where would DOD find the money? Fortunately for the president, a combined accident of timing and luck presented a relatively painless path toward funding the operation.

Throughout fall of 1995, while the Dayton negotiations were on-going and members of Congress were debating proposals to restrict any U.S. operation in Bosnia, Congress was also engaged in its consideration and passage of the annual appropriation bills, including the bill for defense. Unrelated to the potential dispute over Bosnia, Congress and the president were locked in a battle over spending, primarily over new or expanded weapons systems favored by members of Congress and viewed as too costly by the president. When Congress passed a $243 billion defense appropriations bill on 16 November, Democratic leaders suggested that Clinton would veto the bill because it contained $7 billion more than he had requested, with the additional funds earmarked for several defense projects he had not requested. At the time, Republican leaders retorted that a veto would in turn produce a cut-off of funding for the Bosnia operation.

However, the Dayton accords were announced the following week, and testimony by Defense Secretary William Perry and Comptroller John Hamre on 1 December provided the first public budget estimate of $2 billion for a twelve-month Bosnia operation.[19] The president reconsidered his options. If he vetoed the spending bill and then requested the $2 billion separately, the Congress would be unlikely to approve the request for the Bosnia funds. If he offered to accept the $243 defense appropriation, he could seek to strike a political bargain with congressional leaders informally to funnel some of the defense funds to the Bosnia operation.

In effect, that is just what occurred when Clinton allowed the bill to become law without his signature on 1 December. Although House Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert L. Livingston stated that "there has been no agreement on where the [Bosnia] funds come from,"[20] it appears that the fat in the fiscal 1996 Pentagon appropriation provided the flexibility for the president to charge DOD officials with finding the funds for Bosnia from within fiscal

[18] Interview, 6 May 1997.

[19] William J. Perry, Prepared Statement, "Bosnia Costs and Funding Requirements," Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, 104th Congress, 1st sess., 1 December 1995, S. Hrg. 104–286, 21, 43.

[20] Donna Cassata, "Clinton Accepts Defense Bill in Bid for Bosnia Funds," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 December 1995, 3672.

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1996 accounts and thus avoid, temporarily at least, the need to ask Congress for funds for Bosnia.

When the Bosnia deployment was ordered by the president, Congress had thus neither specifically appropriated funds for the Bosnia initiative nor restricted the use of appropriated funds. As IFOR began, DOD relied on its discretion to draw down lump sum operations accounts. The administration's plan was to begin to spend for the Bosnia operation by depleting fiscal 1996 funds for operations and maintenance and personnel that would otherwise have been available for obligation later in the fiscal year. The enacted appropriation provided $81.6 billion for military operations and maintenance, $752 million over the president's request. Thus, the operation could have begun from accounts that were funded above the Department's request. However, because the drawdown from accounts where funds were added by Congress could conceivably affect specific projects favored by members of Congress, the administration required DOD to find all of the funds for Bosnia without diminishing the funds available for specific projects or activities added by Congress to the DOD budget request, and without the requirement of new funds. Thus, one apparent quid pro quo for the congressional leaders' commitment not to attempt to deny or formally condition funds for Bosnia in the DOD appropriation or otherwise was the administration's promise not to spend funds from within lump-sum accounts that had been earmarked for favored projects, and not to come asking for additional funds for Bosnia later in the fiscal year.

By their very nature, lump sums threaten the Framers' theory of the power of the purse: It was anticipated that the president would be disabled from acting without going to Congress first for specific appropriations. In effect, the use of lump-sum appropriations for national security eliminates the ex ante control over spending and sends Congress to the sidelines when any unanticipated national security operation comes along. However, lump-sum appropriations have been employed for some defense spending since the First Congress, because members found it impossible to estimate necessary expenditures without the help of the executive. Over time, the lump-sum practice replaced the tradition of line itemization in appropriations for defense, although the executive estimates were to some extent and at times incorporated into the statutory text.

If the first Congresses and presidents found lump-sum appropriations unavoidable for the military, no one would seriously contemplate line-item appropriations for a $250 billion defense budget today. Although DOD lump-sum accounts have historically been subject to nonstatutory understandings that sums would be spent in accordance with details in the itemized budget requests, the broad delegations in the statutes of hundreds of millions or even billions for "operations and maintenance, army" leave considerable room for the operation of spending discretion.

To facilitate obtaining replacement funds due to the costs of the Bosnia operation as early as possible and to take advantage of the availability of noncontroversial funding sources, the administration determined to request funding in

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three phases. IFOR operations in Bosnia (and logistical support in neighboring countries) fell primarily to the army. The army's estimated FY96 Operations and Maintenance budgetary requirements for Bosnia were $780.2 million. To offset the incremental costs of the Bosnia operation, the president submitted a request in January 1996 to reprogram $991 million in DOD funds, later revised downward to $876 million, financed by projected inflation savings resulting from revised economic assumptions. Thus, the claim was that no net costs would occur because the reprogramming would be "financed" by a downward revision of earlier inflation forecasts.

Reprogramming permits funds in an account to be used for different purposes than those contemplated when the funds were appropriated. In a reprogramming action, funds are shifted from one object to another or from one program element to another within an appropriation. It is thus different from the general discretion to spend from a lump sum account, although the differences are in degree, not kind, and often are based on informal arrangements between congressional committees and spenders. The authority to reprogram is implicit in an agency's discretion to manage its lump-sum appropriations. Typically, reprogramming is not authorized or prohibited by statute. However, by statute and DOD regulation, most of its requests require the approval of four congressional committees,[21] although this one anticipated no set costs to any program or activity, based on the administration's downward revision of its earlier inflation forecasts. Although statutes now limit DOD reprogramming to "higher priority items based on unforeseen military requirements," and by prohibiting the practice "where the item for which reprogramming is requested has been denied by Congress,"[22] reprogramming discretion is of central importance to DOD. Because the DOD appropriation builds in considerable discretion through large lump-sum accounts, and because Congress apparently expects contingencies to occur, reprogramming provides one of the mechanisms through which funding decisions are made as matters of judgment of DOD professionals and others in the political process. DOD also continues to comply with these "prior approval" reprogramming procedures as a courtesy to the congressional committees and as part of the politically powerful set of informal controls on the discretion to spend appropriated funds.

Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds were reprogrammed first, because these funds make up a large part of the defense budget. Furthermore, if funding was not restored to these funds, there would be an adverse impact on military readiness. This was followed by military personnel costs that have a predictable outlays pattern. The overall strategy was to minimize congressional opposition by financing the Bosnia operations through inflation savings that were known when the operation commenced.

[21] These committee approval arrangements have no binding legal effect, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in *Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

[22] Department of Defense, Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–172, §8010, 105 Stat. 1173 (1991).

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The second phase and next largest piece of the $2.5 billion was found through a virtual gift from the intelligence community—a proposed rescission of $620 million in previously appropriated funds located in an obscure National Reconnaissance Office fund. The NRO funds, substantially in excess of any needs for that agency, were rescinded from the NRO budget and were proposed to be added to DOD as a no-cost supplemental appropriation. Although the supplemental would require bicameral congressional approval, an affirmative appropriation of new funds for Bosnia would not be required.

As the initial reprogramming request was making its way through the four required congressional committees in January and February 1996, the NRO rescission grew from $620 to $820 million and then $858 million, when it was proposed that $200 million be included for civilian peace implementation programs, independent of IFOR. Even though the $820 million was not "new" money, an appropriation was nonetheless required before it could be spent by DOD for IFOR. By early March 1996, political compromises were reached whereby the entire $820 million of NRO funds would be spent on IFOR to assuage members of Congress who balked at spending DOD funds on civilian peace implementation programs, traditionally a State Department responsibility. A supplemental appropriation was prepared, including the $820 million for IFOR along with funding for several domestic programs at levels that Clinton may have vetoed if they were not bound together with the IFOR funds. By the end of March, both houses had approved the supplemental appropriation and the last of four committees had approved the reprogramming request, although not without some reservations. The Senate stipulated that its approval of the supplemental was contingent on not disbursing the funds until the Muslim government in Sarajevo cut its ties with Iran, and House National Security Committee Chair Floyd Spence (R–SC) wrote to Secretary William J. Perry that the practice of using inflation savings as a source of funds for reprogramming "allows the department and services unusually broad discretion to apportion what is in fact an undistributed reduction within each account."[23] Spence also said he remained concerned with the practice of the administration submitting proposals for funding based on savings from revised economic assumptions to fund unbudgeted activities.

By April, it was clear that the costs of IFOR would exceed DOD's first revised estimate of $2.2 billion for fiscal year 1996 and $.5 billion for fiscal year 1997. Another round of revised estimates were summarized by Under Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre in mid-April 1996 in a letter to Congressman C. W. Young, chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations, where he estimated that total costs for the twelve-month Bosnia operation for FY 1996/1997 would be $2.8 billion through December 1996. Some of the revisions were due to intelligence gathering and distribution, and environmental conditions that turned out to be harsher than expected.

[23] "Congress Oks Nearly $1 Billion for Bosnia," *Defense Daily*, 190 (22 March 1996): 440.

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In the same letter to Chairman Young, Comptroller Hamre described an attached reprogramming request, the third of three phases of the DOD plan to finance the Bosnia operation. The 15 April request was for $659.6 million, primarily for Bosnia, although it also included modest amounts for contingency operations in Haiti and Cuba. The April request permitted DOD to incorporate its revised cost estimates for the operation in Bosnia. The phased timing also allowed DOD to take advantage of additional inflation savings as resources to fund the reprogramming. The inflation savings, along with some navy program sources, were used to fund the reprogramming for the balance of the anticipated fiscal 1996 costs for U.S. participation in IFOR, as well as some non-IFOR requirements for Bosnia and other non-Bosnia contingencies. The few navy program items reduced in the reprogramming—three Sea Cobra helicopters, the conversion of a few ships, reduced fleet support and maintenance upgrades, and the like—were lined out to make "funds available to finance higher priority items."

The funding flexibility enjoyed early in a fiscal year shrinks accordingly as the fiscal year enters the third and fourth quarters. As recently as 1995, congressional critics of peacekeeping spending had charged that such spending for unplanned operations was compromising combat-readiness accounts, including training exercises and equipment overhauls planned for the third and fourth quarters of the fiscal year. Although DOD Comptroller Hamre testified to a Senate panel that Clinton would ask Congress to authorize a "line of credit" that the services could use to pay for unbudgeted overseas missions, the administration's proposal was never given serious consideration.[24] As congressional consideration of the supplemental for DOD peacekeeping illustrated, many members of Congress face a dilemma when they vote on a proposal to fund a peacekeeping deployment in Bosnia, for example, when the spending has already occurred with "borrowed" funds from lump-sum or other accounts. The members who oppose the deployment are hard-pressed to vote against the supplemental, because of the obligation to support troops already in the field and the need to replace funds in the combat-readiness accounts to permit the possibly delayed training or equipment overhaul to be completed. Funding options thus change. While lump-sum spending discretion and reprogramming remain theoretically available as options, there are fewer unobligated funds late in the year.

A Deadline Passes

The Dayton accords called for IFOR to enforce the peace and to provide a secure environment for other parts of the peace plan to take place. The United States was the major force provider to IFOR, and Americans held the key mili-

[24] Pat Towell, "Pentagon Seeks Money to Pay for Unscheduled Missions," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 January 1995, 216.

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tary leadership positions that conducted the operation. The principal military tasks for IFOR were to mark and monitor a four-kilometer-wide zone of separation between the three factions, patrol the zone of separation, and oversee the withdrawal of forces and weapons away from the zone and to containment areas. When the deployment was begun, DOD listed among "[m]ajor threats to IFOR"[25]

- Indirect fire against unprotected forces
- Landmines, civil disorder, snipers, noncombat losses
- Extremist elements
- Hostage taking for political goals
- Undisciplined local factions

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili testified that we "must be prepared for casualties."[26] Based on the prior deployment of UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel in Bosnia, DOD estimated that there would be about fifty casualties in a year's deployment. Among the risks encountered by the troops were problems in identifying friends and foes, land mines (which claimed a U.S. casualty in February 1996), snipers, checkpoint control, and area and perimeter surveillance and protection. Military personnel deployed to Bosnia in IFOR were eligible to receive imminent danger pay. While no U.S. military were killed in combat in Bosnia during IFOR, the risk of casualties remained throughout the operation.

As the one year anniversary of the deployment approached, it became increasingly clear that it was not realistic to expect that the U.S. ground troops' presence in Bosnia would end in a year's time. The decision to delay municipal elections in Bosnia, an integral part of the Dayton accords, and the movement toward a sustained peace merely reflects that little progress has been made in transforming the war zone into some form of nation. Most of the political or economic structures necessary to nation-building are not yet in place in Bosnia, and the enmity and initiation of violence continues among the three factions. For example, in November 1996, the bloodiest postwar clash between Serbs and Muslims left at least one dead and ten people wounded, when a group of 600 Muslim villagers attempted to return to their prewar homes, located on what is now Serb land. NATO officials opined that Bosnian army officers forced the Muslims to return to the Serb-held village in an effort to provoke the Serbs. In an effort to punish both sides for their clash, U.S. troops raided a Muslim army brigade and a Serb police station and seized weapons and armored personnel carriers. Thus, in seeking to carry out the terms of the accords, a new conflict could easily reach a flash point in Bosnia.

[25] General John M. Shalikashvili, "Bosnia Costs and Funding Requirements," Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, 104th Congress, 1st sess., 1 December 1995, S. Hrg. 104–286, 22.

[26] Ibid., 33.

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A report by the independent International Crisis Group concluded in November that the civilian provisions of the Dayton accords were in danger of collapse. Their report notes that indicted war criminals remain at large; leaders earlier held responsible for the outbreak of war have been given new mandates to govern after fraudulent elections; and repatriation of refugees has failed. The IFOR troops were not charged with resolving these problems, only promoting the stability thought necessary to make solutions possible. As the problems persist, however, the stability forced by armed forces is itself tenuous.

Although no firm commitments were made prior to the November 1996 election day, it seemed likely that only a continuing, probably long-term international ground force would be able to prevent the rekindling of war. The president had likely known that for a long time, as had his defense secretary, his military commanders, and most members of Congress. By contrast, the stated public policy was different. General Shalikashvili said in April 1996 that he was "absolutely convinced" that all U.S. forces would be out of Bosnia by year's end: "I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a way that we would remain in Bosnia."[27] In May, DOD under secretary for policy, Walter B. Slocombe, said that "there's every reason to believe . . . that all IFOR forces will be out of Bosnia shortly after 20 December."[28] Secretary Perry played an additional semantic game with congressional leaders and the media by calling more recently deployed troops part of an "exit protection force."

In a 15 November 1996 speech, Clinton announced that in place of IFOR, a 8,500 strong Stabilization Force (SFOR) would "in principle" remain in Bosnia until mid-1998. Although Perry admitted that he was wrong one year before in recommending to the president that the objectives of the Dayton accords could be met in one year, he expressed confidence that the mid-1998 withdrawal target could be met. His convoluted explanation of his "error in judgment" in setting the exit deadline was, he said, "right in the sense that all of the specific tasks spelled out we did do in 12 months; it was not right in the sense that those tasks were enough to allow us to safely leave the country."[29]

Less than a month after the reelection of Clinton, the administration officially announced the extension of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia. In a letter to congressional leaders, Clinton wrote: "In order to contribute further to a secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO has approved, and I have authorized U.S. participation in, an IFOR follow-on force to be known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR). SFOR's tasks are to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace, to consolidate IFOR's achievements, to promote a climate in which the civilian-led peace process can go forward. Subject to this primary mission, SFOR will provide selective support, within its capabilities, to

[27] Michael Dobbs, "Bosnia Exit Deadline Crumbles," *Washington Post*, 28 November 1996.

[28] James Kitfield, "Six Months Down, Six More to Go," *The National Journal*, 25 May 1996, 1154.

[29] Elaine Sciolino, "Loosening the Timetable for Bringing G.I.'s Home," *New York Times*, 17 November 1996.

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civilian organizations implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement."[30] The new NATO force includes 8,500 U.S. troops. This force was scheduled to stay until June 1998.

While Secretary of State Warren Christopher hinted in September 1996 that some form of international force would probably have to remain after IFOR completed its mission, many members of Congress were not pleased at both the timing and substance of the president's announcement. Tom Lantos, Democratic Congressman from California, commented: last year's talk about a "clear-cut exit strategy" was "an escape from reality. . . . This may have been the only way for [the administration] to get Congress to acquiesce in deployment."[31] Republican members were publicly less forgiving, and Senator John McCain (R–AZ) said that the credibility gap of administration officials on Bosnia is now "wide as the Grand Canyon."[32] Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R–TX) reacted to the president's postelection announcement of U.S. participation in a new peacekeeping force in Bosnia this way: "I don't think that the president has kept his word on the commitments he made to Congress last year. He said that he would keep the mission to a year. He didn't. He said he would arm and train the Bosnian Muslims. He hasn't. He said he would consult with Congress, and he hasn't." As for the administration's insistence that the original December 1996 "exit strategy" remained intact, because the original force will be withdrawn "on schedule," Senator Hutchinson's reaction was typical: "The President is playing with words."[33] Even some journalists voiced criticism. Writing in the *New York Times*, Thomas Friedman said, "Let's get right to the point: The Clinton Administration has not been candid with the American people about its intentions in Bosnia."[34] Two months later, Clinton's nominee to replace Perry—former Republican senator from Maine, William Cohen—tried to soften his former colleagues' criticisms of the administration's Bosnia policy by repeating the promise during his confirmation hearings that U.S. ground forces would leave in June 1998. In his words, "This is a signal, and a very strong message to our European friends. We are not going to be there [after the new deadline]. It was primarily a European problem to be solved, and it's time for them to assume responsibility."[35] He soon reiterated this position in early March 1997 on a trip to Germany, when he told reporters that the American forces will be out of Bosnia by the target date even if hostilities break out again. He also stated that any new peace force for Bosnia would not include

[30] William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia," 32 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 2535–36 (20 December 1996).

[31] Dobbs, "Bosnia Exit."

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ann Swardson, "Bosnian Presidents, Western Powers Renew Dayton's Promises; U.S. Peacekeepers Seize Weapons from Muslim Army," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1996.

[34] Thomas Friedman, "The Fudge Factor," *New York Times*, 3 November 1996.

[35] Pat Towell, "Cohen, in Confirmation Hearing, Vows Timely Bosnia Pullout," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 25 January 1995, 247.

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U.S. troops, even though some European officials were already planning for that eventuality.

The administration's fiscal 1997 budget contained only the previously identified $542 million in DOD funds for Bosnia, earmarked as part of the originally anticipated costs of a twelve-month operation. Given the timing of the president's announcement of U.S. participation in SFOR, it was not practically possible to request SFOR funds in the regular DOD appropriation. Thus, the administration faced the same situation and followed the same strategy as in fiscal 1996 in budgeting for SFOR—find the funds from within the fiscal 1997 DOD accounts, and do not ask for new money. One difference between the fiscal 1996 and 1997 budgeting strategies, however, was that the planners and cost estimators within DOD had a better chance to come up with a budget closer to actual needs. First, they had the 1996 IFOR actual spending experience to work with. Second, they had more time to prepare the spending plans the second time around. Even though the president did not announce that the U.S. forces would stay beyond December 1996 until November 1996, behind the scenes, the planners were anticipating the expected contingency.

Another difference from fiscal 1996 was that the fiscal 1997 DOD appropriation included the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund for the first time.[36] Any contingency fund would, of course, supply additional obligational authority, to be used when unanticipated circumstances or needs arise. In such instances, the need to obligate funds is determined by the agency officials, consistent with the underlying appropriation act. However, despite its title, this $1.1 billion fund, available for transfer only to operation and maintenance accounts in DOD, was envisioned as a funding source for known contingencies, such as Bosnia. It did not signal any acquiescence on the part of Congress to give DOD a blank check for new Bosnia costs or for other peacekeeping operations.

Less than two months after announcing SFOR, Pentagon Comptroller Hamre testified that Bosnia costs, as of late February 1997, would total $6.5 billion, more than three times the original cost estimates. A $2 billion supplemental appropriation for fiscal 1997 would be required, largely to fund U.S. participation in SFOR. By mid-April 1997 funding sources for the supplemental were identified. About $1 billion was proposed for rescission from specific programs; $246 million from unobligated balances; $307 million from revised inflation estimates; and $308 million related to fluctuation in foreign currency rates.[37]

Meanwhile, DOD once again played its readiness card. Hamre said that if Congress did not act on the fiscal 1997 supplemental before its mid-April recess, the army and the air force would have to cancel selected training exer-

[36] Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Fiscal 1997, Pub. L. No. 104–208, §618 (1996).

[37] "House Defense Appropriators Mark Up Bosnia Supplemental," *Defense Daily*, 18 April 1997, 195.

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cises.[38] At the same time, Marine General John Sheehan, head of the Atlantic Command, told the House National Security Committee in March that the army would start cutting back on tank miles, flight hours, and training.[39]

As DOD was emphasizing the exigencies of the funding situation for SFOR and the need for Congress to enact the supplemental expeditiously, Republican leaders in Congress decided to join the DOD supplemental to a supplemental for disaster relief and then to encumber the larger supplemental with unrelated riders. The supplemental was, in terms of its $6.5 billion and publicity, dominated by funds for disaster relief for flood victims, primarily in North Dakota. In the face of an explicit veto threat by Clinton, Congress added to the disaster relief/peace operation supplemental two politically charged provisions—one prescribing an automatic continuing resolution in the event that the regular appropriations were not enacted by the end of the fiscal year, and the other forbidding the use of statistical sampling techniques in compiling census data for the next biennial census.[40] As expected, Clinton exercised his veto, and Republican leaders were embarrassed by the obvious realization that they lacked the votes to override the veto and that public opinion would not look favorably upon delays in forwarding disaster relief to flood victims as a pawn in political battles with the president.[41] After a few more days of wringing hands and political posturing, a new bill was passed, stripped of the objectionable riders. It was signed by the president on 12 June 1997,[42] almost two months after it was scheduled for passage.

The enacted supplemental provided funds for Bosnia in part through replenishing the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund with $1.4 billion, thus permitting DOD to transfer the infusion of funds into such of the operations accounts as, in the Department's view, should have the new budget authority, or to pay for the costs of drawdown.[43] The balance of funds for Bosnia was earmarked for personnel accounts. In keeping with the pattern of paying for peace operations with existing funds, the president proposed and Congress accepted a cancellation of $2 billion of unidentified appropriations from the fiscal 1997 Appropriations and Military Construction Acts. The secretary of Defense was authorized to determine which programs, projects, and activities should be rescinded to attain the $2 billion amount.[44] The secretary was thus not even required to adhere to his proposed list of rescissions.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Tom Breen, "Sheehan: Atlantic Command Faces Cutbacks Without Supplemental," *Defense Daily*, 7 March 1997, 194.

[40] James Bennet, "As Promised, President Vetoes Bill on Flood Aid," *New York Times*, 10 June 1997.

[41] Jerry Gray, "Flood Relief Bill Passes As G.O.P., in Turmoil, Yields," *New York Times*, 13 June 1997.

[42] Ibid.; Supplemental Fiscal 1997 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105–18,—Stat.—(1997). See also Andrew Taylor, "Clinton Signs 'Clean' Disaster Aid After Flailing GOP Yields to Veto," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 June 1997, 1362.

[43] See H.R. Rep. 105–119, 105th Congress, 1st sess. (1997).

[44] H.R. Rep. 105–83, 105th Congress, 1st sess. (1997).

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LESSONS

The commander in chief has acquired his own spending power, eroding the congressional power of the purse and the check it gives on executive national security initiatives. At a minimum, the Bosnia deployments to IFOR and SFOR show that the ex ante check resulting from the on-going need for military supply and the inevitability of unanticipated military operations have been substantially undercut by the accretion of discretionary spending authority in the commander in chief. The Bosnia operation illustrates that drawdown options—lump sum spending authority, along with special discretion to reprogram, transfer, and spend for contingencies—have given the commander in chief a formidable short-term national security spending cushion without the need for prior specific appropriations. As Bosnia demonstrates, however, the discretionary mechanisms also permit the president to undertake long-term, large-scale operations, which may leave Congress little practical choice but to appropriate specifically for their continuation.

In addition, once an unauthorized operation begins without an explicit appropriation, members may balk at being seen as unwilling to support troops in the field. In the throes of the Bosnia deployment debate, on 30 November 1995, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole said: "It is time for a reality check in Congress. If we would try to cut off funds, we would harm the men and women in the military who have already begun to arrive in Bosnia."[45] Senator Dole's response merely recognizes a dilemma that Congress itself created through its inability to enact an authorization, appropriation, or restriction on the Bosnia operation. Nonetheless, this justification for congressional acquiescence has recurred often, at least since the Vietnam War.[46]

Because the president committed U.S. forces to a potentially hostile environment, risking at least limited involvement in hostilities and ensuing casualties, the deployment was, in our opinion, an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional power over war. Congress itself recognized the legal and policy problem in 1995, when the conference report on the DOD supplemental appropriation stated that military deployments "in support of peacekeeping objectives both merit and require advance approval by Congress."[47] Ironically, when Secretary Perry was asked by Senate Appropriations Committee members whether IFOR was empowered to arm and train Bosnian Muslim forces, Perry demurred: "I do not believe the Defense appropriations bill gives me the authority to use [funds appropriated for DOD] to buy equipment for the Bosnian

[45] Pat Towell, "Congress Reluctantly Acquiesces in Peacekeeping Mission," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 December 1995, 3668.

[46] See *Mitchell v. Laird*, 488 F. 2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows . . . that a Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement and continuation might vote for . . . appropriations . . . because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already fighting.")

[47] H. Rep. No. 104–101, 104th Congress, 1st sess. (1995), 25.

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army. . . . There has to be some enabling legislation for that to happen. . . . If the cost is to be paid by an American taxpayer, there has to be an authorization. . . ."[48] Thus, according to the secretary, more than 20,000 troops may be deployed into a hostile environment at a cost of more than $2 billion with neither an authorization nor appropriation for that purpose, but the deployed forces cannot undertake a politically controversial operation that bears little dollar costs. Too little attention has been paid to this mischaracterization of Congress's role.

In addition, the president's efforts to rely on NATO or the UN as authority for U.S. participation in IFOR are wide of the mark. First, NATO is a defensive treaty, intended to contain the Soviet Union through "collective defense" and resistance to "armed attack." The treaty does not authorize offensive actions generally or peacekeeping in particular. Second, the provisions of the treaty were to be carried out "in accordance with [the parties'] constitutional processes." This language, like a parallel provision in the UN Charter, reminds us that, for operations like Bosnia peacekeeping, the treaty provisions are not self-executing. Thus the treaties grant the president no unilateral power to use the military to enforce the peace in the Balkans.[49]

At the same time, the Bosnia deployment followed a familiar script. Neither the president nor Congress ever articulated a clear or consistent set of policy objectives for Bosnia, certainly not before the Dayton accords. And when the proposal was made by the president to commit U.S. ground troops to enforce the peace, the proposal was not made to Congress. Instead, the president relied on NATO and the UN, and he came to Congress only as a reporter and huckster, selling a done deal. Factions and individuals within Congress tried but failed to get Congress to take a principled up or down vote on Bosnia, either through the authorization or appropriation processes. At the same time, members of Congress and the administration knew that the discretionary spending devices permitted the operation to occur without further action required by Congress. To implement the discretionary spending, the president made political deals to free up the funds, while he sent the secretary of Defense and chairman of the Joints Chiefs to congressional hearings to brief members of Congress on the details on an operation that had already begun. Members of Congress thus remained free either to criticize or applaud the operation and the president; no institutional position or risk was taken by Congress. The presi-

[48] Transcript: DoD News Briefing, Secretary William J. Perry with press, 20 December 1995, http://www.dtic.dla.mil/cgi-bin/wa.

[49] While treaties become part of "the supreme Law of the Land" pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Constitution Article VI, the domestic legal effect of treaties may turn on whether their provisions are consistent with other constitutional limits, such as the Declaration Clause. See Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 92–97, 188–189. In addition, "if implementing legislation is constitutionally required" by a treaty, it is non-self-executing and thus does not permit the President to act alone. *Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States* §111(4) (1987).

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dent continued to call the shots, and if things did not go well, he could choose to blame the Congress for insufficient support.

The case of financing U.S. military involvement in Bosnia highlights the relationship between budget execution and public policy, particularly in the area of national security. More than twenty years have past since Louis Fisher wrote: "Public policy is not so easily apportioned into watertight compartments. Policy-making is a dynamic, ongoing phenomenon, beginning with the inception of an idea and carrying through to its enactment and implementation. . . . If Congress is to play the role of major policy-setter, it must avoid situations where budget execution becomes a controlling factor, locking Congress into commitments and decisions ahead of time."[50] Fisher's study documented the use of budget execution procedures throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is instructive to recall that the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1972-1973 was financed through a transfer of funds that was approved after the fact.[51] A more recent account of the use of budget execution devices to finance national security activities by William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen documents several interventions from the Vietnam War period through Operation Desert Shield.[52] This case study of Bosnia is consistent with these earlier assessments in the overall conclusions about the changing institutional dimensions of financing national security activities in the post-cold war era.

From time to time, Congress has rescinded some of the commander in chief's discretionary spending authority—such as the authority to fund operations from third-party funds outside the appropriations process. But the longevity of the remaining sources suggests that Congress believes that the flexibility this discretion affords in matters of national security is worth the cost in congressional control and the risk of abuse by the executive. Or, as we believe, the continuation of the discretionary spending devices is best explained as facilitating a sort of accountability-avoidance game, played by Congress and the president. For members of Congress who do not wish to play the game and who seek to force votes on authorization and appropriation for operations like Bosnia before-the-fact, these discretionary spending devices are potentially maddening. They permit, as House National Security Chairman Floyd D. Spence (R–SC) put it, "[t]he proverbial train [to leave] the station, [with] our troops . . . already on board."[53] Comments like this highlight the frustration created by the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping activities like Bosnia, the political opposition generated by a commitment of this type, and the fear that it will take valuable resources away from more important missions. At the same time, while the absence of U.S. casualties in the Bosnia operations to date has weakened the political opposition, the perceived need on the part of the administration

[50] Louis Fisher, *Presidential Spending Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 258.

[51] Ibid., 111–12.

[52] William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, *National Security Law and the Power of the Purse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[53] Towell, "Congress Reluctantly Acquiesces," 3668.

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to avoid casualties may have weakened the effectiveness of the operations and protracted the length of the U.S. commitment. When asked if there is anything that can be done to reduce the conflict between the branches when funding for unplanned contingencies like Bosnia arise, John Hamre said when he was the comptroller of the Defense Department: "This is a fault line in the Constitution."[54] In other words, from the Pentagon perspective, contingencies such as Bosnia will likely continue to occur, funded ad hoc and without prior approval from Congress. From the constitutional perspective, the fault line has a different purpose—to insure congressional control over the purse strings. That this fundamental piece of our system of separated powers has failed is due to actions of both of the elected branches.

[54] Interview with the authors, 6 May 1997.

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The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan

ALAN J. KUPERMAN

Like much cold war history, the landmark 1986 decision by the United States to arm the Afghan Mujahedin[1] with Stinger antiaircraft missiles—purportedly the first time American-made weapons were supplied to kill Soviet troops—has been distorted by opposing political forces. On one side, and winning the public-relations battle, are conservatives who claim the weapon had a decisive military impact, hastening Soviet withdrawal and the eventual collapse of communism, thereby vindicating their longstanding hawkish approach to the cold war. Opposed are liberals who argue not only that the Stinger did not drive the Red Army out of Afghanistan, but that it actually prolonged the occupation by denying the Soviets an earlier face-saving withdrawal, thereby vindicating their more dovish approach.

The dispute continues, in part because the complete story of the Stinger decision and its impact on the Soviet withdrawal never has been told. Large chunks have emerged in press clippings, investigative reports, and scholarly excavations of the Soviet archives, but they often have been mixed with misinformation and never assembled into a coherent whole. Because of the withholding of key documents by the governments of the United States and Russia, a total picture may not come to light for many years. However, it recently has become possible to tell this fascinating and cautionary tale of cold war decision-making by piecing together and cross-checking earlier fragmentary reports, reviewing newly declassified documents, and consulting former government officials finally willing to speak on the record.

[1] The many accepted spellings of this term for the Afghan rebels are standardized in this text, including in quotations where alternate spellings appeared in the original, in order to avoid confusion.

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Repeated so often, the Stinger myth has entered political folklore.[2] The year is 1986: Soviet and Afghanistan government forces, utilizing their dominance of the skies, for six years have inflicted terrible punishment on the Afghan Mujahedin rebels and their civilian supporters. Relying on "a combination of scorched earth and migratory genocide,"[3] the Soviets have depopulated large portions of the country, creating an estimated 4.5 million refugees, more than one-quarter of the pre-war population.[4] In desperation, the Mujahedin and their supporters in the United States and Pakistan beg the United States to supply the rebels with an effective antiaircraft weapon to help level the playing field. When the Stinger finally arrives in the fall of 1986, it is a "silver bullet."[5] Soviet and Afghan aircraft begin to fall from the skies as never before. Within two months the Soviet Politburo has set a deadline for withdrawal of its troops, and two years later the last Red Army soldier departs. In quick succession, communism is overthrown in Eastern Europe and, by 1991, the Soviet Union itself has dissolved.

While there is nothing factually incorrect in this chronology, it implies a much greater role for the Stinger than it actually played. It also downplays the Reagan administration's major decision-making failures, which delayed delivery of the missiles for more than a year and led to worldwide Stinger proliferation that continues to haunt American security officials. Most importantly, this widely accepted caricature of history deprives U.S. policy makers of the real lessons of the Stinger experience, essential to avoiding similar mistakes in the future.

A Case Study in Covert-Action Decision Making

By its very nature, covert action is somewhat of a mystery. Decisions are made behind closed doors, memoranda and findings are classified "top secret," and even budget levels are nominally classified, though often leaked to the press. An investigation of the Stinger case, however, reveals that covert-action decision making is not very different from more mundane political matters—replete with rival constituencies, fluid coalitions, legislative lobbying, and as-

[2] George Crile, producer, "Charlie Did It," *60 Minutes*, CBS News, 30 October 1988. See also, Fred Barnes, "Victory in Afghanistan: The Inside Story," *Readers Digest*, December 1988; David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989; Steve Coll, *Washington Post*, 19 July and 20 July 1992; Michael Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992; Tim Weiner, *New York Times*, 24 July 1993; Peter Rodman, *More Precious Than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Marc Levin, series producer, *CIA: America's Secret Warriors*, Blowback Productions, New York, televised on The Discovery Channel, 1997.

[3] Major Joseph J. Collins, U.S. Army, quoted in Charles Mohr, *New York Times*, 13 April 1986.

[4] Richard P. Cronin, "Afghanistan After Five Years: Status of the Conflict, the Afghan Resistance and the U.S. Role," Report No. 85-20 F, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, January 1985, CRS-1.

[5] Congressman Charles Wilson (D-TX), quoted in John Walcott and Tim Carrington, *Wall Street Journal*, 16 February 1988.

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sorted backbiting. In this regard, the case confirms Graham Allison's more complex models of governmental decision making, in which "large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives."[6]

The saga begins in December 1979, with the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. decision less than two weeks later to begin supplying weapons to the anticommunist rebels.[7] President Jimmy Carter, who during his first three years in office had publicly denied that the Soviets harbored expansionist intentions, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, simply had had enough.[8] He signed a finding drafted by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, authorizing the covert supply of weapons through Pakistan to help the rebels "harass" Soviet forces—the greatest goal then believed attainable by the ragtag rebels.[9]

Over the next few years, the Red Army gradually transformed inappropriate European-theater military tactics into a more successful counter-insurgency approach. While the rebels proved remarkably committed, they suffered a terrible physical beating under a strategy that took advantage of "virtually complete Soviet dominance in the air"[10] to provide fire-power, reconnaissance, convoy security, tactical lift, mining, ambushes, and dismounted operations. Mujahedin air defenses generally were ineffective, limited to heavy machine guns and a small quantity of unreliable, Soviet-designed SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), obtained from defecting Afghan army troops or supplied covertly.[11]

As early as 1983, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Ronald Spiers says he recognized the vital contribution the Stinger could make to the rebel cause. Knowing that the recently-developed U.S. missile still was in short supply, Spiers recalls, he sent a classified cable to Lawrence Eagleburger, undersecretary of state for political affairs, urging that "serious consideration" be given to supplying the

[6] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 6.

[7] Charles G. Cogan, "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan Since 1979," *World Policy Journal* 10 (Summer 1993): 76.

[8] Robert Gates recently has argued that President Carter was not so naive about Soviet intentions. However, for the first two and a half years the Carter administration limited its covert action to minor propaganda campaigns within the Soviet Union itself. Until the Soviet invasion, covert aid to Afghanistan was limited to less than a million dollars of nonlethal support over six weeks in 1979. Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 142–149.

[9] Rodman, *More Precious*, 216–217.

[10] Alexander Alexiev, *Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan*, prepared for the U.S. Army (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, May 1988), 33.

[11] Scott R. McMichael, *Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan* (London: Brassey's, 1991), 84, 89. See also, Rasul Bakhsh Rais, *War Without Winners* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), 97.

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rebels via Pakistan with Stingers, "when they're available." He also recalls discussing the proposal with Eagleburger during a trip back to Washington, before leaving his post in November 1983.[12] But it appears no significant action was taken on the proposal.[13]

Widespread Opposition to the Stinger Proposal

The rebels themselves took up the plea for effective air defense weapons as early as August 1983, during a visit by two sympathetic U.S. Congressmen, Clarence Long (D-MD) and Charlie Wilson (D-TX). When the American legislators raised the matter with Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq, however, he instead suggested the alternative of an air cannon like the Swiss-made Oerlikon and rejected any U.S.-made weapons. "If it was American-made the Soviets would trace it to Pakistan and he [Zia] didn't want that," recalled Long.[14] As it turned out, neither did the Reagan administration at the time favor the provision of high-tech U.S. weapons, such as the Stinger, to the Mujahedin. There was virtual unanimity within the administration on this point, although individual agencies often had different reasons for opposition, based on their own parochial concerns.

For the Central Intelligence Agency and especially its cautious Deputy Director John McMahon, directly traceable U.S. involvement raised the danger of public exposure and political scandal that could damage the agency, as had earlier CIA covert operations uncovered by the Pike and Church congressional committees in the 1970s. Despite widespread reports dating back to 1980 that the United States was supplying the rebels tens of millions of dollars in annual aid and coordinating an even larger amount from allies such as Saudi Arabia and China,[15] the agency clung to the tenet of "plausible deniability." As Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) later quipped, the aid program was "bizarrely open for something covert."[16] McMahon insisted that CIA involvement be limited exclusively to the supply of foreign-made weapons to its Pakistani counterpart,

[12] Ronald Spiers, interview with author, 16 August 1995. Spiers says the cable was a personal, no dissemination (NODIS) telegram.

[13] Michael Pillsbury, who subsequently worked on the issue at the Pentagon, says he saw no record of the Stinger proposal in the Reagan administration's covert action files prior to 1984 (interview with author, 8 August 1995). Eagleburger can shed no light on this apparently abortive push for the Stinger, saying through a spokesperson that "he just doesn't remember." (Letter from Libby Powell, executive assistant to Lawrence Eagleburger, 28 August 1995.)

[14] Bob Woodward and Charles R. Babcock, *Washington Post*, 13 January 1985.

[15] See, for example , Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Said to Increase Arms Aid for Afghan Rebels," *New York Times*, 4 May 1983; Russell Watson with David C. Martin, "Is Covert Action Necessary?" *Newsweek*, 8 November 1982; "Sadat Says U.S. Buys Soviet Arms in Egypt for Afghan Rebels," *New York Times*, 23 September 1981; Michael Getler, "U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents; Afghan Rebel Forces Reportedly Getting U.S. Arms Assistance," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1980.

[16] Hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, typescript transcript, 30 April 1986, 53. (Obtained from National Security Archives, Washington, DC.)

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the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which would handle all direct interaction with the rebels. Even though the Mujahedin effort was by far the CIA's largest overseas operation, eventually coming to consume the vast majority of its covert action budget, only a handful of U.S. intelligence officers ever were permitted into the field to observe its implementation.[17]

The agency's other main fear, especially for then-Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates, was the risk of Soviet counter-escalation. In a then-classified 1984 memo, Gates warned that "the Soviets would have to consider more seriously more dramatic action," if the U.S. were to increase aid significantly.[18] In addition, some at the CIA claimed the unsophisticated rebels could not handle a weapon like the Stinger, citing the rebels' past failure to shoot down planes with the Soviet SA-7 missile.[19] Despite retrospective claims that CIA Director Bill Casey had actively pushed for the Stinger starting in the spring of 1983, such assertions are not corroborated by his administration colleagues, and the CIA's institutional stance remained resolutely against providing the missile for several more years.[20]

Pentagon officials too had numerous concerns about supplying the Stinger, but in 1983 they worried most about provoking Soviet retaliation against Pakistan. According to Fred Iklé, undersecretary of defense for policy and the civilian in charge of covert programs at the Pentagon, the danger that "one million Soviet troops" might roll into Pakistan in retaliation was still very real in 1983.[21] Even if the Soviets were to respond only by boosting their cross-border raids into Pakistan, experts warned this could undermine vital Pakistani public sup-

[17] Vince Cannistraro, interview with author, 8 August 1995.

[18] "Nomination of Robert M. Gates," Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, S. Hrg. 102–799, Volume II, 24 September, 1–2 October 1991, 449–450. In his later memoirs, Gates is less than frank about the stance he and the CIA took on the Stinger. He claims credit, for himself and the CIA, both for supporting the Stinger decision and for warning of the possible danger of proliferation of Stingers to terrorists. The reality is that U.S. officials who warned about such proliferation were *opposed* to the Stinger decision, as was Gates for a long time. See Gates, *From the Shadows*, 350, 561.

[19] It reportedly later was discovered that the SA-7's given to the rebels had been sabotaged in Poland, explaining their poor performance. (Cannistraro, interview with author, 8 August 1995.) See also, Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 118. Others say this is insufficient explanation, given the variety of sources from which SA-7's were obtained. (Pillsbury, interview with author).

[20] Apparently, the original source of many erroneous reports about Casey is a single reference in Joseph Persico, *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Viking, 1990), 312. Persico writes that in 1983 Casey learned "the Afghan rebels wanted American SA-7 Stingers [sic]." Here, Persico confuses the Soviet SA-7 with the American Stinger. Persico then writes: "Yes, Zia told Casey, he would allow these Stingers to be delivered through Pakistan—after he received the first one hundred for himself." Here, Persico apparently conflates a 1983 meeting with one in 1985. Unfortunately, such uncorroborated claims have found their way into otherwise excellent secondary accounts, including James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 60; and Levin, *CIA: America's Secret Warrriors.*

[21] Fred Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995.

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port for the Mujahedin.[22] An additional concern was prompted by simulated war games, which indicated the Soviets might retaliate symmetrically by supplying antiaircraft missiles to Central American rebels then confronting the U.S.-supported government in El Salvador.[23]

At the State Department, meanwhile, senior diplomats feared that the spectacle of "Made-in-America" weapons being used to kill Soviet soldiers could upset superpower relations in other, higher-priority areas, such as arms control.[24] Even the Near East desk, which had a more exclusively regional focus, was opposed to such military escalation on grounds it could undercut the nascent negotiating track for peace in Afghanistan.

The Reagan administration also gave great weight to Zia's views, because Pakistan was the linchpin of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Although Zia too wanted to help the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, he was under constant Soviet pressure—diplomatically and, near the Afghan border, militarily—to cease funneling aid to the rebels. To retain Zia's allegiance and cooperation, U.S. officials became extremely deferential to his preferences (including overlooking his burgeoning nuclear weapons programs for years after it should have triggered sanctions under U.S. nonproliferation law). Even as late as 1986, when most of the administration had come around to supporting the Stinger proposal, mere reports of Zia's opposition were sufficient to block it.

General Mohammed Yousaf, director of Afghan operations for ISI, learned of Zia's opposition the hard way, according to his memoirs, *The Bear Trap*. In early 1984, soon after being transferred to ISI from the Pakistani army, Yousaf entertained a visiting delegation of private American advocates of the Mujahedin cause. Groups such as the Federation for American-Afghan Action, Free the Eagle, Committee for a Free Afghanistan, and the Freedom Research Foundation played a key role in boosting U.S. aid for the rebels by calling media attention to their struggle and advising conservative members of Congress. When the visiting Americans asked Yousaf which weapon he would recommend to counter Soviet air superiority, he replied frankly, "the Stinger." The Americans, having previously heard CIA reports that Pakistan opposed this weapon, proceeded to the U.S. embassy and accused the CIA station chief of blocking the Pakistani request. He replied that, to the contrary, it was Zia who opposed the Stinger, and the station chief in turn lodged a protest with Yousaf's boss, ISI Chief Akhtar Abdul Rahman. An embarrassed Akhtar invited the delegation back to explain that Yousaf had misspoken: Pakistan did not favor the Stinger.[25]

[22] Barnett R. Rubin, Yale University, testimony before Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 1 May 1986.

[23] Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989.

[24] See, for example, George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 692.

[25] Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap* (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 180–181.

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Zia often illustrated his opposition to the supply of U.S.-made weapons by utilizing a favorite analogy. The key in Afghanistan, he told CIA Director Bill Casey in late 1982 and a visiting congressional official in early 1984, was to "keep the pot boiling."[26] In other words, the Mujahedin should be armed only enough to continue harassing the Soviets. Too much escalation would cause the "pot to boil over," provoking a Soviet retaliation against Pakistan, he cautioned another U.S. delegation the following year.[27] Indeed, the Soviets explicitly had warned Pakistan against permitting introduction of the Stinger.[28] Zia also reportedly feared that a Stinger could fall into his enemies' hands and be used to shoot down his presidential plane, an ironic footnote in light of his ultimate demise in a suspicious plane crash in 1987.[29]

Although Zia maintained the pot-boiling analogy until at least 1986,[30] it appears he reversed his specific opposition to the Stinger as early as November 1984. That month, he requested U.S. supply of the missile from a visiting congressional delegation led by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.[31] Strangely, CIA officials in Washington continued to characterize Zia as opposed to the Stinger for an additional sixteen months, with significant ramifications for U.S. policy.

A Stinger Advocate Joins the Administration

In 1984, the only American officials calling for supply of high-tech U.S. weapons to the Mujahedin were in Congress or private advocacy organizations, while the administration remained strongly opposed to any escalation that would affect the "deniable" nature of U.S. assistance. Indeed, when Congress took up a resolution by Senator Paul Tsongas (D-MA) in October 1984, calling for "material assistance" to be supplied to the Afghan rebels, the State Department and CIA lobbied vigorously in opposition, watering it down to a more ambiguous call to "support effectively" the rebels.[32] As the *Washington Post* reported in January 1985, "congressional supporters wanted initially to supply

[26] John B. Ritch III, "Hidden War: The Struggle for Afghanistan," A Staff Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1984, 36. See also Gates, *From the Shadows*, 252.

[27] Pillsbury, interview with author, 15 August 1995.

[28] Riaz M. Khan, *Untying the Afghan Knot* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1991), 175. Khan was a Pakistani official involved for many years in negotiations on Afghanistan.

[29] Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 181. There is, however, no indication Zia's plane was shot down by a Stinger.

[30] "If anybody's thinking that the greater the heat of the insurgency, the easier the solution, he is wrong." Rubin, testimony of 1 May 1986, 83–84, citing *Washington Post*, 23 March 1986.

[31] "Zia first asked for Stingers for the Mujahedin during a visit by Senator Nunn," according to then-U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Deane R. Hinton (letter to author, 18 January 1996). The date of the visit was November 1984, and the congressional delegation also included Senators John Glenn (D-OH), Bennett Johnston (D-LA), and David Pryor (D-AR). Senator Sam Nunn, personal communication conveyed by his staff, 20 May 1997.

[32] Cronin, "Afghanistan After Five Years"; also Robert Pear, *New York Times*, 18 April 1988.

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U.S.-made Redeye or Stinger ground-to-air, heat-seeking missiles, but the CIA blocked that because those missiles could be traced too easily to the United States."[33]

The monolithic administration stance was broken in September 1984, when conservative senators succeeded in having one of their staffers, Michael Pillsbury, assigned to the Pentagon, where he soon began working on covert programs under Iklé.[34] One of the key policy issues in Congress at the time was the adequacy of U.S. support for anticommunist "freedom fighters" around the world. By October 1984, Pillsbury had drafted a memo for Iklé to send to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, requesting authorization to explore the provision of high-tech U.S. weapons to the four anticommunist insurgencies then supported by the administration.[35]

Pillsbury was not an immediate convert to the Stinger and initially shared the widespread concern about provoking Soviet retaliation against Pakistan. He first explored four less provocative air-defense options, but eventually found each inadequate.[36] The Soviet SA-7 already had proved largely ineffective in the conflict, especially after Soviet and Afghan aircraft were equipped with flares to distract such heat-seeking missiles. The Blowpipe, a British-designed SAM available in many countries, could maintain plausible deniability but was not a "fire-and-forget" weapon, so that rebels would be vulnerable to attack as they stood in the open to guide the missile onto its target with a joystick. The Swiss-made Oerlikon antiaircraft cannon, a pet project of Congressman Wilson who had added $40 million onto the CIA covert budget specifically for the weapon,[37] was too bulky to satisfy mobility requirements. The Redeye, an obsolete U.S. missile that had served as the model for the Soviet SA-7, was sufficiently dispersed around the globe to provide deniability, but generally was ineffective against helicopters and vulnerable to the same counter-measures as the SA-7. Pillsbury gravitated to the Stinger by default.

By early 1985, the administration was compelled to reassess its approach to the Mujahedin for a variety of reasons. First and most importantly, Soviet forces had sharply escalated attacks against the rebels and their weapons pipeline on the Pakistan border, putting at risk the continued viability of the opposition according to a Pentagon intelligence study.[38] Second, the U.S. Congress was stirring up public pressure for increased aid to the rebels. The final version

[33] Woodward and Babcock, *Washington Post.*

[34] Lee Roderick, *Leading The Charge: Orrin Hatch and Twenty Years of America* (Carson City, NV: Gold Leaf Press, 1994), 219.

[35] Iklé, interview with author, 3 January 1996. Pillsbury had been working for the Senate Republican Steering Committee. According to press reports, the other three U.S.-supported insurgencies were in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia.

[36] Pillsbury, interview with author, 16 August 1995.

[37] Bob Woodward, *VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 316–318.

[38] Leslie Gelb, *New York Times*, 19 June 1986.

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of the Tsongas resolution of October 1984 stated that, "it would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom."[39] Soon after, in January 1985, a Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan was established and began holding hearings to showcase the purportedly desperate plight of the Mujahedin.

A third trigger for the administration's reassessment was that in March 1985, the Soviet Union selected a new secretary general, Mikhail Gorbachev, whose commitment to the Afghanistan occupation was unknown. Fourth and perhaps most important, some U.S. officials perceived the Soviets were "tired of the war," so the Red Army was unlikely to increase its commitment of troops sufficiently to invade Pakistan.[40] Indeed, while the Soviets had escalated tactically several times, they stubbornly stuck to a troop cap of 120,000 men. In March 1985, Soviet military expert Alex Alexiev testified, "I don't believe that the Soviet Union can put in half a million men. . . . [A]ctual physical occupation of the country is almost unthinkable." Barring that, he said, "escalation is not really a meaningful concept. Short of open genocide, it cannot get much worse."[41] Nevertheless, there still were dissenting views within the administration, including one official who warned in January 1985: "Consider what they haven't done to Pakistan. . . . You have to believe the Soviets could, if they chose, march in with sufficient troops to do the job."[42]

The formal policy shift occurred in March 1985, when Ronald Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166, still classified secret, authorizing assistance to the rebels "by all means available."[43] Even more significant was an annex, classified top secret and signed by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, which outlined specific measures the United States would take to assist the rebels.[44] American aid no longer would be limited to enabling the rebels to "harass" the Soviets, but would aim to compel a Soviet withdrawal. The Mujahedin would receive satellite reconnaissance and other U.S. intelligence to assist their targeting of Afghan and Red Army installations, as well as demolition expertise and secure communications technology.[45] Secretary of State George Shultz later reported that both he and the CIA's Casey

[39] Pear, *New York Times*, 18 April 1988. Notably, while Congress repeatedly emphasized the immorality of inadequately arming the rebels, this argument does not appear to have figured prominently in the administration's internal deliberations, which hinged on strategic concerns. See also, Woodward and Babcock, *Washington Post*, 13 January 1985.

[40] Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995. The CIA's Cogan concurs, saying it became "clear that our concerns about a Soviet intervention in Pakistan were also exaggerated." (Cogan, "Partners in Time," 80.)

[41] Alex Alexiev, Rand Corporation, testimony before Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. U.S. Senate, typescript transcript, 11 March 1985, 93, 112–113.

[42] Woodward and Babcock, *Washington Post.*

[43] Gelb, 19 June 1986.

[44] Coll, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

[45] Coll, *Washington Post*, 20 July 1992. See also, Coll, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

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fully supported the measure.[46] The dollar value of U.S. aid climbed in successive years from $122 million in fiscal year 1984, to $250 million, $470 million, and $630 million in FY 1987,[47] generally matched by equal contributions from Saudi Arabia.[48] The Stinger missile, however, as well as other high-tech weaponry directly traceable to the United States, were conspicuously absent from the annex.

By all accounts, Pillsbury was unsatisfied by this intermediate escalation of aid, continuing to believe that top-quality U.S. weapons should be sent to the Mujahedin. He says this belief was reinforced in meetings with rebel leaders brought to the United States by private American advocacy groups. Pakistan's ISI had ordered the rebels not to meet with CIA officials, but the Pentagon was immune from the ban. In meetings with leaders including General Rahim Wardak and the brother of Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, Pillsbury says he got the distinct impression the rebels' needs were not being accurately transmitted to Washington via Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies. The initiative for high-tech weapons, he concluded, would have to come from outside the U.S. intelligence community.[49]

A Trip to Pakistan

Pillsbury soon managed to convince his boss, Fred Iklé, of the merits of the Stinger, and in May 1985 the two set off for Pakistan. There, ISI Chief Akhtar informed them the rebels did indeed require Stingers to counter the Soviet escalation. Pillsbury, having been told previously by the CIA that the Pakistanis opposed the Stinger, insisted the agency's station chief report Akhtar's request directly to Casey in a cable.[50] In light of Akhtar's behavior in the previous year's meeting with U.S. advocates, hewing to Zia's then-policy of opposing Stingers, this change is further evidence Zia had come to favor the Stinger by this point.

Around this time, Iklé made his first pitch for the Stinger to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The secretary responded by asking his assistant, Colin Powell, to check with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CIA's Casey. When the word came back negative, however, Iklé told Pillsbury they had no support in the administration.[51]

[46] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1087.

[47] Olivier Roy, *The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War*, Adelphi Papers 259 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), 35. See also, David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 8 February 1987.

[48] Kathy Evans, *The Guardian*, 2 January 1992.

[49] Pillsbury, interview with author, 16 August 1995.

[50] Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 195.

[51] Iklé says that Casey, with whom he regularly spoke and often joined for breakfast with Weinberger, favored the Stinger option "in principle," but felt compelled to defer to the CIA's career staff, who were opposed. Iklé, interview with author, 3 January 1996. Also Pillsbury, interviews with author, 8 August and 1 September 1995.

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Pillsbury, rather than being deterred, apparently redoubled his efforts. Such behavior may have sprung from his experience as a staff person in Congress, where proposals commonly fail several times before being adopted, or may simply have reflected Pillsbury's peculiar character. Even on Capitol Hill he had earned a special reputation for going outside official channels in pursuit of his objectives.[52] Pillsbury acknowledges this operating style ruffled a number of feathers in the executive branch, where decision making, especially on national security matters, is expected to be hierarchical rather than entrepreneurial. Several of his administration colleagues, however, are more blunt, criticizing Pillsbury as a "loose cannon."[53] For better or worse, his persistence appears to have helped keep the Stinger issue alive when it had little institutional support within the executive branch.

When Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) called to ask his former staffer where he might profitably spend the congressional recess of June 1985, Pillsbury seized the opportunity and suggested Pakistan. Discovering that all military aircraft routinely used for official trips already were reserved, Pillsbury also managed to obtain use of the vice-president's Air Force 2, to permit the trip to go forward. Pillsbury and Hatch, along with a bipartisan congressional delegation that included Senators Chic Hecht (R-NV), David Boren (D-OK), and Bill Bradley (D-NJ) traveled to Pakistan, where they met with both President Zia and rebel leaders.[54]

Hatch asked Zia about air-defense needs, but the Pakistani president refused immediately to take the bait. Rather than seeking Stingers directly for the rebels, Zia requested them only for his own army to defend the border area from Soviet aircraft incursions. Zia also hinted he might be able to divert some Stingers to the rebels if they were supplied to his army under an official foreign military sale, but the U.S. delegation explained to his staff that this would violate American law.[55] Apparently, Zia had backed away from his earlier request to Nunn to provide Stingers explicitly for the Mujahedin, but he still appeared to favor the rebels receiving the missiles. Hatch persuaded Zia to put the army request in writing to President Reagan, and the following month the White House announced it was rushing 100 Stingers to Pakistan, accompanied by Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The rebels, however, were left out.[56]

Iklé and Pillsbury finally gained an ally within the administration in September 1985, when Morton Abramowitz, the State Department's assistant sec-

[52] Roderick, *Leading The Charge*, 218–219.

[53] Then U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Deane Hinton criticizes Pillsbury for promoting the Stinger option during his trips to Pakistan despite the "official line" of U.S. opposition, terming him a "loose cannon." He adds, "That was OK for Congressmen and staffers, but once Pillsbury joined the executive branch his behavior was quite objectionable." Letter to author from Ambassador Deane Hinton, 29 August 1995. Weinberger cited in Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 197.

[54] Roderick, *Leading The Charge*, 257–258.

[55] Pillsbury, interview with author, 15 August 1995.

[56] Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times*, 12 July 1985.

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retary for intelligence and research, joined a delegation to Pakistan led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage. Abramowitz says he already had a vague sense the war was not going well for the rebels and wanted to see for himself. The Mujahedin's specific need for enhanced air defense was driven home, he says, in meetings with Akhtar, assorted rebel leaders, and General Mirza Aslam Beg, a Pakistani army commander for the border region. "All professed to want the Stinger," recalls Abramowitz. Even the CIA's station chief told him he could not understand why agency headquarters opposed it.[57]

Upon his return to Washington, Abramowitz went to see Casey to get the director's views on the Stinger. Casey was lukewarm, almost disinterested, says Abramowitz. "He wasn't for it, or strongly against it."[58] Others at the agency, however, clearly were opposed to the Stinger. According to Selig Harrison, Deputy Director John McMahon strenuously pushed the alternative of the British Blowpipe on grounds it would maintain plausible deniability and be just as effective.[59]

JCS Objections

In the fall of 1985, Iklé made his second attempt to win Weinberger's support for the Stinger, managing to put the issue on the agenda of the secretary's weekly "tank meeting" with the JCS. Iklé later reported that a "vigorous quarrel" broke out in the meeting, but JCS opposition prevailed.[60]

The military's objections to the Stinger proposal never before have been documented publicly. However, a recently obtained, declassified 1986 Defense Investigative Service report summarizes an interview with General John Moellering, who attended the tank meeting as assistant to the chairman of the JCS. The report reveals Moellering "was initially opposed to the possible release of the [Stinger] weapons to Third World countries for reasons of technology loss, accountability problems and depletion of a finite and small, strategic stockpile."[61]

[57] Abramowitz, interview with author, 30 August 1995. Abramowitz notes that he took the station chief's comment with a grain of salt.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 196. McMahon ultimately resigned the same month President Reagan approved the Stinger for the rebels in Afghanistan and Angola. Some claim the Stinger decision was a prime motivating factor for McMahon, who had been the object of an intense letter-writing campaign to the White House by American advocacy groups on behalf of the Stinger, calling for his resignation. David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler, *Washington Post*, 5 March 1986.

[60] Pillsbury, interview with author, 1 September 1995. The Army chief of staff at the time, General John Wickham, confirms that Iklé attended the tank meeting to discuss the Stinger. Wickham, interview with author, 8 September 1995.

[61] Special Agents Larry J. Dobrosky and Samuel Blevins, "Report of Investigation, Unauthorized Disclosure—Stinger Missiles," Defense Investigative Service, 14 April 1986, based on interview of General John H. Moellering, 3 April 1986.

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Pillsbury immediately set to work to address each of these three concerns. Technology loss—the risk that the Soviets would obtain a Stinger and use reverse-engineering to copy it and develop effective counter-measures—initially appeared a legitimate concern. Weinberger especially was sensitive to it and years later acknowledged that "I thought there was a great risk in using that technology. . . . In general I felt we should not let our technology out."[62] The JCS viewed its main responsibility as preparing to fight and win a war against the Soviet Union in Europe and did not want to risk undermining its technological edge merely to help rebels in a peripheral struggle. Pillsbury, however, was able to neutralize this argument by uncovering that the Stinger technology already had been compromised to the Soviets a year earlier, through the leak of design information and parts in Greece.[63] Vince Cannistraro, a CIA official delegated to the National Security Council (NSC), suggests this leak stemmed from a 1983 memorandum of understanding between Greece, West Germany, Turkey, and the United States, to produce U.S.-designed weapons in Europe.[64] The Soviets even published a detailed analysis of the Stinger's performance envelope as early as November 1985.[65]

The second JCS concern, the danger of depleting the strategic stockpile, arose despite the army possessing several thousand Stingers, on grounds that all of these missiles were needed for potential hostilities in Europe.[66] The missile's manufacturer, General Dynamics, was reportedly unable to produce a new batch of first-generation Stingers for the rebels, because it was gearing up to produce a more advanced model known as Stinger-POST for the Pentagon. Pillsbury, however, called General Dynamics directly, receiving assurances the manufacturer could boost production to meet both the army's need for the new model and the rebels' need for the original, without net reduction in the army stockpile.[67]

The Joint Chiefs' third ground for objection, accountability, was well-founded, because under the CIA's arrangement with ISI, after weapons arrived

[62] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 197.

[63] Howard B. Means, *Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman* (New York: Donald I. Fine, Inc., 1992), 210. See also, David C. Morrison, "Fatal Sting," *National Journal*, 21 November 1987; and Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989. Fred Iklé notes with irony that this Soviet espionage backfired. Had the Soviets not already obtained the Stinger design, the United States would have been less willing to supply the weapon to the Afghan rebels. Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995.

[64] *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 17 October 1988, 35. Cannistraro, interview with author, 8 August 1995.

[65] Yossef Bodansky, "SAMs in Afghanistan: Assessing the Impact," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 July 1987, 153.

[66] Iklé recalls that the JCS's "stockpile concern was huge," but that he felt the Joint Chiefs were being short-sighted by insisting on preserving Stingers to fight a future NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. In Iklé's view, supplying the Stingers to the Mujahedin could help force the Soviets out of Afghanistan and thereby "reduce the likelihood of World War III" and any need to use Stingers in Europe. Iklé, interview with author, 3 January 1996.

[67] Pillsbury, interview with author.

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in Pakistan they effectively left U.S. control. The CIA could establish rules for distribution, but lacked agents on the ground to ensure that Pakistanis and rebels complied. Moreover, ISI was known to give the best weapons to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—the most radical rebel leader and certainly not the Americans' first choice. Hekmatyar was not the most effective military leader, but ISI reportedly favored him because he supported the Muslim insurgency in Kashmir and, therefore, furthered Pakistan's own regional agenda.[68] Thus, if the United States sent Stingers, there was a real danger they would be stolen from—or sold by—the Mujahedin, ending up in the hands of terrorists or radical states such as neighboring Iran that could use them to shoot down civilian airliners or U.S. military aircraft.[69] Indeed, the rebels earlier had admitted to the CIA's McMahon that, "We do sell some of your weapons. We are doing it for the day when your country decides to abandon us, just as you abandoned Vietnam and everyone else you deal with."[70] To address this concern, Pillsbury began to explore with the CIA whether U.S. military officials could be sent to Pakistan to exercise more control over weapons distribution.

The military brass was not the only roadblock. At the State Department, though Mort Abramowitz had managed to enlist the support of Michael Armacost, Eagleburger's successor as undersecretary of State, there still was vigorous opposition from the regional officers, especially Arnold Raphel, senior deputy assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asian Affairs. Raphel felt a military escalation risked undermining the negotiating track in Geneva, then just beginning to make progress. Pillsbury, in turn, opposed Raphel's negotiations, fearing they would lead to a sell-out of the rebels. After considerable sniping, the two staffers agreed to a horse-trade: Pillsbury would stop undercutting the negotiating track in return for Raphel ceasing to oppose the Stingers.[71] While this deal did not hold, it momentarily smoothed the path for both efforts.

In December 1985, Secretary of State Shultz finally endorsed the Stinger proposal, explaining in his memoirs:

> The Afghan people were war weary, and Soviet policy was "buying them off." The Soviets seemed to be winning. . . . There would be a narrow window in the next year or two in which pressure on the Soviets might be effective. . . . [T]he resistance did not have the weapons to deal with [Soviet helicopters] and the helicopters were wreaking havoc. . . . In the State Department some people worried that any American weapons system that could turn the tide would so antagonize the Soviets that it would sour our overall effort to improve relations. I strongly disagreed.[72]

[68] See, for example, Roy, *The Lessons*, 35–40.

[69] Persico, *Casey*, 313, citing a mid-1980s fact-finding trip McMahon took to rebel training camps in Peshawar, Pakistan.

[70] Ibid., 313.

[71] The deal is discussed in Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 197. Pillsbury confirms it in interview with author, 15 August 1995.

[72] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 692.

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The Turning Point

Despite Shultz's support, the proposal continued to face opposition from Weinberger—based on the JCS concerns—and the CIA, continuing to cite Zia's purported opposition.[73] Pillsbury was equipped to challenge the JCS concerns, but not yet the claims about Zia, so he turned again to Capitol Hill. During the congressional recess of January 1986, Pillsbury and Abramowitz escorted a delegation of Senators Hatch and Hecht, and Congressmen Michael DeWine (R-OH), Robert Lagomarsino (R-CA), and James Courter (R-NJ) to Pakistan. Also aboard were Vince Cannistraro, Charles Dunbar (the State Department's Coordinator for Afghan Affairs), and Norm Gardner (from the CIA's operations directorate).[74]

When the delegation met with Zia, the Pakistani president made an unequivocal request that Stingers be supplied to the rebels. "Zia couldn't have been more clear that this was the one weapon the Mujahedin needed or they would be butchered," says Courter.[75] Much to the CIA's embarrassment, Zia also complained that he had been asking for the Stingers "since last year,"[76] which accords with Senator Nunn's account of his 1984 visit. Apparently, the CIA had been conveying Zia's views inaccurately to Washington officials, though it is uncertain whether this lapse arose in the field or at agency headquarters.[77]

To make sure there was no further miscommunication, upon returning home Senator Hatch called Casey personally to brief him on the meeting. Pillsbury then worked out logistical details with the CIA—such as who would train the Mujahedin, in which country, and subject to which kind of polygraphs—winning approval for the plan from the agency's Deputy Director for Opera-

[73] Walcott and Carrington, *Wall Street Journal*, 16 February 1988.

[74] Roderick, *Leading The Charge*, 259–260. Before meeting Zia in Peshawar, the delegation first travelled to Beijing, where it obtained an endorsement of the Stinger plan (and other expanded U.S. assistance) from an official of the Chinese government, a key ally in the Mujahedin aid program. Obtaining China's imprimatur, it was thought, might help resolve lingering concerns among Pakistani and U.S. decision-makers.

[75] Walcott and Carrington, *Wall Street Journal*, 16 February 1988.

[76] Cannistraro, interview with author, 8 August 1995. Cannistraro also recalls Zia saying they needed the Stingers because the Soviet-bloc SA-7's were useless.

[77] It is also possible that Zia wavered in his stance on the Stinger in response to fluctuating estimates of what was needed to "keep the pot boiling" at the right temperature. However, Cannistraro says the agency simply was opposed and "kept devising one excuse after another." (Interview with author, 8 August 1995.) Gates, *From the Shadows*, 349–350, reports that in a December 1985 meeting with Casey, Weinberger and Iklé, McMahon pledged the agency would transfer the weapons to the rebels if only the Pentagon would supply them. However, Angelo Codevilla, who spent the early-1980s on the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee, says that, "The CIA's protestations of willingness to provide anti-air protection [were] insincere," because they were always accompanied by claims that Zia still opposed it. "By early 1986 it was clear to those inside the government who had been working on the Afghan issue that John McMahon and the CIA bureaucracy had lied." Angelo Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 271–272.

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tions Clair George in late January.[78] By the end of the month, Pillsbury had prepared a memo for Weinberger reporting how each of the JCS concerns had been addressed and that the CIA had dropped its opposition. The secretary finally relented, setting the stage for a dramatic White House meeting.

In the Reagan administration, covert programs usually were managed by the interagency Planning Coordination Group (PCG), which met regularly in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building, chaired by the NSC's Don Fortier. Regular participants included George from the CIA, Iklé from the Pentagon, Abramowitz from State, and Moellering from the JCS, or their deputies, along with other individuals cleared for individual projects. But the meeting to hash out finally the Stinger proposal was special, attended by several more senior officials and held in the White House situation room. In this highly charged setting, a CIA representative declared that Zia and the agency still were opposed to the Stinger. Apparently, the Near East bureau of the agency, which long had opposed the Stinger proposal, had not been briefed on either the Zia meeting or George's decision. Abramowitz reacted with outrage, and the meeting broke down without consensus.[79]

The CIA soon cleared up its error, and on 25 February 1986, the PCG formally approved the Stinger for the Mujahedin, as well as for anticommunist rebels in Angola.[80] Senate Republicans, however, still were concerned that Secretary of State George Shultz might not support sending the Stingers to the anticommunist rebels if asked by the president. Despite the Pillsbury-Raphel nonaggression pact, the State Department's Near East desk had been lobbying hard to block the plan. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) responded by inviting the secretary to his Capitol Hill office, whereupon Shultz was surprised by a roomful of conservative senators demanding he renew his support for "effective" weapons for the rebels. The secretary complied.[81]

Finally, in March 1986, President Reagan authorized notification to Congress of his decision to provide Stingers to the Afghan rebels, necessitating a "memorandum of notification" modifying Jimmy Carter's six-year-old finding. With the Made-in-America threshold now crossed, the United States also began to supply an array of other sophisticated weapons for the rebels, including mine clearers, satellite-targetable mortars, "mule-mobile" rocket launchers, helicopter detectors, and even rudimentary cruise missiles.[82]

Remarkably, the bureaucratic battle still was not over. At the end of April, the administration lost its leading advocate for the Stinger, when Pillsbury was

[78] Pillsbury, interviews with author, 11 August 1995 and 1 September 1995.

[79] Former government official, name withheld upon request.

[80] David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler, *Washington Post*, 30 March 1986.

[81] Ibid. See also Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 197; Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 6 March 1986, which discusses the meeting from the Angola perspective. Also, interview with Pillsbury, 11 September 1995.

[82] Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989. See also Ottaway and Tyler, *Washington Post*, 30 March 1986.

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fired from the Pentagon for allegedly leaking the Stinger decision to the press, a charge from which he subsequently was exonerated.[83] Congressional opponents objected to the deal on grounds of inadequate accountability in Afghanistan, with Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ) warning: "We cannot afford to let these particular missiles, the ultimate terrorist weapon, slip into the wrong hands."[84] Army Chief of Staff John A. Wickham, who had been overruled by Weinberger, nominally toed the new administration line but told the press, "we anguish over decisions" about who should get the weapon. On 7 May DeConcini sponsored a last-minute amendment to bar export of Stingers unless the recipient could guarantee stringent controls, conditions that could not be met in the guerrilla environment of Afghanistan. The vote fell short, 62 to 34.[85]

In June, however, administration officials confirmed the Stingers still had not been sent to Afghanistan.[86] CIA and Army officials, long opposed to exporting the Stinger, now claimed to have identified a new Soviet countermeasure that could inhibit the missile's effectiveness, requiring a new evaluation. Field testing at White Sands Missile Range, however, determined the new Soviet defenses were ineffective.[87] Pakistani instructors were flown to the United States in June for training, and by the end of the summer the first Stingers and a training simulator finally were sent to Pakistan. On 25 September 1986, Mujahedin fighters fired their first five Stinger missiles, knocking three Soviet MI-24 Hind helicopters out of the sky on their first try. The military dynamic had shifted.[88]

Gorbachev Pursues Withdrawal Independently

Unbeknownst in Washington during this long wrangling over how to remove Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Mikhail Gorbachev apparently was seeking the same objective from his seat in the Kremlin. Evidence now indicates that Gorbachev sought withdrawal from the moment he was named general secretary in March 1985 and that the Politburo agreed to pursue this goal well before the Stinger missile reached Afghanistan. Even before coming to power in 1983, he had termed the war a "mistake" in a conversation with a Canadian cabinet official.[89] Likewise, in spring 1984, Gorbachev encouraged Marshal Sergei Akh-

[83] Michael Pillsbury, "Drowning in a Leak," *Washington Post*, Outlook, 10 November 1991.

[84] Dennis DeConcini, *New York Times*, op-ed, 30 April 1986.

[85] David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 21 June 1986. Wickham says that he cannot recall any personal communication with DeConcini on the Stinger issue. Wickham, interview with author, 8 September 1995.

[86] Leslie H. Gelb, *New York Times*, 18 June 1986.

[87] Walcott and Carrington, *Wall Street Journal*, 16 February 1988. Interestingly, the Stingers for Angola were not similarly held up, indicating either that the Soviet counter-measures were not believed to be in use in Angola or that the CIA did not have the same misgivings about the Angolan rebels as they did the Mujahedin.

[88] Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 176, 182.

[89] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 187.

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romeev, a leading Soviet general in Afghanistan, to share with the Politboro his frank military judgment that the war could not be won.[90] Gorbachev himself says that upon coming to power, the Politburo almost immediately "began to seek a way out of the situation."[91] UN negotiator Diego Cordovez confirms that the new Soviet leader had a marked impact on then-stalled peace negotiations between Pakistan and the Afghan government. "From the time Gorbachev came in things began to change. . . . It was immediate and very significant."[92]

By all authoritative accounts, the main force driving Gorbachev to resolve the Afghan conflict in 1985 was not the direct costs of the war—in terms of rubles, casualties, or public opinion. In this regard, Afghanistan was not a Soviet "Vietnam," as some have argued.[93] The Soviets' deployment cap of 120,000 troops and their 14,000 total deaths were approximately one-fourth of the U.S. totals in Vietnam, drawn from armed forces about twice as large and spread over an approximately equal duration.[94] Moreover, Soviet censorship prevented the growth of Vietnam-like domestic public opposition until Gorbachev deliberately lifted the press ban.

Gorbachev's chief concern, rather, was that the Afghan intervention represented a persistent obstacle to achievement of his main political objective—*perestroika*, or domestic economic restructuring. He believed that so long as the Red Army remained in Afghanistan, the West would not renew the economic and technological cooperation of the detente years, which he viewed as essential to revitalizing the Soviet economy. Nor could he commence his desired shift in resources from military expenditures (of which Afghanistan per se was only a small part) to civilian spending until East-West tensions were relaxed. Primarily for these reasons, Gorbachev concluded that Soviet troops had to be withdrawn quickly, one way or another.[95] By so doing, he also stood to

[90] Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 726.

[91] Ibid., 725–726.

[92] Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States & the Soviet Union, 1983-1990* (New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1992).

[93] While many have made this analogy, at least one scholar goes even farther, arguing that the Soviet experience in Afghanistan was analogous to Napoleon's in Russia, and Britain's in the Suez Crisis, in the sense that a military defeat led to the collapse of an empire. See Douglas Anthony Borer, *Superpowers Defeated: A Comparison of Vietnam and Afghanistan* (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1993, 397, forthcoming as book: Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999).

[94] Mark Urban, *War in Afghanistan* (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990), 2nd ed., 298.

[95] See, for example, Sarah Elizabeth Mendelson, *Explaining Change in Foreign Policy: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1993), 200–203; Mike Bowker, *Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth, 1997), 141–142; Tad Daley, *Gorbachev and Afghanistan, The Soviet Debate Over the Lessons of Afghanistan and Consequent Directions in Russian Foreign Policy* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rand Graduate School of Policy Studies, March 1995), 88–90, 104, 234–236. According to several Soviet sources cited by Mendelson, *Explaining Change*, 246, this belief of Gorbachev's was further reinforced by his experience at the Reykjavik summit of October 1986. Gorbachev, himself, declared in February 1987: "I frankly say that our international policy is, more than before, determined by domestic policy, by our interests in concentrating on constructive work to improve our country." Mendelson, *Explaining Change*, 249. See

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reap secondary benefits, including soothing relations with China and the Arab world, boosting the morale of the Red Army, and setting a potential precedent for resolution of other East-West conflicts in the Third World.[96]

Initially, however, Gorbachev's Politburo embraced neither an immediate withdrawal nor the ultimate goal of a "neutral" Afghanistan. To the contrary, Gorbachev at first presided over a continuing qualitative escalation of the military intervention in Afghanistan. While some have characterized this as a last-ditch Soviet effort to "win" the war,[97] that is an exaggeration. At no time did the Soviets increase quantitatively their troop levels necessary to defeat the rebels outright by cutting off their supply lines and occupying large parts of the countryside. Rather, the Politburo strategy in 1985-1986 apparently was to ratchet up military pressure on the rebels sufficient to compel their acceptance of a negotiated settlement that would leave a Soviet-friendly regime in Kabul following Red Army withdrawal.[98]

It is uncertain whether this initially aggressive policy was Gorbachev's own personal preference or resulted from compromise with Politburo hard-liners. Some commentators cite the 1985 escalation as evidence Gorbachev himself initially was not committed to peaceful withdrawal. General Mikhail Zaitsev, the highly-regarded commander of Red Army troops in East Germany, was brought in, and attacks were escalated, especially in areas of the Pakistan border that served as a sanctuary and arms pipeline for the Mujahedin.[99] The Soviets also deployed one-third of their elite *Spetznaz* troops, additional KGB personnel, and "Omsk vans" for secure battlefield communications.[100] Reportedly, Red Army leaders assured the Politburo these moves would enable victory within two years.[101]

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also Eduard Shevardnadze, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 81; Michael MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), 267; Ted Hopf, *Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-90* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 96, 110–114, which concludes that Gorbachev's overall foreign-policy moderation was motivated "by the costs to detente that previous Soviet policy in the periphery had incurred." See also, Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 301; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 331, acknowledges that Gorbachev viewed access to new technology as the key to solving Soviet economic problems.

[96] See, for example, Daley, *Gorbachev and Afghanistan*; and Bowker, *Russian Foreign Policy.*

[97] Borer, *Superpowers Defeated*, 341; Coll, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

[98] Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire to Nation-State* (New York: Longman, 1997), 246–247. Mark Galeotti, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 153. Odd Arne Westad, "Concerning the Situation in 'A': New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (Winter 1996/1997), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 132, (hereafter referred to as CWIHPB).

[99] Schweizer, *Victory*, 212; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 188. Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 175. The largest Soviet offensive began in May 1985. In July 1985, Zaitsev was brought in.

[100] Coll, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

[101] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 187.

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Morton Abramowitz, however, puts this escalation in perspective, arguing that the plans were not Gorbachev's. "When Gorbachev came in, the plans for escalation were already made. . . . It was like Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs." Confirmation comes from Alexander Yakovlev, Gorbachev's foreign policy adviser: "The military-industrial complex pressed him to try this, try that . . . . but it's not true, as some have said, that he himself wanted to try for a military decision."[102] A slightly more nuanced explanation is offered by Viktor Kremeniuk, who argues Gorbachev initially did not push any personal strategy for how to get Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. Rather, Gorbachev the politician walked a fine line between liberals and hard-liners, and "decided to give the military a chance to prove themselves."[103]

A compelling analysis by Sarah Mendelson concludes that such compromise was characteristic of Gorbachev's first two years in office, during which time he laid the groundwork for more fundamental reform through personnel changes in the Communist party and empowerment of nontraditional expert institutions. The personnel overhaul was massive, but could not be achieved overnight. For example, not until Gorbachev's first anniversary, at the 27th Party Congress of March 1986, could changes be made in the Central Committee. At that event, however, some 40 percent of the Central Committee was newly elected—four times the turnover rate of the previous two congresses. Similarly, Politburo membership was altered dramatically by Gorbachev, with eight new members added and five removed in his first year.[104] Still, Gorbachev faced persistent pressure from his right wing and from the Russian and Afghan militaries, which at first opposed the withdrawal decision and later attempted to sabotage its implementation.[105]

In the face of such pressure, Gorbachev pursued a remarkably steady effort to extract Soviet troops from Afghanistan—albeit while initially trying to ensure a "friendly" regime remained. In June 1985, he restarted regional security talks with the United States after a three year hiatus and jump-started the UN negotiations by authorizing Afghan approval of a key provision under which the superpowers would guarantee an eventual settlement.[106] The following

[102] Ibid., 187–188. Yakovlev also has said that, "Right from the start the view of [Gorbachev] was that a peaceful withdrawal should be effected." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS) SOV-91-251, 31 December 1991, 3, transcript of "Political Investigation—Behind the Scenes of War," Moscow Central Television First Program Network, 27 December 1991.

[103] Mendelson, *Explaining Change*, 224.

[104] Ibid, 22, 70, 220, 226–227.

[105] On Soviet and Afghan attempts to sabotage implementation of the withdrawal, see FBIS-SOV-91-251, 31 December 1991, 3, where Yakovlev notes, "the implementation was sabotaged. . . . The evacuation was hampered. The road was blocked, cut in two places. Then they found that a bridge had been blown up somewhere. Then it was said that the air force could not get through to Kabul. There was some kind of conference going on there. . . . It became apparent that they were deliberately holding things up, spinning things out in order to put off the moment when it would be possible to say: That's it, we're getting out."

[106] Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 726; and Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 189.

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month, he instructed Soviet newspaper and television reporters to begin reporting the war openly, including the controversial issue of Soviet casualties.[107] Previously, the Soviet public routinely had been told that "soldiers in Afghanistan were planting trees and building schools and hospitals."[108] In retrospect, this media directive can be seen as an attempt by Gorbachev to outflank Politburo hard-liners, by appealing directly to the sensibilities of the Soviet people.

In October 1985, the Politburo approved Gorbachev's strategy of employing "a combination of military and political measures" to "expedite the withdrawal" of Red Army troops while leaving a "friendly Afghanistan" behind. Essentially, this was a three-track strategy: escalate the war to drive the Afghan opposition to seek compromise; accelerate Afghan government reforms to coopt moderate elements of the opposition; and intensify negotiations to harness the results of the first two tracks.[109] One tactic the Soviet leader used to persuade his Politburo colleagues was to read aloud letters from angry mothers questioning how it could be the Soviet Union's "internationalist duty" to destroy villages and kill civilians[110]—letters no doubt triggered by his earlier lifting of media restrictions.

The following month at the Geneva summit, Gorbachev tried to convey this important shift in policy to Ronald Reagan, but the president "did not pick up at all on Gorbachev's lightly veiled hint about pulling out of Afghanistan," according to Shultz.[111] Reagan, however, later claimed he did understand Gorbachev's message even at the time, that "it was a war he had no responsibility—and little enthusiasm—for."[112] By December 1985, Gorbachev's skepticism about the Afghan effort had leaked into official publications, with *Pravda* acknowledging that "far from all the people in Afghanistan, even amongst the workers, have accepted the Saur Revolution."[113] Gorbachev's Foreign Ministry,

[107] Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992. Interestingly, while the ban on reporting individual casualties was reportedly lifted at this early date, and Soviet TV broadcast a report on the anxiety of soldiers' families on 20 October 1986 (see Khan, *Untying*, 178), high-profile press exposes from Afghanistan (notably Artem Borovik's articles in *Ogonek*) did not start to appear until spring 1987, and aggregate casualty figures were not published until two years later (*Pravda*, 17 August 1989), suggesting either that Gorbachev continued to have to compromise with Politburo hard-liners or that Gorbachev himself did not want to undercut too drastically public support for continued prosecution of the war. For discussion of Gorbachev's use of the press to build support for withdrawal, see Mendelson, *Explaining Change*, 238, 253–255. Apparently, the idea of applying *glasnost* to coverage of the war was originated by Politburo liberals and quickly embraced by Gorbachev. See comments of Yakovlev, FBIS-SOV-91-251, 4.

[108] Vladislav Tamarov, *Afghanistan: Soviet Vietnam* (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1992), 1. Tamarov, a 1984 Red Army draftee, writes that "Only a few knew that more and more cemeteries were being filled with the graves of eighteen- to twenty-year-old boys."

[109] CWIHPB, 180. Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992.

[110] Rodman, *More Precious*, 327.

[111] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 601.

[112] Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 639.

[113] Gordon Adam, "Afghanistan—The Superpower Trap" in *Detente in Asia?* (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), 33, quoting *Pravda*, 23 December 1985.

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under Edouard Shevardnadze, later confirmed that the "political decision of principle on this matter [was] adopted as far back as December 1985."[114]

In February 1986, Gorbachev went public, telling the 27th Party Congress that Afghanistan was a "bleeding wound" and "we should like, in the nearest future, to withdraw the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan. . . . "[115] American conservatives, still skeptical, downplayed the importance of this comment by pointing out that Gorbachev continued to blame the war on "counterrevolution and imperialism" rather than Soviet aggression.[116] Foreign Minister Shevardnadze later acknowledged this admittedly mixed message was the product of a compromise with hard-liners, who nearly succeeded in removing the troop-withdrawal reference entirely.[117]

In the spring of 1986, Gorbachev removed yet another barrier to Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan's ruler Babrak Karmal. Because Karmal had been unable or unwilling to broaden his political base within Afghanistan, the Kremlin believed an immediate Red Army withdrawal would lead to his quick demise and replacement by a regime unfriendly to the Soviets. Karmal also refused to cooperate with Soviet efforts to set a withdrawal timetable, telling Gorbachev, "If you leave now, you'll have to send in a million soldiers next time."[118] But Gorbachev would not permit the Afghan ruler to block his plans, telling the Politburo in October 1985 that Soviet withdrawal must take place "with or without Karmal." On 4 May 1986, Karmal bitterly accepted his forced resignation and was replaced by his chief of intelligence, Mohammed Najibullah, who savvily had aligned himself with the new Soviet policy of withdrawal.[119] In July, Gorbachev ordered a token troop withdrawal to demonstrate the seriousness of his intentions. Although a public relations disaster in the West, because there was little actual reduction in Soviet combat strength,[120] Pakistani officials among others took it as a sincere indication of Gorbachev's intent to leave Afghanistan entirely.[121]

The watershed change in the Politburo's official policy came in November 1986. While Gorbachev had been laying the groundwork for withdrawal for

[114] USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Foreign Policy and Dipomatic Activity of the USSR," *International Affairs* (January 1990): 12. See also, Shevardnadze, *The Future*, 68. Shevardnadze was announced as Andrei Gromyko's replacement on 3 July 1985.

[115] Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "The Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Party Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 25 February 1986" in *Toward a Better World* (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1987).

[116] Rodman, *More Precious*, 327.

[117] Shevardnadze, *The Future*, 47. See also, Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 202.

[118] Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 239.

[119] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 202–205. These authors also cite an additional point of contention between Gorbachev and Karmal: the Afghan leader demanded as a condition of his cooperation that the indirect UN negotiations (in which his government and Pakistan communicated exclusively via the UN mediator due to Pakistan's refusal to recognize the Afghan regime) be converted to direct negotiations.

[120] Rodman, *More Precious*, 329.

[121] Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 223–224.

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more than a year, he always had conditioned that goal on arranging to leave behind a "friendly" regime in Kabul. At the Politburo meeting of 13 November 1986, however, this changed dramatically in two ways.[122] First, the ultimate Soviet objective was changed from a "friendly" to a "neutral" Afghanistan—an outcome the Mujahedin and United States would be much more inclined to accept in a negotiated settlement. Second, the Politburo imposed on itself a deadline for withdrawal—in Gorbachev's words, "one year - at maximum two years"—to be enforced apparently even if the first condition were not met.

As Andrei Gromyko stated at the meeting: "Our strategic goal is to make Afghanistan neutral. . . . But most important—to stop the war. I would agree that it is necessary to limit this to a period of one–two years." Edouard Shevardnadze concurred that Gorbachev had "said it correctly—two years." The Politburo also embraced two further steps to lay the groundwork for a Red Army withdrawal: establishing a separate Afghan-run military command to assume control after the pull-out, and inviting Najibullah to visit Moscow the following month to impress upon him the need to broaden his domestic political base in anticipation of the withdrawal.[123]

General Akhromeev, by this time deputy defense minister, conceded at the Politburo meeting that despite the Soviets' qualitative military escalation, their deployment still lacked sufficient troops either to establish authority on rural territory or to shut down all border supply routes. Soviet-backed forces could continue to win individual military confrontations but, he said, "we have lost the battle for the Afghan people." The Red Army could "maintain the situation on the level that it exists now. But under such conditions the war will continue for a long time." Only KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov still parroted the hardline position that "not everything was done that could have been done"—but he received no support from the others.[124] Soon after the meeting, Gorbachev went public with at least part of the new policy, telling Indian reporters in late-November 1986 that the Soviet Union now favored a nonaligned, neutral Afghanistan,[125] but Western observers failed to recognize the significance at the time.

Because this momentous decision came just two months after introduction of the Stinger, many previously have argued that the missile's impact triggered the Soviet decision—based on the simplistic logic of *post hoc ergo propter hoc.* Viewed in context, however, the Politburo's establishment of a withdrawal deadline was merely one step in a steady progression of Soviet policy, set in motion more than a year earlier and facilitated by Gorbachev's growing power base in the Kremlin.

Thereafter, Gorbachev adhered resolutely to the Politburo deadline despite substantial hurdles, including a prolonged dispute over the conditions un-

[122] CWIHPB, 179–180, contains a full transcript of the meeting.

[123] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 208.

[124] CWIHPB, 179–180; also Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992.

[125] MccGwire, *Perestroika*, 275.

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der which U.S. and Soviet aid to the contending Afghan sides would terminate.[126] In December 1986, he informed Najibullah that Soviet troops would withdraw within one and a half to two years. In July of the next year, during the Afghan leader's visit to Moscow, Najibullah was told he had only twelve months. Also in July 1987, Soviet diplomats were authorized to pass word of the decision to their foreign counterparts,[127] with Shevardnadze personally telling U.S. Secretary of State Shultz in September 1987.[128] In February 1988, the Kremlin publicly announced its plans to withdraw, and on 15 February 1989, the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan, only three months behind the deadline set by the Politburo two years earlier.[129]

The Stinger's Impact

A number of important questions about the Stinger's use in Afghanistan have never been addressed satisfactorily. Most fundamentally, what was the Stinger's military impact? Second, what was its political impact, if any, on the Soviet decision to withdraw and on the end of the cold war, and did it match U.S. expectations? Third, was the Stinger supply program, once approved, handled responsibly by the CIA? Finally, from a longer-term perspective, what was the net impact of the Stinger decision on global security in light of the hundreds of missiles apparently still unaccounted for?

U.S. Intentions

Before assessing the Stinger's impact, it is necessary to explore precisely what the Reagan administration hoped to achieve by this watershed escalation. Former officials concur on the basic rationale—the Stinger would increase the Soviets' costs in Afghanistan, convince them it was unwinnable, and compel a decision to withdraw. In the words of Peter Rodman, deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs at the NSC, the United States intended to show the Soviets that Afghanistan was "indigestible."[130]

However, Reagan officials differ on several important points. One is the extent to which the Stinger decision was a reaction to Gorbachev's ascension to power. According to former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé, a scholar of war termination and author of the seminal work *Every War Must End*, the decision was not spurred by the presence of a new Soviet leader but rather was part of an older U.S. strategy to escalate the war gradually.[131] Indeed, as early

[126] On the contentious debate over "symmetry," see Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 260–266, chapter entitled "The United States Moves the Goalposts."

[127] Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 240–244.

[128] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1086.

[129] Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992.

[130] Peter Rodman, interview with author, 15 August 1995.

[131] Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995.

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as 1983, President Reagan had signed NSDD 75, stating: "The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues."[132] In 1985, NSDD 166 boosted aid for the rebels with the explicit goal of helping them compel a Soviet withdrawal. Thus, the Stinger decision of 1986 can be seen as but one step—albeit a major one—in a steady escalation of U.S. pressure against the Soviet occupation. For Iklé, Gorbachev was "just the beneficiary" of this gradually escalating policy.[133]

According to Mort Abramowitz, however, Gorbachev was the key. The administration's assessment of the new general secretary as a moderate, not personally committed to the war, led it to conclude that escalating the war would compel withdrawal rather than counter-escalation. "If it had been another Stalin, you might have thought about it differently," he explains.[134]

Another bone of contention is whether the Stinger escalation was informed by secret intelligence from high-placed sources in the Kremlin or public reports on Red Army tactics and the deteriorating condition of the Soviet Union. The *Washington Post* reported in 1992 that: "An intelligence coup in 1984 and 1985 triggered the Reagan administration's decision to escalate the covert program in Afghanistan. The United States received highly specific, sensitive information about Kremlin politics and new Soviet war plans in Afghanistan. . . . The Reagan administration moved in response to this intelligence to open up its high-technology arsenal to aid the Afghan rebels."[135]

Similarly, Peter Schweizer's book *Victory* reports that, "In January 1985, the administration received detailed knowledge of Soviet plans to dramatically escalate the war in Afghanistan." According to an account Schweizer attributes to Robert McFarlane, President Reagan responded by telling his national security team: "Do whatever you have to to help the Mujahedin not only survive but win."[136]

Pillsbury likewise was impressed by the "super information about KGB and General Staff decision-making" available to the administration, at least until the CIA's Aldrich Ames began exposing U.S. agents at the end of 1985. Based

[132] Christopher Simpson, *National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations: The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 258.

[133] Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995.

[134] Abramowitz, interview with author, 30 August 1995. This concept that political leaders responsible for entry into a war will be less willing to concede in the face of opposing escalation than will incoming leaders with less of a personal political stake in the war is explored formally in George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Princeton University and UC-Davis, "Intervention, Escalation, and Gambling for Resurrection," unpublished manuscript, 15 April 1992. For a more general discussion of the relationship between domestic politics and surrender in war, see Fred Charles Iklé, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), rev. ed., chap. 4, "The Struggle Within: Patriots Against 'Traitors.'"

[135] Coll, *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

[136] Schweizer, *Victory*, 212–213.

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on the reams of unconfirmed intelligence reports that crossed his desk, as well as CIA studies, Pillsbury says he perceived a serious schism in the Kremlin. General Zaitsev, together with the General Staff and KGB, were escalating the war aggressively and distorting their reports to the Kremlin on the war's status and prospects. "I believed the information was going through several filters before reaching Gorbachev and Shevardnadze," says Pillsbury. It was this filtering, he argues, that made it necessary for U.S. officials to find a way to convey directly to Gorbachev that the United States would not permit a Red Army victory. Shooting down Soviet aircraft with American-made missiles, he says, was the perfect solution.[137]

Many other administration officials, however, discount the influence of secret intelligence. Iklé says his support for the Stinger was prompted by the well-publicized 1985 Soviet escalation and by his assessment—based on public reports on the unhealthy state of the Soviet military and economy—that the Red Army would not respond by invading Pakistan.[138] Abramowitz says that while the United States knew "there was a controversy" in the Kremlin about what to do in Afghanistan, he recalls the information coming from open sources rather than raw intelligence. "The highly sensitive intelligence came later," he says.[139] Rodman reports the administration found out only subsequently about the General Staff's secret plan to win the war within two years and that "we just saw they were going for broke." Rather than secret intelligence reports, he says, the Stinger escalation was based more on "objective factors" and "changes in Gorbachev's rhetoric."[140]

The Initial Military Impact

Without question, the Stinger had an immediate military impact. Although initial estimates may have been somewhat overblown—claiming the Stinger downed approximately one aircraft per day during the first three months of its deployment—the missile clearly represented an enormous qualitative improvement in the rebels' air-defense capability. As ISI's Yousaf details in his memoirs, previous antiaircraft technology provided to the rebels paled in comparison. The Oerlikon, for example, required "some twenty mules to transport a section of three guns . . . [making] the weapon more of a liability than an asset." It was especially ill-suited to Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, since "the long, heavy, cumbersome barrel had to be positioned across the animal, making it impossible to go through defiles, where it snagged on every bush." Likewise, the Blowpipe, which arrived in 1986, "was a disaster." During one engagement, thirteen of the missiles were fired at exposed enemy aircraft without a single

[137] Pillsbury, interviews with author, 11 August and 15 August 1995.

[138] Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995.

[139] Abramowitz, interview with author, 30 August 1995. It should be noted that Abramowitz did not assume his intelligence position at the State Department until spring 1985.

[140] Rodman, interview with author, 15 August 1995.

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hit—"a duck shoot in which the ducks won." The weapon was not man-portable "over any distance," says Yousaf, who cannot "recall a single confirmed kill by a Blowpipe" before he left ISI in 1987.[141]

The Stinger was different. While the kill rate and number of targets destroyed are still disputed, the missile unquestionably shot down Soviet and especially Afghan aircraft at an unprecedented rate in its first few months of use.[142] Selig Harrison has attempted to rebut this conclusion relying on Soviet statistics,[143] but even if the reported statistics are accurate, his argument is flawed by several lapses. First, in attempting to prove the Stinger did not trigger an increase in downed aircraft, he counts 1986 as a pre-Stinger year because the missile was used only in its final four months. However, 1986 was the year of the missiles' greatest effectiveness, as opposing pilots had yet to adopt countermeasures. Second, he fails to grasp the significance of his own findings that while the Soviets themselves experienced no significant increase in aircraft losses, there was a sharp jump in the loss of Afghan government aircraft. Rather than indicating any Soviet imperviousness to the Stinger, as he implies, such evidence is consistent with reports the Soviets responded to the missile by abstaining from dangerous missions, shifting them to Afghan pilots. From the Mujahedin perspective, the nationality of pilots was of little consequence so long as enemy aircraft finally were being shot down.

Third, Harrison appears to conflate aircraft losses with aircraft shootdowns, a key distinction underscored in an earlier analysis by Scott McMichael. As McMichael states: "During the first two years of the war, the great majority of Soviet aircraft losses (75-80 percent) must be attributed to non-combat causes, plus losses suffered on the ground due to raids, rocket attacks, and sabotage. . . . There can be no doubt at all that the Stinger turned the ratio on its head."[144] The Stinger's effectiveness was due mainly to six technological advantages: it required little training; it was truly man-portable, weighing just 35 pounds; it was a "fire-and-forget" weapon; it was faster and had greater range than earlier SAMs; it could attack fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from any angle, unlike the relatively primitive SA-7 and Redeye, which could focus only on a jet engine's exhaust from the rear; and once locked on target, it could not be deflected by flares.[145]

[141] Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 87–88, 171.

[142] Declassified U.S. intelligence cables (dates withheld but identified as approximately March 1987) reveal the initially enormous perceived impact of the missiles. "The Stinger missile has changed the course of the war because Soviet helicopter gunships and bombers no longer are able to operate as they once did," says one cable. "More tactical and air support changes occurred in the last quarter of 1986 and the first quarter of 1987 than in the previous seven years of the conflict," according to another. (Cables obtained from National Security Archives, Washington, DC.)

[143] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 199.

[144] McMichael, *Stumbling Bear*, 92.

[145] Ibid., 90, although he appears to attribute one feature to the Stinger, an ultra-violet lock-on, that is found only on the more advanced Stinger-POST, a model not provided to the Mujahedin, at least initially. See also, Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 175.

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Yousaf presents a detailed accounting of the Stinger's first ten months in service until his departure from ISI in August 1987. During this time, he claims, 187 Stingers were fired, of which 75 percent hit their target, for a total of approximately 140 downed aircraft. Such detailed statistics must be based on Mujahedin self-reporting, the reliability of which is unknown. Nevertheless, these figures are more reliable than those in an oft-cited September 1987 U.S. analysis, which estimated "the destruction of about 270 aircraft per year." That study's author, Aaron Karp, acknowledged his projections were pure conjecture based on arbitrary assumptions the Mujahedin would fire all their missiles and achieve a low kill rate of 33 percent.[146] While these two assumptions may have seemed reasonable at the time, evidence suggests both were mistaken. Unfortunately, Karp's study has contributed to popular confusion about the Stinger's performance, as his estimates have been widely reported without indication of their lack of empirical basis.

A more rigorous U.S. Army analysis was conducted in early 1989 by a team sent to "go sit with the Mujahedin" in Pakistan for several weeks. It concludes that by war's end the rebels had scored "approximately 269 kills in about 340 engagements" with the Stinger, for a remarkable 79 percent kill ratio.[147] Selig Harrison rejects such figures, quoting a Russian general who claims the United States "greatly exaggerated" Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses during the war. However, the findings of the U.S. study are not necessarily out of line with the Soviets' own statistics that he cites. From 1986 through 1988, the years that include all Stinger launches, Harrison reports that Soviet and Afghan forces lost a total of 310 aircraft. If one discounts for the number of aircraft shot down in 1986 prior to introduction of the Stinger in September, those lost to attrition, and those shot down with other weapons, it is not implausible that somewhere in the range of 269 were shot down with Stingers.

As for the kill ratio, it is impossible to confirm. A U.S. Army analyst involved in the study claims that "several levels of verification" were used to ensure that rebel descriptions of the engagements were consistent with each other, with the limited amount of available physical evidence, and with known characteristics of the missile system. Among factors reportedly responsible for the rebels' high success rate is that distribution of the weapons was limited to their best educated, most effective warriors, who were trained to hold fire unless a kill was extremely likely.[148] Yousaf also cites the rebels' daring tactics, which included positioning Stinger teams at the ends of Soviet runways. Another tactic was for one team of rebels to stand vulnerably in the open, acting as bait to draw enemy aircraft into range, while a second hidden team waited

[146] Aaron Karp, "Blowpipes and Stingers in Afghanistan: One Year Later," *Armed Forces Journal International* (September 1987): 36–40.

[147] Maj. William McManaway, "Stinger in Afghanistan," *Air Defense Artillery* (January-February 1990), 3–8; Maj. William McManaway, "The Dragon is Dead!" *Air Defense Artillery* (July-August 1989); Tony Capaccio, *Defense Week*, 12 June 1989; David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 5 July 1989.

[148] Former U.S. Army analyst, interview with author, 18 November 1998.

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to fire the missiles. By contrast, the Pakistan Army utilized more conservative tactics, necessitated in part by having to stay on its own side of the border, which led to miserable results. Yousaf reports that, to his knowledge, the army "fired twenty-eight Stingers at enemy aircraft without a single kill."[149]

War correspondent Mark Urban, however, claims the Mujahedin Stinger kill ratios reported by the U.S. Army were grossly inflated, venturing his own alternative estimate of only 10 percent.[150] While Urban's skeptical views have been widely cited, it is rarely noted that the primary basis for his conclusions appears to have been the anecdotes of TV journalists, who reported great difficulty in videotaping successful missile hits.[151] In retrospect, there are several plausible reasons why journalists might have observed a lower kill ratio than occurred overall, including: taping Stinger firings on the safer, Pakistani side of the border, where the Pakistani Army reportedly had much lower kill ratios than the Mujahedin; viewing launches of missiles other than Stingers, without knowing the difference; observing Stinger firings during the war's last year or two, after Soviet adoption of counter-measures that significantly reduced the Stingers' effectiveness; and for logistical reasons, being unable to tape Mujahedin employing their most daring and dangerous—and, therefore, most successful—tactics. In sum, a host of selection effects may have distorted the sample of missile firings that TV journalists were able to view, making it unrepresentative of the total universe. In this light, it is possible that the reports of both Urban and the U.S. Army are essentially accurate—the Mujahedin achieved a high Stinger kill ratio overall, but TV journalists witnessed a low kill ratio in the firings they observed.

Soviet Counter-Measures

In response to the Stinger's immediate success, the Red Army initially restricted its pilots to less dangerous missions, shunting the rest onto Afghan flyers. The Afghans, however, soon lost their nerve as well. According to Yousaf, they would pretend to go out on missions, fire off their ammunition, return to

[149] See Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 183–184, although their statistics for the Pakistan Army's success rate should be approached cautiously in light of the memoir's generally negative tone toward that army.

[150] Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 296. Urban also argues that other weapons and tactics were more important to the Mujahedin's cause than the Stinger, including plastic-cased mines (238, 303), high-tech radios (303), and the rocketing of air fields (223). In addition, he gives evidence that the Soviets still were able to use helicopters effectively after the Stinger's introduction, for example, in the re-supply of Khost in late-1987 (303). Finally, Urban even claims that changes in Soviet air tactics in late-1986 were a response not mainly to the Stinger, as generally argued, but to Gorbachev's pre-Stinger decision to scale-down the Soviets' offensive ground posture, which reduced the need for air support (297).

[151] Ibid., 270–271, and fn. 18, 277, which cites "interviews with various journalists . . . between them they witnessed more than 20 launches with only one possible kill."

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base, and falsely report success.[152] A former Afghan pilot confirms that he and his fellow "pilots went on strike and refused to fly in areas where Stinger missiles were present."[153]

Fairly quickly, however, Soviet forces adopted a series of technical and tactical countermeasures that mitigated the impact of the Stinger. In the technical area, Soviet aircraft were retrofitted with improved flares, infrared beacons, and baffles on their exhausts to impede the Stingers' ability to lock on target. Aircraft also were equipped with a missile radar warning system to notify pilots of the need for evasive action.[154]

Tactically, the Soviets had numerous responses. Fixed-wing aircraft flew at higher altitudes outside the Stinger's three-mile range, which averted the missile threat but reduced the pilots' effectiveness, earning them the derisive sobriquet "cosmonauts" from Soviet ground troops.[155] Helicopter pilots pursued the opposite strategy, adopting low-altitude, nap-of-the-earth techniques to hide from the Stingers, which function best when hot aircraft are silhouetted against a cool, blue sky. At the lower altitude, however, helicopters became more vulnerable to small-weapons fire. Interestingly, the same tactical countermeasures had been reported as early as the first year of the war and several times thereafter in response to earlier-model SAMs.[156] However, the Stinger's introduction apparently triggered a dramatic renewal and expansion of their use.

The Soviets also reportedly shifted many air operations to cover of darkness, as the rebels initially were not equipped with night-vision equipment.[157] They increasingly relied on human intelligence to discover the location of Stingers, then either destroyed the missiles, purchased them, or avoided the locations entirely.[158] Some daredevil Soviet pilots utilized a tactic that was a mirror-image of the rebels' own: flying in tandem within the Stinger's range but separated by a large distance, the first of two Soviet aircraft would make itself vulnerable in order to flush a Mujahedin Stinger team from its perch, after which the second aircraft would appear and fire on the exposed rebels.[159] For

[152] Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 179.

[153] David Isby, "Soviet Surface-to-Air Missile Countermeasures: Lessons from Afghanistan," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1 January 1989.

[154] Ibid., McMichael, *Stumbling Bear*, 89; see also, Bodansky, "SAMs in Afghanistan."

[155] Capaccio, *Defense Week*, quoting Representative Charlie Wilson.

[156] David C. Isby, "Soviet Tactics in the War in Afghanistan," *Jane's Defence Review*, vol. 4, no. 7 (1983), 683–685. See also, Ritch, "Hidden War"; Craig Karp, "Afghanistan: Six Years of Soviet Occupation," U.S. Department of State, Special Report No. 135, December 1985, 1. Prior to the initial introduction of these techniques, the rebels are reported to have downed sixty helicopters with SAMs in 1980, according to Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 350.

[157] Gates, *From the Shadows*, 350, says that about five months after the Stinger's original introduction into Afghanistan, the CIA introduced a new sighting system that also worked at night, which forced Soviet and Afghan pilots to fly at higher altitudes both day and night.

[158] Isby, "Soviet Surface-to-Air."

[159] John Gunston, "Stingers Used by Afghan Rebels Stymie Soviet Air Force Tactics," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 4 April 1988, 47.

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important air support missions that could not be conducted safely in the presence of Stingers, such as facilitating insertion of special operations forces, the Soviets sometimes substituted long-range suppressive artillery fire, which was effective but required more ground forces and sacrificed the element of surprise.[160]

Despite the army's claim that the "Stinger was the war's decisive weapon"[161]—echoed by many others including *60 Minutes*, which declared, "The Stinger is generally credited with having won the war for the Mujahedin"[162]—the net effect of Soviet counter-measures eventually was to offset the Stinger.[163] David Isby, an expert military analyst of the Afghan conflict, concluded in 1990 that, "although none of the Soviets' countermeasures were totally successful, the Stinger . . . did not succeed in forcing Soviet helicopters out of the sky."[164] A leading French expert on Afghanistan, Olivier Roy, confirms from his experience among the rebels in late 1988 that, "by 1989, the Stinger could no longer be considered a decisive anti-aircraft weapon."[165]

Ironically, one of the JCS's original concerns had been vindicated. The combat effectiveness of the Stingers—at least in their original configuration—was indeed compromised. The resulting impact on American security interests, however, was minimal. By war's end, U.S. Stinger technology had already advanced two generations and, more importantly, the cold war was drawing to a close.

Impact on Soviet Withdrawal

A key question is what impact, if any, the Stinger's deployment had on the power struggle between Gorbachev—already seeking withdrawal—and General Staff hardliners claiming Soviet escalation could enable military victory.

[160] David C. Isby, "Stinger in Afghanistan: The Soviets Try to Adapt," *Rotor & Wing International*, February 1990, 58.

[161] McManaway, "Stinger in Afghanistan." See also, Capaccio, *Defense Week*.

[162] *60 Minutes*, CBS News, 30 October 1988; see also, Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989, which quotes Congressman Charlie Wilson saying, "Once the Stinger made their helicopters useless, that put the Russians on foot against the Mujahedin and there's nobody on Earth who can fight the Mujahedin on foot."

[163] A few press accounts, dissenting from the common wisdom, voiced this opinion as early as 1987. See, for example, Elaine Parnell, "Stingers in a Tale," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 November 1987, who wrote that the Stinger's impact was "nothing approaching the impression given by some that the Stinger has tilted the balance of the war." See also, Bodansky, "SAMs in Afghanistan," who wrote in July 1987 that, "the primary impact of the Resistance's air-defence capabilities was a modification of Soviet-Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) tactics. . . . [T]here is no evidence that any Soviet-DRA aerial operation was canceled or aborted because of Resistance air-defence." It should be noted, however, that Bodansky consistently had a hawkish view of Soviet intentions and capabilities, stating in March 1985 that the Red Army was "on its way to attaining total victory." See Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, 11 March 1985.

[164] Isby, "Stinger in Afghanistan," 58.

[165] Roy, *The Lessons*, 53.

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As commonly reported, "the supply of high-tech American weaponry to the Mujahedin played a key factor in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. . . . [T]here is evidence it helped convince the Kremlin that the war was unwinnable."[166] Likewise, the NSC's Cannistraro says that when the Stingers arrived, the Soviets "started taking losses that were unacceptable."[167] His NSC colleague Rodman attributes the diplomatic breakthrough in part to "the escalation of U.S. military aid to the Mujahedin, especially the furnishing of 'Stinger' antiaircraft missiles."[168]

Former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, however, presents a contrary view: "The Stinger definitely prolonged our stay. . . . It made our military men, our hawks, much more determined than ever not to withdraw, not to appear to be giving in under duress." This view is shared by Georgi Arbatov, Andrey Kokoshin, and General Akhromeev,[169] and is the main thesis of Harrison and Cordovez in *Out of Afghanistan.* More generally, George Kennan[170] and Raymond Garthoff argue that the militarized version of U.S. containment strategy, including the Reagan Doctrine, prolonged the cold war as a whole. As Garthoff puts it, "Gorbachev pressed ahead. . . not owing to the Reagan hard line and military buildup, but despite it."[171] According to these authors, reduced U.S. pressure would have enabled an earlier withdrawal by permitting the Soviets to save face while doing so.

Rodman rejects such revisionist assessments of the Stinger as "liberal fantasy."[172] Abramowitz, despite being present when Shevardnadze made his comment, says, "I don't believe that for a minute."[173] Iklé cautions that "too much face-saving might have saved the Soviet regime." He believes the humiliating defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan was integral to reducing the status and influence of hard-liners in the Kremlin. "Otherwise, we might still have the Cold War."[174] French expert, Olivier Roy, concurs that "by undermining the prestige of both the old Brezhnevian guard and the army, [the failure in Afghanistan] gave Gorbachev more room for manoeuvre."[175]

Implicit in all such assessments of the political impact of the Stinger decision are counter-factual claims—that is, what would have happened in its ab-

[166] Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1992.

[167] Quoted in Schweizer, *Victory*, 270.

[168] Rodman, *More Precious*, 221. He says that Gorbachev's ascendance was the other key.

[169] Mendelson, *Explaining Change*, 43, 215–216.

[170] See, for example, "Who Won the Cold War? Ask Instead, What Was Lost?" *International Herald Tribune*, 29 October 1992, adapted from "The G.O.P. Won the Cold War? Ridiculous," *New York Times*, 28 October 1992. See also, "The Failure in Our Success," *New York Times*, 14 March 1994.

[171] Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 775. This argument is also made by MccGwire, *Perestroika*, 386, who states that Gorbachev pressed for reform "despite the assertive policies of the Reagan administration, not because of them."

[172] Rodman, interview with author, 15 August 1995.

[173] Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, 198.

[174] Iklé, interview with author, 19 August 1995.

[175] Roy, *The Lessons*, 47.

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sence. These must be separated from actual facts and evaluated for plausibility. Two facts are clear. First, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he initially escalated the war. Second, had the United States not countered with NSDD 166, followed by the Stinger and other U.S. technology, the Soviets would have gained militarily against the Mujahedin. However, at least three important counter-factual questions remain: How badly damaged would the Mujahedin have been? Would this have reversed the rebels' opposition to the unfavorable negotiated settlement then on the table? How would this military progress have affected Politburo decision making? While counter-factual reasoning never is certain, answers to these questions can be found with relative confidence.

First, despite the claims of some,[176] it is highly unlikely that the Soviet escalation of 1985-1986, if not countered by the United States, would have succeeded in eliminating the Mujahedin. Indeed, the Mujahedin had proved able to survive even in the early 1980s, when they were considerably more outmatched than they would have been in this subsequent scenario.[177] The Soviets' fundamental problem was their unwillingness to increase troop levels, forcing them into a strategy of coercion based mainly on air power.[178] Throughout the twentieth century, such an approach had failed to produce victory against a people on its home territory.[179]

Second, it is extremely unlikely that even substantial Soviet military progress would have compelled the rebels to accept a negotiated settlement that left a pro-Soviet government in Kabul. As demonstrated in subsequent years, the rebels preferred to face death rather than cede power even to each other, let alone to a pro-Soviet regime.

Third, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, Gorbachev was intent on his two-track strategy of consolidating power, by placing allies in key Communist party positions, and establishing nontraditional sources of expertise. By late 1986, therefore, he likely could have pushed his views through the Politburo despite any military gains in Afghanistan. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether Gorbachev's own preference would have changed had the 1985

[176] Gates, *From the Shadows*, 429, for example, claims that, "Thanks to our massive infusion of assistance during 1985-1986, the Mujahedin were able to withstand the Soviet maximum push."

[177] Of course, Soviet tactics had improved by the later time period, but so had those of the rebels. For an insightful contemporaneous view from the rebels' perspective, see Almerigo Grilz, "Afghanistan: The Guerrilla is Changing," *Military Technology*, no. 6 (June 1987), which appends an interview with Abdul Haq. Mujahedin commander in the Kabul area. See also, Ian Kemp, "Abdul Haq: Soviet Mistakes in Afghanistan," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 March 1988, in which the rebel leader contends that some Soviet changes, such as the use of *Spetsnaz* troops, had backfired. Abdul Haq also denies that the Stinger made a decisive difference.

[178] As Galeotti, *Afghanistan*, 17, describes the Soviet escalation that started in 1984: "The aim appears to have been to win by shattering rebel morale and destroying their support infrastructure by, quite simply, encouraging mass emigration from rural areas outside Kabul's control: a policy of 'migratory genocide.'"

[179] Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win—Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

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Soviet escalation gone unopposed and produced military gains in Afghanistan. The key fact here is that Gorbachev's primary objective in Afghanistan was to eliminate a thorn in East-West relations that inhibited Soviet economic revitalization. The West, especially the Reagan administration, would not have dropped its insistence on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a precondition for renewed détente, regardless of progress in the war. Thus, it is very likely that Gorbachev still would have pushed for the withdrawal deadline in late 1986, even had the Soviets made gains against the Mujahedin.[180] Red Army hard-liners would have protested, as they did in any case, but Gorbachev had sufficient votes in the Politburo to prevail.

Although counter-intuitive and contrary to popular wisdom, it appears the U.S. counter-escalation of 1985-1986 was largely irrelevant to the Soviet withdrawal decision of November 1986.[181] This is clearly the case for the Stinger, which was not utilized in Afghanistan until September 1986, a mere two months before the Politburo's decision to adopt a withdrawal deadline. At the key November 1986 Politburo meeting, no mention was made of the Stinger nor any other U.S. escalation. Rather, Defense Minister Akhromeev blamed Moscow for capping troop levels and Kabul for failing to coopt the opposition. Moreover, the Stinger effectively was neutralized by technical and tactical countermeasures well before the Soviets actually completed their withdrawal. Thus, there is no evidence the Stinger even hastened Soviet withdrawal. Neither is there evidence it delayed the Soviet pullout.

Had Gorbachev not decided autonomously to withdraw, it is unlikely the Stinger could have chased him out of Afghanistan. Prior to his entering office, the Red Army's strategy in Afghanistan had presumed a protracted occupation, relying only on holding key cities and garrisons as bases for attacks on population, infrastructure, and supply lines in rebel-controlled areas.[182] These bases were never seriously threatened by the Mujahedin even after they acquired the Stinger. Previous Soviet conquests had required occupations of far greater duration. Indeed, in the mid-1980s, there was a cottage industry among U.S. Sovietologists trying to figure out which historical model the Soviets would use to absorb Afghanistan: Mongolia,[183] Central Asia,[184] Finland,[185] Eastern Eu-

[180] Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 300, reaches the same conclusion.

[181] This belies the conclusion of Scott in his otherwise excellent account of the Reagan Doctrine: "There is little doubt that the increasing costs of Afghanistan, caused in no small part by the application of the Reagan Doctrine, contributed mightily to the restructuring of Soviet policy." Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 78. See also Gates, *From the Shadows*, 350: "There is little question that providing the Stinger was a major turning point in the Afghan war." Mark Urban is closer to the truth in dismissing as "nonsense" the "myth that American supplies, particularly the Stinger missile, won the war in Afghanistan." He concludes: "The West and Pakistan did not win the 20th Century Great Game—Gorbachev simply decided he was not playing any more—not with Soviet soldiers at least." Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 302–304.

[182] Rais, *War Without Winners*, 102–104.

[183] "A Brief History of Russian and Soviet Expansion Toward the South," Combat Capabilities Analysis Group, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, 30 June 1985, 71.

[184] Alexander Alexiev, testimony, 11 March 1985, 114.

[185] Rubin, testimony, 1 May 1986.

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rope generally,[186] or Poland specifically.[187] In 1982, General Secretary Yuri Andropov reminded Politburo colleagues that it had required almost fifteen years to subdue Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizstan.[188] In June 1985, the United States Central Command, unaware of the changes Gorbachev was bringing to the Kremlin, concluded the Soviets could "be expected to show their historical persistence in Afghanistan, anticipating a slow, gradual domination of the country. . . . [where] time may be on their side." The study, citing previous Soviet triumphs over indigenous anticommunist movements, concluded that "the Afghans will likely suffer a similar fate."[189] According to a key Pakistani official, Islamabad likewise believed Soviet "costs [in Afghanistan] were not intolerable and appeared to be on the decline."[190]

Unintended Consequences: Stinger Proliferation

As the JCS and Senator DeConcini had warned, Stinger accountability proved grossly inadequate. First, Pakistan skimmed off a percentage of the Stingers for itself—a missile tax—with some reportedly winding up on the black market. Of those that reached the Mujahedin, perhaps half were sold for cash, given to allies such as Iran, lost in ambushes, or hoarded for future conflicts.[191]

According to press reports, Stingers now have proliferated around the globe. While not all of this spread can be confirmed or attributed solely to the Mujahedin supply operation, the missiles originally destined for Afghanistan likely account for much of it. Reportedly, Stingers already have shot down aircraft twice in Bosnia[192] and once in Tajikistan.[193] In 1987, an Iranian boat fired a Stinger that reportedly hit a U.S. helicopter in the Persian Gulf but failed to explode.[194] Tunisian fundamentalists are reported to have used a Stinger in a failed 1991 assassination attempt.[195] Stingers also reportedly have been acquired by Kashmiri militants, Indian Sikhs, the Iranian drug mafia, Iraq,[196] Qa-

[186] Edward Luttwak, testimony before Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, 30 April 1986, 45.

[187] Thomas Gouttierre, Center of Afghan Studies, University of Nebraska, quoted in Aaron R. Einfrank, *Washington Times*, 17 January 1986.

[188] Dobbs, *Washington Post*, 16 November 1982.

[189] United States Central Command, "A Brief History," 71–72.

[190] Khan, *Untying*, 169.

[191] Parnell, "Stingers in a Tale," 33. According to a report cited in Urban, *War in Afghanistan*, 225, several stolen or diverted Stingers ultimately were sold to the rebels' opponent, Afghan leader Najibullah, for about $25,000 each, although other analysts assume the missiles were captured by the Afghan army in ambushes.

[192] Charles Hanley, AP, *Calgary Herald*, 18 November 1993, reports the 1992 downing of an Italian supply plane. *Washington Post*, 28 July 1995, reports the 1995 downing of a French plane by a Stinger that "almost certainly came from Pakistan."

[193] Anwar Iqbal, *United Press International*, 26 July 1993.

[194] Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989.

[195] Christopher Dobson, *The Herald* (Glasgow), 30 July 1993.

[196] Evans, *The Guardian*, 2 January 1992.

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tar,[197] Zambia (most likely from Angola),[198] North Korea, Libya, and militant Palestinian groups.[199] In addition, authorities reportedly have broken up plots to acquire the missiles by the Irish Republican Army, the Medellin Cartel, Croatian rebels, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechen secessionists,[200] and Cuban exiles.[201]

Under President George Bush, the CIA attempted to stop this hemorrhaging, motivated especially by the connection of some of the former rebels to radical Islamic terrorists. The agency initially requested $10 million to buy back Stingers, and when that proved inadequate, another $55 million in 1993.[202] Former rebel leader and then-Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar responded that he did "not intend to allow even a round of ammunition to be taken out of Afghanistan."[203] Although a few dozen Stingers apparently were retrieved by the CIA, the main effect of the buy-back program has been to bid up the black-market price of the missile from its original value of $30,000 to as high as $200,000. Intelligence officials worry that those who sell back the Stingers at such exorbitant prices will recycle the profits to buy an even larger quantity of Soviet SA-14 missiles—reportedly based on the Stinger design—potentially exacerbating the overall terrorist threat.[204] Ironically, the $65 million appropriated by the United States to buy back a fraction of the leftover missiles is about twice the original purchase price of all of them.

A still unanswered question is precisely how many Stingers are left over from the Mujahedin supply operation. A variety of sources suggest that 300 Stingers were exported for delivery to the rebels in 1986, growing to a total of between 900 and 1200, together with approximately 250 reusable gripstocks.[205] The U.S. Army reported in 1990 that only about 340 Stingers actually were fired by the rebels prior to the Soviet withdrawal, and the *Washington Post* reported that no missiles were fired subsequently in Afghanistan through 1994.[206] The *Times* of London reported in 1994 that approximately 200 of the missiles were in storage in Pakistan—never delivered to the Mujahedin—and that the CIA had bought back another sixty.[207] If these reports are accurate, some 300 to 600 of the missiles remain unaccounted for. In January 1995, U.S. intelligence

[197] Hanley, *Calgary Herald.*

[198] David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 1 May 1987.

[199] Edward Gorman, *The Times* (London), 14 May 1994.

[200] Hanley, *Calgary Herald.*

[201] Larry Rohter, *New York Times*, 4 June 1994.

[202] Robin Wright and John M. Broder, *Los Angeles Times*, 23 July 1993.

[203] *Los Angeles Times*, from *Associated Press*, 20 August 1993.

[204] Hanley, *Calgary Herald;* Gorman, *The Times*; Brian Duffy and Peter Cary, *U.S. News & World Report*, 30 August 1993.

[205] See, for example, Parnell, "Stingers in a Tale"; Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989; Coll, *Washington Post*, 20 July 1992; Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 182.

[206] Molly Moore, *Washington Post*, 7 March 1994.

[207] Gorman, *The Times.*

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sources were quoted as believing that "over 370 Stingers are still in Afghanistan."[208]

Some commentators have downplayed the terrorist threat posed by these remaining Stingers. Cannistraro has said the battery packs on several Stingers recovered from an Iranian boat in 1988 were found to be run-down, rendering the weapons ineffective.[209] He also recalls being told the weapons had "a shelf life of about a year."[210] However, a partially declassified 1987 analysis by the U.S. Central Command states clearly that, "The BCU, the power source required to activate the Stinger, has a shelf life of at least 10 years with a reliability rate of 98-99%."[211] Pillsbury recalls that a House Armed Services Committee staff person, Tony Battista, originally proposed modifying the Stingers to shorten their shelf life to several weeks prior to delivery to the rebels, but was turned down.[212] Even if some battery units have deteriorated, however, Cannistraro concedes, "it's silly to think" that potential users couldn't buy a battery, or have one engineered, to meet their needs.[213]

A final consideration is whether the Stinger is any more effective than other surface-to-air missiles commonly available in international arms markets. Among the alternatives are the British Javelin, the French Mistral, the Swedish RBS 70, and the Soviet SA-14 and SA-16.[214] Moreover, missiles similar to the Stinger are produced or are under development by China, South Africa, Brazil, and Egypt.[215] As far back as 1986, terrorism expert Robert Kupperman downplayed the significance of potential Stinger proliferation by arguing that the Soviet SA-7B, widely available even then, was sufficient to shoot down a civilian airliner.[216] Nevertheless, the Stinger appears to be in a category of its own, especially as a threat to military aircraft. Former CIA national intelligence officer, David Whipple, says he "would doubt there are missiles as good as the Stinger out there."[217] That would explain why the CIA is willing to spend $65 million to try to get them back.

The CIA's Performance

Confronted in 1993 with the worldwide proliferation of Stingers leaking from Afghanistan, former CIA associate director for covert operations, Edward

[208] Behroz Khan, *United Press International*, 14 January 1995.

[209] David Hughes, "FAA Examining Missile Threat," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 16 August 1993.

[210] Cannistraro, interview with author, 8 August 1995.

[211] "Stinger: One Year of Combat," Afghanistan Fusion Cell, United States Central Command, 26 October 1987.

[212] Pillsbury, interview with author, 11 August 1995.

[213] Cannistraro, interview with author, 8 August 1995.

[214] James W. Rawles, "Stinger: Requiem for the Combat Helicopter," *Defense Electronics*, November 1988.

[215] Wright and Broder, *Los Angeles Times*.

[216] Robert Kupperman, quoted in Peter Grier, *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 April 1986.

[217] David Whipple, interview with author, 9 August 1995.

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Juchniewicz, responded, "Isn't the danger posed by a handful of Stingers worth the dissolution of the Soviet Empire?"[218] Surely it would be, had that been the trade-off. However, in light of the far smaller role actually played by the missiles in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, let alone the cold war, the security threat they now pose may be the most lasting legacy of the Stinger decision.

The obvious question is whether the CIA could have handled the original distribution of Stingers in a more responsible manner. The CIA's Whipple concedes only that, "in hindsight, that's indisputable."[219] However, even at the time, the CIA should have known better, and could have acted more responsibly. In several key respects the agency's failings were due to poor decision making, not to a lack of concurrent knowledge.

First, the agency relied on the worrisome ISI distribution network for the Stinger in 1986, even though an expert had written as early as November 1984 that "direct supplies to the resistance are increasingly feasible."[220] Such an alternative would have enabled restricting the missile to only the most reliable rebels. By contrast, the agency knew that ISI favored the most radical rebels, many with ties to Iran.

Second, the CIA should have taken into account that the rebels were only a temporary ally of convenience. As later acknowledged by the CIA's former chief of operations for the Near East and South Asia, Charles Cogan, it was obvious at the time that "the long-range aims of a country in which Islamists were at least beginning to have a say would not be, could not be, wholly compatible with the aims of a Western nation."[221] This concern turned out not to be so long-range. As early as 1991, Hekmatyar supported Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. Two years later, in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York City, Whipple confirmed that "some of the same people who are actual or potential terrorists in [the United States] are former guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan."[222]

Third, the CIA should have recognized soon after the initial modest deployment of Stingers that it was unnecessary to follow up with additional supplies of such an advanced weapons system. In 1987, the U.S. Central Command reported that due to the initial success of the Stinger and the "extreme difficulty for pilots to differentiate between shoulder-fired SAMs, Soviet pilots appear to treat all launches as Stinger. In numerous instances it has been noted that Soviet aircraft will depart an area as soon as a SAM is fired."[223] Thus, the CIA

[218] Weiner, *New York Times*, 24 July 1993.

[219] Whipple, interview with author, 9 August 1995.

[220] Alexander Alexiev, *The War in Afghanistan: Soviet Strategy and the State of the Resistance* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, November 1984), 7.

[221] Cogan, "Partners in Time," 74. Nevertheless, as Gates, *From the Shadows*, 349, reveals, the CIA ironically tried to increase the number of Arabs coming to Afghanistan to fight with the Muslim fundamentalists, going so far as to explore establishment of an "international brigade."

[222] Weiner, *New York Times*, 24 July 1993.

[223] "Stinger: One Year of Combat," 11.

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could have reduced the danger of Stinger proliferation by substituting lower-technology SAMs in follow-up shipments—without undermining rebel effectiveness.

Fourth, the CIA should have known the rebels would hoard Stingers if supplied a surplus. Even an avid Mujahedin supporter, Congressman Charlie Wilson, had earlier acknowledged that the rebels had a troubling habit of "ratholing" weapons for future use.[224] For all these reasons, the CIA should have kept the rebels on a much shorter tether—at least denying them more Stingers until the original ones were exhausted.

Instead, in its most profound error, the CIA supplied additional Stingers in 1987, just as the rebels were reducing their use of the weapon in response to Soviet counter-measures. Given that the rebels were reported to be downing about one aircraft per day and to be enjoying a 75-80 percent kill ratio, the initial batch of 300 missiles should have lasted at least half a year. At that point, the CIA could have assessed the need for more missiles and found, as *Aviation Week* later reported, that "the number of launch opportunities has declined due to changes in Soviet operating techniques."[225] The agency then could have suspended or sharply reduced supply of Stingers in 1987. Instead, the CIA reportedly shipped another 600 or more missiles in 1987, distribution of which continued to the rebels until mid-1988.[226] Making matters worse, the CIA reportedly loosened restrictions on missile distribution in 1987, rescinding the requirement that an expended tube be presented in exchange for each new missile and permitting individual rebels to receive more than one at a time.[227] The *Washington Post* reported in April 1987 that "so many Stingers are arriving in Pakistan that there is a problem of storing the weapons safely." A U.S. intelligence official later confirmed, "we were handing them out like lollipops."[228]

So far, the United States and its allies have avoided paying a heavy price for this sloppy CIA performance, as no civil airliners outside of Afghanistan are confirmed to have been shot down by Stingers.[229] U.S. intelligence officials, however, do not assume this luck will last and in 1992 established a Federal Aviation Administration study group to assess the terrorist missile threat. *Aviation Week* reports that less sophisticated SAMs were used in at least twenty-two attacks on civil airliners from 1986 to 1993, generally in countries experiencing civil insurgencies. According to a Rand analyst, as airports and airlines

[224] Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, 30 April 1986, 29.

[225] Gunston, "Stingers Used," 46. Recall that the U.S. Army later reported only about 340 Stingers were launched during the entire war.

[226] Barnes, "Victory in Afghanistan," 93.

[227] David Ottaway, *Washington Post*, 5 April 1987; Yousaf and Adkin, *The Bear Trap*, 175.

[228] Moore, *Washington Post*, 7 March 1994.

[229] The Soviet press reported several times that Stingers had been used to shoot down civil airliners in Afghanistan. See, for example, *Tass*, 14 August 1987, reporting the downing of two AN-26 aircraft, killing thirty-six passengers in February 1987 and fifty-three passengers in June 1987.

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boost security to inhibit hijackings and bombings, terrorists are increasingly likely to turn to missiles.[230]

The Stinger Decision in Retrospect

The case of the Stinger provides several cautionary lessons about U.S. foreign policy generally and covert action specifically. First, it raises the question of who actually makes U.S. foreign policy and suggests procedures to help ensure its soundness. Second, it highlights shortcomings in the CIA's performance of a top-priority covert action, raising questions about the utility of such action as a tool of foreign policy. Third, it provides insight into perennial questions about the strengths and weaknesses of democracies in the conduct of foreign policy. Finally, it underscores the necessity for scholars to engage in painstaking "process tracing" to draw the proper lessons from history.

Without question, the Reagan administration's notorious lack of centralized policy coordination significantly retarded the Stinger decision and contributed to a nearly eighteen-month delay from initial proposal to final implementation, which effectively changed a good idea into a bad one.[231] When first seriously proposed in early spring 1985, in the wake of a Soviet escalation in Afghanistan, the Stinger plan fit an overall U.S. strategy to prevent Soviet absorption of Afghanistan by increasing the costs of the occupation. Despite misgivings of the CIA, the JCS, and the State Department, the potential benefits outweighed the risks in light of the intensified Soviet air campaign, a new Soviet leader not personally committed to the war, and the low assessed risk of retaliatory escalation. As events transpired, the missiles apparently were unnecessary to ensure the rebels' survival or to compel Gorbachev's withdrawal. However, U. S. officials had no way of knowing that in the spring of 1985, so it does not detract from the merits of the Stinger proposal when originally presented.

By the time the plan eventually was implemented in late summer 1986, however, it made considerably less sense, given that the Soviets already had signaled their intention to withdraw. At this point, the risks outweighed the potential benefits. Though delivery of Stingers at this later date probably did not prolong the war, it was unnecessary and led to two consequences feared by the JCS: missile proliferation and the development of Soviet counter-measures that effectively neutralized first-generation Stinger technology.

The Reagan administration's lack of a strong, hands-on leader in the Oval Office or at the NSC permitted individual agencies to pursue their own agendas even to the point of withholding relevant information. The JCS claimed the

[230] Hughes, "FAA Examining."

[231] This is directly contrary to the claims of Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 234–235, 250–252, that the White House spearheaded the 1985-86 escalation of assistance to the Mujahedin and generally "dominated policy-making" when issues "involved crisis characteristics." He is closer to the truth in subsequently acknowledging that President Reagan's decisions "were taken only after other actors pushed, prodded, and even manipulated the process," 252.

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Stinger plan could lead to loss of this U.S. technology without disclosing that it already had been compromised in Greece. The JCS claimed as well that the plan would negatively impact the U. S. Army's missile stockpile, without disclosing that its supplier could increase production to offset any losses. The CIA continued as late as 1986 to report that Pakistani President Zia opposed introduction of the Stinger, even though he had been telling visiting U.S. officials otherwise since 1984.

As bureaucracies inevitably promote their own interests,[232] it is no surprise the army guarded its stockpile of missiles and the CIA attempted to avoid a covert project that could lead to its embarrassment. However, it is the job of the president, the national security adviser, and their staffs to ensure that such parochial pursuits are subordinated to the national interest. Policy disputes should be brought to a head on a timely basis, debated openly and with full information, decided authoritatively, and implemented with the full cooperation of all agencies. Lack of such decisive leadership was a signal failing of the Reagan administration in the Stinger case. As Rodman observes, President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, "never would have stood for this."[233]

Some scholars have identified two factors as primarily responsible for this Reagan administration shortcoming—bureaucratic structure and presidential personality. In one of its first directives, NSDD 2, the administration intentionally downgraded the structural authority and coordinating role of the national security adviser to reduce risk of his vying for control with the secretary of State, as occurred in the Carter administration.[234] Reagan's management style, meanwhile, was to avoid making decisions until his subordinates attained consensus.[235] The result was a power vacuum in which "each department was free to pursue its own interpretation of the president's decisions—or to ignore the president altogether."[236] As President Reagan's former chief of staff, James Baker, confirms, the foreign policy apparatus "was often a witches' brew of intrigue, elbows, egos, and separate agendas"—a dangerous model of inefficiency.[237]

[232] See Allison, *Essence of Decision*, especially his Model II. Also, Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

[233] Rodman, interview with author, 15 August 1995.

[234] Christopher C. Shoemaker, *The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 59–60.

[235] Cecil Van Meter Crabb, *American National Security: A Presidential Perspective* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1991), 182. See also, Karl F. Inderfurth, Loch K. Johnson, eds., *Decisions of the Highest Order: Perspectives on the National Security Council* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988); John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: Morrow, 1991); Constantine C. Menges, *Inside The National Security Council: The True Story of The Making and Unmaking of Reagan's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988).

[236] Shoemaker, *The NSC Staff*, 67.

[237] James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), excerpted in *Newsweek*, 2 October 1995, 53.

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The CIA's performance in the Stinger case raises questions about the agency's resources and capabilities for covert action, the quality of its decision making in such secret activities, and the reliability of its intelligence reporting, which together reinforce doubts about the overall worth of covert action and government secrecy as tools of foreign policy. The CIA's error in relying on Pakistan's ISI for Stinger distribution—long after plausible deniability was lost and the agency had established its own connections to the rebels—is often justified on grounds the agency lacked sufficient numbers of trained covert-action personnel.[238] However, the inexcusable error of boosting the supply of Stingers just as their use was waning, which contributed to a gross oversupply of the missiles and worldwide proliferation, can be attributed only to a combination of shoddy intelligence, poor decision making, and bureaucratic inertia. Ironically, the CIA's program to supply the Afghan rebels, its single largest operation during the Reagan administration, is often cited as a rare example of a covert action success.[239] If the above shortcomings are what can be expected from a top-priority "success," however, the overall worth of covert action should be reassessed.[240] Assuming U. S. leaders wish to retain this prerogative, despite its potentially inherent shortcomings, the CIA at a minimum must beef up its in-house capabilities to reduce the risk of again falling prey to the whims of another nation's intelligence service.

The Stinger case also contributes to the long debate on foreign policy and democracy,[241] suggesting that effective foreign policy is fostered by a moderate level of democracy, but can be hurt by too much or too little. The Reagan administration appears generally to have suffered from too much democracy in its making of foreign policy. Disparate interests represented within the executive branch were able to lobby each other, leak information beneficial to their viewpoint, form coalitions with members of Congress, and continue to fight even after their proposals had been rejected formally. Even lone advocates could

[238] Roy Godson, "Covert Action: Neither Exceptional Tool Nor Magic Bullet" in Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt, eds., *U.S. Intelligence At the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform* (London: Brassey's, 1995), 168.

[239] Robert Gates takes issue with the conventional wisdom that the CIA has had few operational successes. However, even he claims that "the greatest of them all was the war in Afghanistan." See Gates, *From the Shadows*, 360.

[240] For a view supporting Gates, that covert action has been and can continue to be a useful tool of American foreign policy, see Roy Godson, *Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards: U.S. Covert Action and Counterintelligence* (London: Brassey's 1995). For an opposing view, see the work of Greg Treverton including in *In From the Cold* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996), 23; see also Ernest May in Godson et al., *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads*, 173–177; and Codevilla, *Informing Statecraft*, 270.

[241] A classic statement is Theodore Lowi, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: On Fighting the Next War" in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (New York: Harper Collins, 1989). See also, Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Political Competition and Foreign Policy Power Sharing" (paper presented at the 1996 American Political Science Association meeting, 29 August–1 September 1996).

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affect U. S. foreign policy substantially by applying these tactics with sufficient enthusiasm and disregard for protocol.[242]

By contrast, the CIA's problems in the Stinger case were exacerbated by too little democracy. Government secrecy artificially restricted the circle of informed decision makers, contributing to poor decisions.[243] Had there not been insistence on maintaining plausible deniability, the U. S. government might have debated openly which of the rebel groups were most worthy of assistance, rather than quietly delegating this crucial decision to a foreign intelligence agency with an ulterior agenda. More generally, had the program not been covert, Congress, the executive branch, and the press could have scrutinized its implementation—for example, questioning the wisdom of shipping additional Stingers to Muslim fundamentalists just as the missiles' use was dropping off.[244] Reduced government secrecy also might have prevented the CIA from inaccurately reporting Pakistani President Zia's views on the Stinger for more than a year, which interfered with sound decision making.

According to Abramowitz, the government's interagency process "worked" in that officials eventually were turned around "based on argumentation."[245] However, the combined effects of too much and too little democracy stretched that process out over eighteen months, which had deleterious consequences. The Stinger proposal was rejected when it might have made sense, approved when it no longer did, and implemented in a manner that unnecessarily raised risks to U. S. national security.

An important question is whether the degree of democracy in the making of U.S. foreign policy is subject to strategic manipulation or is the product of inexorable social, technological, and historical forces. Those cited above attribute the free-for-all nature of the Reagan administration's foreign-policy process to specific management style and organizational choices. Others claim, however, that it represented just one step in a historical progression toward the ever-increasing domestic relevance of foreign affairs, which is becoming subject to the intense level of democracy traditionally reserved for domestic affairs.[246] It can be argued that technological advances such as the Internet, CNN, satellite

[242] Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 241–245, argues this pattern is inherent in modern American democracy.

[243] Sometimes the circle of decision makers is overly restricted *within* the CIA as well, as certain offices "have been notorious for using security compartmentation to protect themselves from legitimate inquiries that might expose operational failures or uncover financial overruns or schedule slips." See Duane R. ("Dewey") Clarridge, with Digby Diehl, *A Spy for all Seasons* (New York: Scribner, 1997), 405.

[244] The progressively decreasing concern about Stinger distribution in the field is reflected in the comments of Milt Beardon, CIA station chief in Pakistan during implementation of the program: "My philosophy, and one that I think prevailed, was: get the weapons into the hands of the shooters and really let God sort it out." (Quoted in Levin, *CIA: America's Secret Warriors.*)

[245] Abramowitz, interview with author, 30 August 1995.

[246] Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, 248–250. He also argues that this trend has been exacerbated by the end of the cold war.

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communication, faxes, and copy machines have exacerbated this trend by making global information instantly available to ever widening circles and encroaching on the government preserve of classified information.[247] If such an historical trend does exist, the Stinger case suggests it will be beneficial as it broadens decision making from artificially small circles, but deleterious to the extent it undermines the government's ability to expedite, centrally coordinate, and implement its decisions.

Another lesson of the Stinger case is that in order to draw the proper lessons from history, political scientists and foreign-affairs analysts must trace the internal decision making processes of both U.S. and foreign governments, rather than treating them as "black boxes." Such process tracing of the U.S. Stinger decision reveals a surprising lack of consensus about the means and ends of the so-called Reagan Doctrine.[248] On the Soviet side, such close analysis is essential to understanding that the withdrawal decision was driven not mainly by the direct human, financial, or political costs of the war, but by Gorbachev's desire to have Western sanctions lifted. Earlier black-box analyses concluded erroneously that Gorbachev was responding to the U.S. escalation.[249]

Ironically, the two elements of U.S. policy that appear most to have influenced the Soviet decision to withdraw were initiated not by the Reagan administration, but by President Carter immediately after the Soviet invasion of 1979. Carter suspended détente, cutting off access to trade and technology, which the Soviets came to see over time as a significant drag on their economic growth. He also initiated aid to the Mujahedin when they were weakest, establishing a weapons pipeline that helped avert their early defeat by the Red Army. The Reagan administration, spurred by Congress, steadily increased aid to the Mujahedin, no doubt improving the rebels' military prospects. However, the major U.S. escalation of aid in 1985-1986 appears not to have been crucial to the rebels' continued survival, nor to have had significant impact on Soviet decision making. Gorbachev eventually obtained domestic support for withdrawal as the result of his own actions, not due to U.S. escalation. He changed personnel, empowered nontraditional experts, and permitted press coverage of the war. Thus, the Reagan administration's most consequential action to effect Soviet withdrawal may have been holding the Carter line, refusing to normalize economic relations so long as Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan. The Reagan Doctrine, at least in the case of Afghanistan, has been credited with an achievement that had other causes—apparently due to little more than a coincidence of timing.

[247] Doug MacEachin, "The Uncertain Future of Intelligence Analysis: Confronting the Faultline" (Oral presentation at Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 14 February 1997). MacEachin is a retired CIA official.

[248] Interestingly, the policy's name was coined not by the administration, but by columnist Charles Krauthammer. However, Scott in *Deciding to Intervene* adduces evidence that the administration had in place a formal policy of assistance to anticommunist rebels well before this appellation was applied.

[249] See Daley, *Gorbachev and Afghanistan.*

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The pervasiveness of the myth that the Stinger slew the Red Army and by implication the Soviet empire and communism demonstrates how the distortive effects of the cold war have survived its passing. For almost half a century, Americans were confronted with apparitions such as the missile gap and the evil empire. Those responsible for erecting such exaggerated images of the Soviet adversary are now, perhaps predictably, exaggerating the credit they deserve for destroying it. Despite mounting contradictory evidence, these cold warriors continue to give the Stinger much of the credit for ending the cold war and to promote the simple lesson that the hawks had it right all along. In reality, the Stinger's impact was far smaller, and the lessons are far more complex.*

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

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The United States and South Korean Democratization

JAMES FOWLER

During 1979 and 1980, South Korea experienced a failed transition to democracy. The "Seoul Spring," which took place after the assassination of authoritarian leader Park Chung Hee in late 1979, was brought to a brutal halt when martial law was declared and at least 200 demonstrators were killed at Kwangju in May 1980. Not until June 1987 would South Korea's new leader, Chun Doo Hwan, agree to step down and allow direct elections of the president. Many critics of U.S. foreign policy have studied this period, and the current literature follows two basic schools of thought. One school asserts that the United States had little impact on events in Korea, because it was strategically bound to support the South Korean government regardless of its level of commitment to democratization. This school advances several domestic reasons for the delayed transition, including the lack of labor and middle class support for the opposition and the weakness of the interim civilian government in 1979–1980. The other school focuses on the presence of U.S. troops in Korea and the U.S. "approval" of the use of Combined Forces Command (CFC) units in their bloody crackdown of the Kwangju uprising. These writers claim that the United States could have denied such approval and prevented the crackdown, which led to seven years of rule under the authoritarian Chun regime.

Acknowledging that there are probably many factors that determined the timing of democratic transition, this article will focus on an issue that has yet to be given appropriate attention in the literature: the use of U.S. public pressure. The recent declassification of thousands of pages of telegrams between the U.S. State Department and its embassy in Seoul has especially illuminated the choices that decision makers faced during the period. This evidence indicates that contrary to the opinions expressed throughout the literature, U.S. actions did have an impact on events, though the approval of CFC forces was

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only incidentally important. Instead, the essential policy tool was the use of public criticism. Ironically, this tool was abandoned under a Carter administration oriented towards human rights and then used by a Reagan administration oriented towards security.[1] The counterintuitive result can be explained by the impact of the Iranian crisis on policy makers in 1979–1980 and the effect of Philippine democratization on policy makers in 1986–1987. Thus this article seeks to illuminate the process whereby conflicts in other countries that had no direct bearing on South Korea ultimately affected the outcome of its own domestic political process.

Two Cycles of South Korean Liberalization

To better analyze the initial failure and subsequent success of South Korea's transition to democracy, it will be useful to discuss two distinct cycles of liberalization. The first cycle began in 1979, when the government responded to opposition demands by relaxing the application of laws against dissent and securing the release of over 1,000 political prisoners.[2] In spite of these actions, opposition to the Park regime grew. Demonstrations increased in frequency, and even members of the government openly criticized the Park administration.[3] Hardliners began to clamp down in August, arresting key officials of the main opposition party (NDP), confiscating NDP newspapers, and raiding NDP headquarters during the Y. H. Trading Company workers' sit-in.

These actions radicalized the opposition. Kim Young Sam, the leader of the NDP, said in a speech on 10 September that he would start a movement to "overthrow the Park regime."[4] Not surprisingly, the government replied that it would return to strict enforcement of restrictions on dissent.[5] On 4 October, Kim Young Sam was expelled from the National Assembly. Radicals responded in kind on 17 October, when 12,000 students took a demonstration to

[1] At President Jimmy Carter's first transition meeting with President Ronald Reagan in 1980, Carter noted that Reagan "expressed with some enthusiasm his envy of the authority that Korean President Park Chung Hee had exercised during a time of campus unrest, when he had closed the universities and drafted the demonstrators." Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 578.

[2] Telegrams from U.S. Ambassador to South Korea William Gleysteen to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, "Reaction to Prisoner Release," 19 July 1979, and "Prisoners Released as Expected on ROK Independence Day," 16 August 1979. These and all telegrams cited were released by the Department of State in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request originally filed by Tim Shorrock and can be found in the *Kwangju Documents Collection*, Government Documents and Information Center, Mudd Library, Yale University.

[3] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "National Assembly Finishes Fourth Day of Interpellations," 26 July 1979.

[4] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Kim Young Sam's September 10 Press Conference," 10 September 1979.

[5] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "ROKG Limits Dissent," 14 September 1979.

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downtown Pusan where as many as five students were killed and 500 arrested.[6] Though the Park government was very used to dealing with student protests, these demonstrations were much larger in scope and received widespread support from citizens other than students.[7] In response to continuing demonstrations in Pusan and Masan, the Park government declared martial law for the region including and immediately surrounding the two cities.

The Pusan and Masan riots had a substantial impact on the mood of the nation. However, no one was prepared for the events that would follow.[8] On 26 October 1979, the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Chae Kyu, shot and killed Park Chung Hee at a dinner party. Kim had been embroiled in an argument with Cha Chi Chol, the head of the Presidential Protective Force, over how to respond to the riots in Pusan and Masan. Kim believed that the government should pursue a policy of conciliation, while Cha argued that it was time to crack down.[9] Kim apparently feared an impending purge of reformers in the government (including himself), so he readied his men on the night of 26 October. When it was clear that Park would accept Cha's advice instead of his own, Kim shot both Cha and Park.[10] Believing that he had the support of many reformers in the military, Kim tried to convince the moderate Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law Commander General Chung Song-Hwa to execute a coup that evening, but Chung refused in the name of law and order.[11] Kim was promptly arrested.

Hardliners clamped down, declaring martial law for the whole mainland. The month of November was very confusing. Prime Minister Choi Kyu Hah was the de facto head of state, but he gave no clear signals of whether he was a reformer or a hardliner. The opposition demanded democratic reform and cautiously began to organize. Meanwhile, General Chung tried to soothe hardliner fears of disorder by announcing that "if the North were to attack, ten million South Korean lives would be sacrificed and he would prefer to crack down

[6] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Situation in Pusan Following Declaration of Martial Law," 18 October 1979.

[7] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "More on Pusan Demonstration; Demonstration at EWHA University in Seoul," 17 October 1979.

[8] Ironically, Gleysteen writes: "None of our contacts, including the dissidents, see the current situation in Pusan as an indication that the Park Government faces real problems in staying afloat." Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Update on Martial Law Situation October 22," 22 October 1979.

[9] Kihl Young Whan, *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contrast* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 76. In private conversations with Ambassador Gleysteen, Kim said that he thought EM-9 should be repealed and that he was concerned about "the accumulation of grievances against the Park government and the relatively depressed economic climate in which such grievances can grow." See telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Meeting with Kim," 17 March 1979, and "Charges of U.S. Complicity in President Park's Death," 19 November 1979.

[10] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "ROK Announce Partial Investigative Results on President's Death," 28 October 1979.

[11] Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 78.

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now on a thousand demonstrators who were inviting such an attack."[12] On 6 December, Choi was elected interim president by the electoral college, and the following day he gave hope to the opposition that he was a reformer by lifting the much-hated Emergency Measure 9 (EM-9) and releasing Kim Dae Jung, a key opposition leader, from house arrest.[13]

On 12 December, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, the commander of the Defense Security Command, and "a group of men very close to President Park,"[14] arrested sixteen military generals, including martial law commander General Chung, and initiated a purge of reformers at all levels of the military.[15] Their primary motivations were a fear that social unrest would break out very soon and a concern that the older, more moderate officers were mishandling the prosecution of Kim Chae Kyu.[16] Chun would later consolidate the purge of reformers by maneuvering into the job of acting director of the KCIA while retaining his post as director of the Defense Security Command.[17]

In spite of these movements by hardliners against reformers in the military, the civilian government continued to pursue liberalization. 1,722 political prisoners were released or had their sentences reduced in December 1979, and in February 1980 the government relaxed press censorship and restored political rights to Kim Dae Jung and hundreds of EM-9 violators.[18] The move briefly appeased radicals,[19] but the probably intentional effect on the moderate opposition was to start up an age-old internecine rivalry between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam that would hamper their ability to focus on their real opponents.[20]

In April 1980, students participated in massive, but peaceful demonstrations on the twentieth anniversary of the student revolution that toppled Syngman Rhee, Korea's first president. But even as student pressure remained contained, labor pressure was on the rise. A miners' strike at Sabuk turned violent,

[12] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Martial Law Administrator General Chong Song-Hwa Briefs the Press," 29 November 1979.

[13] Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 77; and telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "ROKG Announces the Lifting of Emergency Measure 9," 7 December 1979.

[14] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Younger ROK Officers Grab Power Positions," 13 December 1979.

[15] Yang Sung Chul, *The North and South Korean Political Systems* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 429; and telegram from Christopher to Vance, "Military Power Play in South Korea," 12 December 1979.

[16] Donald Stone MacDonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 58; and telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Younger ROK Officers Grab Power Positions," 13 December 1979.

[17] Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 78.

[18] Telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Release of Prisoners on Occasion of Inauguration," 21 December 1979, and "Political Rights Restored," 29 February 1980.

[19] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "ROK Universities: Off to a Calm Start," 14 March 1980.

[20] Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 78.

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and a Pusan steel mill riot left one dead and several injured.[21] Moreover, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) threatened to sue the government if it did not eliminate the Special Measures law that denied rights to labor.[22] This rise in radical pressure on the government did not go unnoticed. By 1 May, the Martial Law Command (MLC) was issuing warnings that labor and campus disturbances would no longer be tolerated.[23] Hardliners were in position.

The first student-MLC clashes took place on 2 May, as students at Seoul National University tried to take a demonstration off campus.[24] The result of the clashes was to reorient student demands to a call for the end of martial law by 15 May.[25] Their patience exhausted, moderates agreed to ally with radicals: Kim Dae Jung joined in the demand on 8 May, and Kim Young Sam and the Catholic Church joined on 9 May.[26] The result on 15 and 16 May was 40–50,000 students in the streets of Seoul alone.[27] In an effort to bolster students' demands, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung displayed unprecedented unity by jointly calling for the lifting of martial law.[28] For hardliners, this final coalition between radicals and unified moderates was the final provocation. On 17 May 1980, the military arrested several student leaders and pressured President Choi and the Cabinet to extend martial law to the whole country, giving the military direct control.[29] Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam were promptly arrested. That morning newspapers printed the official text of the martial law order, citing "current North Korean movements and the certainty of incidents of unrest all across the ROK" as reasons for the return to military rule.[30]

[21] Ibid.; and telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "More Violence on Labor Scene," 1 May 1980. NB: "SecState" was used in the interim period after Secretary Vance resigned and before Edwin Muskie became secretary of State.

[22] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Organized Labor Calls for Suspension of Special Measures Law," 29 April 1980.

[23] Telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "Martial Law Command Threatens Action Against Future Disturbances," 1 May 1980.

[24] Telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "Student-Police Clashes Occur for First Time This Year," 2 May 1980.

[25] Telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "Student Activism Turns to National Political Issues," 5 May 1980.

[26] Telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "National Alliance Calls for Resignation of Prime Minister and Acting Chief of KCIA," 8 May 1980; and telegrams from Gleysteen to Secretary of State Edwin Muskie, "Kim Young Sam May 9 Press Conference," 9 May 1980, and "Catholic Church Calls for Lifting of Martial Law," 9 May 1980.

[27] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Seoul Sitrep, 2000 May 15: Demonstrations Out in Force but Police Lines Holding," 15 May 1980.

[28] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam Join in Call for Lifting of Martial Law and Resignation of Prime Minister and Acting KCIA Chief," 16 May 1980.

[29] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Crackdown in Seoul," 17 May 1980.

[30] See Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 79; and telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "ROK Sitrep as of 0900 18 May," 18 May 1980.

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On 18 May, thousands of students from Chosun University initiated a demonstration in Kwangju that drew massive support.[31] Demonstrators called for the release of Kim Dae Jung (who was from Kwangju) and an immediate end to military rule. Army Special Forces were sent to stop the demonstration and in the ensuing struggle used fixed bayonets on demonstrators, causing several deaths. By midafternoon a full scale riot had broken out, attracting thousands of townspeople and ordinary citizens.[32] Rioting continued on 19 May, as crowds swelled to 100,000.[33] On 20 May, the Korean Army was forced to withdraw. After seven days of siege, the regular Korean Army entered the city in the early morning hours and took control in a "relatively bloodless maneuver."[34] By midday the army had arrested 1,740 civilians, 730 of whom, mostly students, were detained for investigations.[35] The final death toll for the uprising was officially put at 230, although unofficial estimates ranged from 600 to 2,000.[36] This first cycle of liberalization ended in bloodshed without democracy. Chun would rule with a tight grip for the next six years.

The second cycle of liberalization would not begin in earnest until February 1986, when the opposition launched a petition campaign for a constitution with direct elections. Under the aegis of the new campaign, the opposition successfully united under a new party (NKDP) and pushed hard for liberalization. Reformers in the government party (DJP) relented, initiating a dialogue on constitutional reform. But subsequent demonstrations, especially the Inchon demonstration on 3 May, indicated the growing radicalization of certain groups within the opposition.[37] The growing power of these radicals fueled a reformer faction in the military that feared that if they did not negotiate with the moderate opposition soon, radicals would become too powerful and attempt to violently overthrow the Chun regime.[38]

Hardliners quickly grew impatient with bickering between and within the DJP and NKDP. On 13 April 1987, Chun suspended debate on constitutional reform, and on 10 June he nominated retired General Roh Tae Woo to succeed

[31] For an excellent account of the Kwangju uprising, see Nam Koon Woo, *South Korean Politics: The Search for Political Consensus and Stability* (New York: University Press of America, 1989), 221–224.

[32] See MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 58–59; and telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Korea Sitrep—5 M. May 19," 19 May 1980.

[33] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Seoul Sitrep, 1430 May 21," 21 May 1980.

[34] MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 58–59.

[35] Nam, *South Korean Politics*, 223.

[36] Yang, *The North and South*, 429–431. For example, the human rights group AsiaWatch maintains that 2,000 civilians were killed.

[37] James Cotton, "From Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea" in James Cotton, ed., *Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations* (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 33.

[38] Cotton, "From Authoritarianism," 33; Robert E. Bedeski, "State Reform and Democracy in South Korea" in Cotton, *Korea Under Roh*, 65; and Edward A. Olsen, "The Challenge of Political Change Overseas," *Washington Quarterly* 10 (Spring 1987): 177.

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him under the unchanged constitution. The opposition exploded as thousands of demonstrators took to the streets in Seoul and elsewhere.[39] Over the course of the next two weeks, reformers began to convince hardliners that they had no choice this time, that repression could not succeed. General Roh sensed this shift away from hardliners in the military and began to "pull away from Chun."[40] Finally, on 26 June, General Roh announced that the demands of the opposition would be met, including for the first time direct and open presidential elections. Thus was democracy born in the second cycle of liberalization.

A Model of Liberalization

In both cycles, initial liberalization by the government engendered increasing demands by the opposition for further liberalization. The spiraling conflict eventually led to a reversal of liberalization that provoked significant demonstrations (Pusan and Masan in 1979, Seoul and Kwangju in 1980, and the June demonstrations in 1987). However, the outcomes of these cycles were very different (crackdown in 1980 and democracy in 1987). What factors could explain the different outcomes?

The transitions to democracy literature describes the liberalization process generally as a two-stage interaction in which the opposition pushes for reform and the government either reforms or cracks down on the opposition. Following a distinction originating with Guillermo O'Donnell, these reforms can either be described as liberalization (prisoner releases, relaxation of restriction on dissent) or democratization (free and fair elections).[41] The distinction is important because, as Samuel Huntington notes, liberalization without democratization is inherently unstable.[42] Instead of reducing pressure on the government, liberalization gives the opposition more leeway and a greater incentive to increase pressure for democratization. Hence, the interaction between the government and the opposition is repeated through successive stages of partial liberalization until the government either democratizes, cracks down on the opposition, or is overthrown. Adam Przeworski concludes: "These indeed are the alternatives: either to incorporate the few groups that can be incorporated and to repress everyone else, returning to authoritarian stasis, or to open the political agenda to the problem of institutions, that is, democracy."[43]

[39] Don Oberdorder, "U.S. Policy in the 1987 Crisis Compared With Other Allies" in Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Hongkoo, eds., *Korea–U.S. Relations: The Politics of Trade and Security* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 180; and Okonogi Masao, "South Korea's Experiment in Democracy" in Cotton, *Korea Under Roh*, 11.

[40] Author's interview with U.S. Ambassador to South Korea James Lilley, 28 February 1997.

[41] See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Notas para el estudio de procesos de democratización a partir del estado burocrático-autoritario," *Estudios CEDES* (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, 1979).

[42] Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 136–137.

[43] Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University, 1991), 60.

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While this explanation illuminates the choices facing the government and the opposition in transitions to democracy, treating these groups as unitary actors obscures the competition to influence strategy that takes place within each group. To enrich the model, we can use the typology introduced by O'Donnell and further elaborated by Przeworski, in which the government is divided into two factions—hardliners and reformers—and the opposition is divided into moderates and radicals.[44] Though these writers use the typology to refer to actors with strictly different preferences, it may be more useful to think of them as existing along spectra from radical to moderate and from reformer to hardliner. For example, some hardliners might be more inclined to support reform than others, while some radicals might be more inclined to support moderate opposition strategies.

Each faction exercises power in two ways—by provoking a response or by changing preferences. For example, if moderates participate in large radical demonstrations, this might cause hardliners to crack down. However, it might also cause some hardliners to be more receptive to reform if the demonstration changes their belief about the probability that a crackdown will have hugely negative consequences. Thus the predictive power of this model may be hampered by an inability to assess the relative weight of cross-cutting effects. This should not, however, discourage the use of the typology as an analytical tool to clarify the interests of each faction and to discover whether explanatory hypotheses can be eliminated because they fall too far outside the realm of the possible.

The most important result of the typology is that the reformer faction is critically important to successful transitions to democracy. To maximize their own benefit in a potential transition, reformers must marginalize radicals by making concessions to moderates. Otherwise, opposition strategies will become more extreme as radicals lose patience with the process, increasing the risk of civil disorder. However, the natural tendency of the opposition to demand greater and greater concessions may increase the probability that hardliners will respond by cracking down to avoid a loss of power. Caught in a high-risk balancing act, reformers must be able to face down or change the hardliners if they are to continue making concessions and complete the process of transition.[45] Thus, a weak reformer faction is a recipe for failure, while a strong reformer faction can dramatically improve the probability of democratization.

The importance of the strength of reformers is empirically verified in South Korea. In the first cycle of liberalization, Kim Chae Kyu tried to initiate a coup in the name of democratization, but the coup failed when reformers failed to support him. Moreover, Chun Doo Hwan was able to purge reformers in the military and in the KCIA, meaning that there were no reformers left to oppose

[44] Ibid., 67.

[45] Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order," *Politics and Society* 23 (September 1995): 278–280.

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garrison decree and the crackdown at Kwangju. However, in the second cycle, Roh Tae Woo led a group of reformers that convinced Chun to step down. In both of these cycles, the relative strength of reformers correlated directly to the likelihood of a transition. When reformers were weakest, hundreds died at Kwangju. When reformers were strongest, democracy bloomed. Any explanation of the timing of the transition must thus be tested for its effect on reformers.

Ad Hoc Explanations

Scholars and other observers have advanced many ad hoc explanations that identify one factor or another as being important to the timing of Korean liberalization. Five of the most common arguments will be addressed here. First, there is widespread agreement that nationwide demonstrations held in June 1987, especially those held on the 18th and 19th, were very important in contributing to Chun's decision to allow direct elections.[46] The most common argument in the literature is that these demonstrations were unique because they drew the support of the middle-class or ordinary citizens.[47] More and more Koreans identified themselves as middle class over the period, and Soo Young Auh hypothesizes that middle-class Koreans as "postmaterialists" were better educated, more physically secure, and thus more likely to place a "high priority on self-expression" and participate in demonstrations.[48] This effect primarily increased civilian support for the opposition, but it also increased the strength of reformers in the lower ranks of the military as they too became middle class.[49] Thus authors like Robert E. Bedeski assert that a critical threshold of support from a "broader cross-section of society" was reached in 1987, which finally led to a "popular reaction" against the government.[50]

However, the middle class also participated to a lesser degree in the first cycle. The Pusan demonstration in October 1979 was the first major demonstra-

[46] For samples, see Okonogi, "South Korea's Experiment," 11; Bedeski, "State Reform," 65; and Sam Jameson, "U.S. Reportedly Had Little Influence in South Korean Policy Turnabout," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 July 1987.

[47] See Daniel A. Bell, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 87; Bedeski, "State Reform," 65; Jameson, "U.S. Reportedly," 12; Oberdorfer, "U.S. Policy," 180; and Russell Watson, "Crisis in Korea," *Newsweek*, 29 June 1987, 8. This view was also expressed in the author's interviews with Ambassador William Gleysteen, 27 February 1997 and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Michael Armacost, 28 February 1997.

[48] Soo, "The Impact of Value Change on Democratization in Korea," (http://www.kois.go.kr/Explore/Studies/15.html), 1 January 1997. See also Tat Yan Kong, "From Relative Autonomy to Consensual Development: The Case of South Korea," *Political Studies* 43 (December 1995): 641. For a description of the theory of postmaterialist values, see Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

[49] Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997.

[50] Bedeski, "State Reform," 69.

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tion that was widely supported by townspeople;[51] and the Kwangju incident in May 1980 brought thousands of ordinary citizens onto the streets. That this behavior was first observed in 1979 is no surprise; a public opinion poll in early 1980 showed that for the first time, Koreans viewed a greater share in political decision making and a larger measure of personal freedom as more important than economic priorities.[52] Even though the middle class did participate somewhat more in 1987, some observers doubt that they played a significant role in the demonstrations.[53] The weakness of the middle class did not pose a barrier to transitions in countries like the Philippines, for example.

Second, labor is another group that has been cited in the literature as critical to the 1987 demonstrations.[54] With productivity rising twice as fast as wages, workers resented the fact that they had not shared in the fruits of the Korean economic miracle. Moreover, though workers' rights of free association and collective bargaining were included in the constitutions under both Park and Chun, in practice these rights were not protected.[55] The result, it is argued, was that labor increased its support for the radical opposition by joining in student demonstrations or organizing protests of their own during the second cycle of liberalization.

However, labor activity was even more pronounced in the first cycle of liberalization because of the dramatic economic problems experienced in 1979 and 1980. The international oil shock and a disastrous rice harvest because of a severe winter fueled inflation and caused the Korean economy to shrink in 1980 for the first time since the 1950s.[56] If anything, the economic crisis should have made a transition to democracy more likely.[57] Responding to the crisis, students tried to stimulate support for demonstrations by including specific economic demands such as punishment for businesses that lay off workers.[58] As a result, workers began striking for better wages and working conditions.[59] The Y. H. Trading Company sit-in at the NDP in August 1979 and labor support for the demonstrations in Pusan and Masan in October 1979 contributed to the

[51] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "More on Pusan Demonstration; Demonstration at EWHA University in Seoul," 17 October 1979.

[52] MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 127.

[53] See, for instance, Chalmers Johnson, "South Korean Democratization: The Role of Economic Development" in Cotton, *Korea Under Roh*, 105.

[54] See, for example, Bedeski, "State Reform," 64.

[55] Robert E. Bedeski, *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic Under Roe Tae Woo, 1987–1992* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 115.

[56] Sakong Il, *Korea in the World Economy* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993), 54; and MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 57–58.

[57] Though the empirical evidence is inconclusive, Przeworski intuits that "finer analysis may still show that economic factors operate in a uniform way: Liberalization occurs when an economic crisis follows a long period of growth." Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*, 97.

[58] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Second Demonstration at Seoul National University," 20 September 1979.

[59] MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 58.

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fall of the Park regime.[60] As the first cycle of liberalization unfolded, labor became more and more active as evidenced by the Peace Market strike, the miners' strike in Sabuk, the FKTU's threat to sue the government over the Special Measures Law, the Pusan steel mill riot, the FKTU rally for the right to strike, and strikes at hundreds of other firms throughout the period, especially as wages were being renegotiated in spring 1980.[61] The Kwangju uprising itself was an example of "labor and student unrest."[62] Recognizing the importance of labor, one of the first actions of the Chun government was to coerce the FKTU to make a statement calling for an end to labor strife.[63] This evidence indicates that labor played an even more important role in the events of 1979 and 1980, meaning that it cannot be credited as a critical factor in the timing of democratization.

Third, Samuel Huntington argues that hardliners in South Korea were constrained by the *nunca más* effect, named for a December 1982 event in Argentina in which the death of a protester led to a call for reconciliation and reduced violence in the transition. In the Korean protests of 1986 and 1987, Huntington notes that Korean authorities were "careful to avoid using firearms so as not to replicate the Kwangju massacre."[64] While this might have been a declared reason to avoid another crackdown, it does not explain why huge peace marches in April 1980 commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Rhee government's massacre of 200 students failed to have the same effect. Students were undoubtedly screaming "never again" shortly before the massacre at Kwangju. Hence, if we are to believe that hardliners were indeed constrained by the *nunca más* effect in 1987, the failure of this constraint in 1980 must be explained.

Fourth, other observers argue that the 1988 Olympics played a critical role in constraining hardliners by drawing world attention to the government's actions.[65] The conventional wisdom asserts that if Chun had used the military to crack down on demonstrations, the International Olympic Committee would have moved the Games.[66] General Roh contributed to this perception when he

[60] Tat, "From Relative Autonomy," 638; and Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 76–78.

[61] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Garment Workers Strike," 11 April 1980; Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 78; telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Organized Labor Calls for Suspension of Special Measures Law," 29 April 1980; telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "More Violence on Labor Scene," 1 May 1980; telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "FKTU Holds Rally for Right to Strike," 14 May 1980; Frederica M. Bunge, ed., *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 179; and telegram from Gleysteen to Christopher, "The Labor Scene: Disputes, Remedies and Recommendations," 6 May 1980.

[62] MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 131.

[63] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Unions Feel Pressure from ROKG," 3 June 1980.

[64] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 196; Former Director of Korean Affairs Robert G. Rich, Jr. concurred with this assertion in an interview with the author on 27 February 1997.

[65] Okonogi, "South Korea's Experiment," 11; Cotton, "From Authoritarianism," 33; and Jameson, "U.S. Reportedly," 12.

[66] Johnson, "South Korean Democratization," 104.

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announced that liberalization would take place in the name of political tranquility, a smooth transition, legitimate government, and a peaceful Olympic Games.[67] However, the importance of the Games is questionable. They did not lead to liberalization in other nations—the Soviet Union not only did not liberalize prior to games in Moscow in 1980, it invaded Afghanistan. Moreover, the threat of moving the Games in the event of a crackdown was probably overstated. The committee had, after all, decided to locate the Games in Seoul despite the hundreds killed in Kwangju. Chun could just as easily have been convinced that the committee's assignment of the Games to Seoul was based on his ability to maintain order by any means necessary.

Finally, many observers argue that the first cycle of liberalization ended in failure because of the weakness of the leader of the interim government, President Choi Kyu Hah.[68] Choi's lack of "political experience and leadership qualities"[69] became apparent almost immediately after he became the acting president. On 10 November 1979, Choi infuriated opposition leaders when he announced a plan for an interim government before consulting them.[70] By December, both the opposition and the government expressed fears that Choi's refusal to announce an explicit timetable for constitutional reform and new elections was increasing the possibility of North Korean intervention.[71] Ambassador William Gleysteen was so pessimistic about Choi's ability to run the government that he began to focus on other men within the government such as Prime Minister Shin.[72] As tensions between radicals and hardliners increased in 1980, Choi's voice was noticeably absent, "adding to the general sense of suspicion rather than setting forth clearly what needs to be done."[73] He actually left the country in May on a diplomatic mission to the Middle East, and though he returned before the 15 May demonstrations, he did nothing to calm radicals or allay pressure from hardliners.[74] In a last ditch effort to get Choi to act, Am-

[67] Bell, *Towards Illiberal Democracy*, 87.

[68] Author's interview with Rich, 27 February 1997; Jameson, "U.S. Reportedly," 12; and Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 77.

[69] Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 77.

[70] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Acting President's Speech and Dissidents," 10 November 1979. It should be noted that after much prodding, Choi did meet with Kim Young Sam and dissident groups two weeks later. See telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Acting President Meets Opposition Leader," 24 November 1979, and "Acting President Meets Religious Leaders," 26 November 1979.

[71] Telegram from Rich to Holbrooke, "Weekly Status Report—Korea," 7 December 1979; and telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Conversation with NDP Assemblymen," 12 December 1979, and "My December 20 Conversation with NDP President Kim Young Sam," 21 December 1979.

[72] See telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Current Political Scene Review with Member of Acting President's Staff," 30 November 1979, "Discussion of Military Grab With President Choi," 13 December 1979, "New Defense Minister," 15 December 1979, and "Korea Focus—My Meeting With Prime Minister December 18," 18 December 1979.

[73] Telegram from Gleysteen to Christopher, "Korea Focus: Building Tensions and Concern Over Student Issue," 8 May 1980.

[74] Telegram from Christopher to Gleysteen, "Korea Focus—Tensions in the ROK," 8 May 1980; and Kihl, *Politics and Policies*, 77.

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bassador Gleysteen met with his secretary general on 17 May to emphasize that Choi was the only one who had a chance of heading off the looming confrontation.[75] The meeting obviously failed.

However harshly history might judge Choi's character, he should not be blamed for the failure of the transition. In the wake of Park's assassination, any acting president would have had three choices: ally with the moderate opposition and seek a negotiated transition to democracy, ally with hardliners and support renewed authoritarianism, or make no commitments. That Choi did not ally with hardliners indicates that he must have desired a transition and believed that it was possible. However, any alliance with the opposition so soon after Park was killed in the name of democracy would undoubtedly have alarmed hardliners. Though Park's assassination was "semi-popular,"[76] reformers were naturally constrained by the subversive nature of this attempted political change. Any stronger action by Choi to move toward transition might have encouraged a purge of reformers, perhaps including civilians like Choi himself, even before 12 December. After the purge, Choi was on his own.[77] An indictment of Choi thus misunderstands that he could only be as strong as the reformers who could help him stand down the hardliners.

The Role of the United States

None of the above ad hoc explanations are satisfactory, because they leave out what must be considered a crucial variable—the role of the United States. The scholarly literature has addressed U.S. influence, but most of these treatments get bogged down by the debate over the use of CFC forces to put down the Kwangju uprising.[78] Some observers blame the United States for approving the brutal use of force in Kwangju.[79] Others side with the State Department, which

[75] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "My 17 Meeting with Blue House SYG Choi Kwang Soo," 17 May 1980.

[76] Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997.

[77] Even though reformers did retain posts in the military (some of whom would be instrumental in 1987), Chun effectively forced them to remain silent by installing loyalists deep within the ranks. Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997. By February, a reformer faction in the military was "virtually non-existent," meaning that a negotiated transition to democracy was unlikely. See telegram from Gleysteem to Vance, "Role of the Moderate Opposition in the Transition Away from Authoritarianism," 11 February 1980.

[78] See Kim Hyun K., "Unification Fever and Resentment: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Korean Press Reports on Radical Student Movement" in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Lee Seong Hyong, eds., *Forty Years of Korea–U.S. Relations, 1948–1988* (Seoul: Kyung Hee University, 1990), 194. For an especially balanced treatment, see Donald Clark, *Korea Briefing, 1991* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 156–159.

[79] See Yang, *The North and South*, 431–432; Selig S. Harrison, "Political Alliance in the Two Koreas: The Impact of the American Presence" in Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter, eds., *The U.S.–South Korean Alliance* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991) 123; and Tim Shorrock, "U.S. Knew of South Korean Crackdown: Ex-Leaders Go on Trial in Seoul," *Journal of Commerce* 27 (February 1996).

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has repeatedly claimed that it was "not involved."[80] Resolving this debate is important, because it will illuminate the choices that U.S. officials faced during the period.

Until 1994, all South Korean troops were technically under the supreme command of an American officer. The CFC structure was originally designed to enable South Korea to quickly deploy its own forces if needed for emergencies other than an invasion by North Korea. While giving the South Koreans more flexibility, the CFC system still kept a considerable amount of authority in the hands of the Americans.[81] In theory, the South Korean government was supposed to obtain U.S. approval before removing forces from the CFC command. However, there was no logistical reason that would prevent the government from removing units first and notifying the United States later.[82] The CFC procedure was used for the first time prior to the Pusan and Masan riots. Ambassador Gleysteen observed that CFC Commander General John A. Wickham had been consulted and the new system worked "in an orderly manner."[83] Six weeks later General Chun demonstrated that the CFC command could be completely ignored when he moved Korean forces away from the border in order to support his takeover of the military.[84]

American officials assert that the special forces sent to put down the original demonstration in Kwangju on 18 May were not under CFC control.[85] Moreover, they imply that the Korean military was not required to and did not consult American authorities before using them.[86] However, there is evidence that on 7 May the United States released from CFC control the 11th and 13th Special Forces Brigades in anticipation of the 15 May demonstrations.[87] The following day Gleysteen wrote: "In none of our discussions will we in any way suggest that the USG opposes ROKG contingency plans to maintain law and order, if absolutely necessary by reinforcing police with the army."[88] Assistant Secretary

[80] Moon Ihlwan, "U.S. Still under Fire for 'Role' in 1980 S. Korea Massacre," *Reuters North American Wire*, 30 November 1995. See also Kim Hyun K., "Unification Fever," 195.

[81] For an interesting discussion of the uniqueness of the CFC system, see Harrison, "Political Alliance," 123.

[82] Clark, *Korea Briefing*, 158.

[83] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Text of Scope Paper RE State Funeral for Korean President Park," 1 November 1979.

[84] Pae Sung Moon, "Korean Perspectives on American Democracy" in Kim Ilpyong J., ed., *Korean Challenges and American Policy* (New York: Paragon House, 1991), 468–469; and Harrison, "Political Alliance," 123.

[85] Michael Armacost in *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Public Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives*, 96th Congress, 2nd sess., 25 June 1980 and 28 August 1980, 10. See also Harrison, "Political Alliance," 123.

[86] Armacost, *Hearings*, 10; Kim Hyun K., "Unification Fever," 195.

[87] Telegram from Gleysteen to SecState, "ROKG Shifts Special Forces Units," 7 May 1980.

[88] Telegram from Gleysteen to Christopher, "Korea Focus: Building Tensions and Concern Over Student Issue," 8 May 1980. See also telegrams from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Korea Focus: May 9 Conversation with Blue House SYG Kwang Soo Choi," 10 May 1980, and "May 19 Discussion with FonMin on Domestic Politics," 20 May 1980.

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of State Warren Christopher wrote back: "We agree that we should not oppose ROK contingency plans to maintain law and order."[89] Although none of this heavily sanitized evidence specifically applies to Kwangju, it does indicate that the United States was aware of a large-scale preparation for a crackdown, which they explicitly did not oppose.

American officials do admit that they approved the release of units used in the final assault on Kwangju.[90] Again, the State Department telegrams emphasize the concern for law and order that motivated officials not to oppose the use of force. On 23 May: "While we will not deny U.S. approval of troop movements and will affirm our belief that the primary task at present is the restoration of law and order, we will not engage in prolonged debate of these actions."[91] On 26 May: "We were not telling the government to refrain from military action since we recognized the dangers of an extended period of lawlessness in Kwangju. . . ."[92]

Many writers have focused on the U.S. role at Kwangju as though it were crucial to the outcome of the first cycle of liberalization. The belief is that if only the Americans had "disapproved" the use of CFC forces, the crackdown would not have occurred and Chun would have been forced to accept a transition to democracy. However, normative arguments about this choice have misunderstood the positive constraints on U.S. actions. Chun did not ask for or receive approval to move CFC forces on 12 December. By May he would have felt even less pressure to avoid a crackdown, because he had already purged reformers in the Korean military. Thus it is not likely that General Chun would have complied, even if General Wickham had told him no.[93] The American choice was constrained by the lack of actors within the Korean military who could have used an American signal of disapproval to convince Chun not to crack down. Since U.S. decision makers believed that they could not change the outcome, the choice between giving a tacit green light or ruining relations with Chun was obvious. On the other hand, if the United States could have done something earlier to strengthen reformers, the option to disapprove would have been more lucrative, because it would have increased the probability of a successful transition to democracy.

Other observers have argued that the events at Kwangju demonstrate that the influence of the United States was "limited" or "marginal."[94] The fear of

[89] Telegram from Christopher to Gleysteen, "Korea Focus—Tensions in the ROK," 8 May 1980.

[90] Armacost, *Hearings*, 11. General Wickham approved 20th division reinforcements. See Clark, *Korea Briefing*, 158; Pae, "Korean Perspectives," 469; and telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Korea Sitrep, 1800, May 22, 1980," 22 May 1980.

[91] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Possible ROK Domestic Reaction to U.S. Position," 23 May 1980.

[92] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "May 26 Meeting with Blue House SYG Choi," 26 May 1980.

[93] Doug Bandow, *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996), 42.

[94] Sohn Hak-Kyu, *Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 146; author's interview with Gleysteen, 28 February 1997; Lee Manwoo, Ronald D. McLaurin, and

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North Korea and the importance of security in Northeast Asia prevented the United States from seriously considering the use of economic or military sanctions to promote liberalization. But this does not exhaust the means of influence at the U.S. command. In the second cycle of liberalization, the United States would make its presence felt primarily through the use of public pressure.

For its first six years, the Reagan administration had explicitly followed a policy to avoid public criticism of allies like Korea.[95] However, the silence was broken in February 1987 when Assistant Secretary Gaston Sigur gave an "exceptionally outspoken" speech in which he called on the Korean government to permanently "civilianize their politics" and implied that Chun could not count on American support if he resisted popular demand for change.[96] The United States also publicly called for a dialogue between the government and the opposition to avert a breakdown that might lead to a North Korean intervention.[97] By June, the United States had dramatically increased its public efforts to pressure the government to proceed with constitutional revision.[98] To head off a plan by Chun to declare martial law, the State Department issued a sharp statement on 19 June.[99] In the aftermath of the Roh declaration on 26 June, many American officials credited public speeches and statements for being the "major instrument of persuasion and impact at the U.S. Command."[100]

Public pressure was brought to bear in the first cycle as well. In August and September 1979, the Korean government complained to the State Department about its increasingly vocal criticism of the renewed enforcement of EM-9, the arrest of NDP officials, and police brutality in the Y. H. Trading Company sit-in at NDP headquarters.[101] When Kim Young Sam was expelled from the National Assembly, State Department officials expressed "deep regret" and claimed that

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Moon Chung-in, *Alliance Under Tension: The Evolution of Korean–U.S. Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 45, 150; and Holbrooke, *Hearings*, 28.

[95] Claude A. Buss, *The United States and Korea: Background for Policy* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1982), 164; Harrison, "Political Alliance," 123; and Bandow, *Tripwire*, 42.

[96] William Gleysteen and Alan D. Romberg, "Korea: Asian Paradox," *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Summer 1987): 1052. See also Oberdorfer, "U.S. Policy," 179; Lee, McLaurin, and Moon, *Alliance*, 44; Kim Chonghan, "Korea–U.S. Relations: The Convergence and Divergence of National Interests" in Kwak and Lee, *Forty Years*, 12; and Morton Kondracke, "Seoul Searching: South Korea Isn't a Democracy—Yet," *The New Republic*, 27 July 1987, 24.

[97] Bedeski, "State Reform," 65.

[98] Harrison, "Political Alliance," 123; and Oberdorfer, "U.S. Policy," 180.

[99] Kondracke, "Seoul Searching," 24.

[100] Oberdorfer, "U.S. Policy," 179. Ambassador Lilley concurred in his interview with the author, 28 February 1997.

[101] Telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Embassy Expresses Concern Over Arrest of NDP Newspaper Editor," 2 August 1979, and "U.S. Criticism of EM-9," 9 August 1979; telegrams from Vance to Gleysteen, "U.S. Criticism of EM-9," 9 August 1979, and "Police Assault on NDP Headquarters in Trading Co Sit-In Incident," 14 August 1979; and telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Police Assault on NDP Headquarters," 14 August 1979, and "Situation Report: Y. H. Incident—August 16," 16 August 1979.

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the expulsion was "inconsistent with the principles of democratic government."[102] More importantly, for the first time ever, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea was recalled to Washington.[103] President Park "complained bitterly" to Ambassador Gleysteen about the recall[104] and with good reason—days later, anger over Kim's expulsion would lead to riots in Pusan, which would lead to Park's assassination. Gleysteen later reflected that U.S. public pressure may have "unwittingly contributed" to his death.[105]

Immediately following Park's assassination, U.S. public pressure declined dramatically. On the plane to Park's funeral, Director of Korean Affairs Robert Rich, Undersecretary of State Richard Holbrooke, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance decided that an opportunity existed for democratization, which meant that "we had to shut our mouths a bit" and instead pursue liberalization through increased private diplomatic pressure.[106] As a result, the State Department maintained relative silence in November and in stark contrast to their protest of the 1960 coup, refused to criticize the actions taken by General Chun in December 1979.[107] American officials instead protested the breach of CFC command through private channels.[108] After the Korean government agreed on a vague timetable for reform, Holbrooke promised that the U.S. government "would not publicly contest the ROKG version of recent events." In January, reformers in the Korean government hoped they could strengthen their hand by holding a Carter-Choi summit meeting, but the request for the meeting was denied.[109] U.S. public comment remained muted throughout 1980, even in the aftermath of the May declaration of military rule and the Kwangju uprising.[110] Carter's statement to the Democratic Platform Committee on 12 June claimed: "We have promoted an increasingly frank and friendly dialogue with the Korean Government." Throughout the trial of Kim Dae Jung, the policy of the State Department was to avoid public comment.[111]

Thus, in 1979 and 1987, public statements by the American government contributed to the progress of Korean transitions by catalyzing the radical op-

[102] Telegram from Rich to Holbrooke, "Weekly Status Report—Korea," 4 October 1979.

[103] Sohn, *Authoritarianism*, 163.

[104] Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997.

[105] William Gleysteen in David D. Newsom, ed., *The Diplomacy of Human Rights* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1986).

[106] Author's interview with Rich, 27 February 1997.

[107] Pae, "Korean Perspectives," 468.

[108] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Younger ROK Officers Grab Power Positions," 13 December 1979.

[109] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Trial Balloon RE Visit of President Choi to US," 7 January 1980.

[110] Lee, McLaurin, and Moon, *Alliance*, 38. For a specific example, see the telegram from Christopher to Gleysteen, "Crackdown in Seoul," 18 May 1980, in which the State Department deliberately delays and weakens its response.

[111] See, for example, the telegram from Christopher to Gleysteen, "Korea Focus: Instructions to See General Chun," 7 August 1980.

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position and influencing reformers to act against hardliners.[112] Meanwhile, the failure of liberalization in 1980 can be at least partially attributed to the weakness of reformers, especially after they were purged by Chun on 12 December 1979. While there can be no certainty that sustained U.S. public pressure in late 1979 and early 1980 would have strengthened the reformers enough to make a transition to democracy possible, the result is strong enough to raise two important questions. U.S. officials clearly wanted Korea to democratize in 1980, so why did they eliminate an option that could have catalyzed the opposition and strengthened the reformers as happened in 1987? And if there was a good reason to avoid public statements, what caused officials to use public statements in 1987?

Public Pressure in the First Cycle of Liberalization

The word "caution" rings time and again like a mantra throughout declassified telegrams between Ambassador Gleysteen and the State Department. In the first cycle of liberalization, Gleysteen struggled with the State Department's increasing use of public criticism. Before the Carter-Park summit, Gleysteen cautioned the president not to endorse any individual or group engaged in human rights activities.[113] When discussing the Y. H. Trading Company incident with the Korean foreign minister, he explained that he would not have worded the public criticism so strongly.[114] In September 1979, Gleysteen urged that Washington not denounce the expulsion of Kim Young Sam, but instead call for "mutual restraint."[115] Days later, when Kim Young Sam criticized President Carter's visit and the embassy in a *New York Times* article, Gleysteen refused to rebut in order not to exacerbate tensions in the present environment.[116] Richard C. Holbrooke further noted that public statements had been moderated because of Gleysteen's influence.[117] In October, Gleysteen recommended avoiding comment on military law and the demonstrations in Masan and Pusan.[118]

[112] This also appears to be true of 1960, when U.S. statements "catalyzed" the movement that sent Syngman Rhee into exile. See MacDonald, *The Koreans*, 53.

[113] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Summit Background Paper 3: Human Rights," 25 May 1979.

[114] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Meeting with FonMin on Y. H. Trading Company Incident," 17 August 1979.

[115] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Meeting with Blue House Official on Political and Human Rights," 15 September 1979.

[116] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Kim Young Sam Criticizes President Carter's Visit and Embassy," 17 September 1979.

[117] Telegram from Vance to Gleysteen, "Assistant Secretary Holbrooke's Bilateral with ROK Foreign Minister Park R—Korean Political Developments," 27 September 1979.

[118] Telegrams from Gleysteen to Vance, "Situation in Pusan Following Declaration of Martial Law," 18 October 1979, and "Embassy Thoughts on Current Mood Following Declaration of Martial Law in Pusan," 20 October 1979.

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After Park's assassination, Gleysteen was much more successful at restraining comments. After Park's assassination he urged the State Department to work toward political liberalization through diplomatic channels.[119] After the 12 December incident, Warren Christopher noted: "On the basis of Ambassador Gleysteen's recommendation, we are being cautious at this juncture in how we publicly characterize the situation and are avoiding any implication of a coup d'etat."[120] A pattern had definitely emerged, which was carried into 1980. During the Kwangju crisis, Gleysteen recommended that Korea–U.S. planning talks set for June not be canceled.[121] And as Congress considered public punitive action in June 1980, he opposed it, preferring that members of Congress write letters instead.[122] In response to the verdict in the trial of Kim Dae Jung, he opposed a strong public statement.[123]

The Carter administration "relied very heavily" on Ambassador Gleysteen.[124] Moreover, Gleysteen has admitted that he "managed to keep public statements repressed" after Park's assassination.[125] However, it is difficult to believe that this entirely explains the dramatic change observed in the first cycle of liberalization. What conditions existed that would give Gleysteen so much more power over public commentary?

The Iranian revolution and the taking of American hostages in 1979 had a twofold impact on U.S. policy towards South Korea. First of all, it diverted the attention of both the State Department and the administration away from Korea.[126] Gleysteen noted that "Iran distracted the Administration while it disciplined them," which enabled him to exert more control over the use of public criticism.[127] Second, though, it motivated analogies that directly influenced U.S. policy. Kim Young Sam drew the analogy in a speech at Yale: "If the U.S. had made the Shah step down ten years ago and had engaged in dialogue with the opposition, there wouldn't exist a situation in which the embassy is being stormed."[128] In September 1979, Kim compared the embassy in Seoul with that in Teheran just before the shah's downfall.[129]

[119] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Initial Reflections on Post-Park Chung Hee Situation in Korea," 28 October 1979.

[120] Telegram from Christopher to Vance, "Military Power Play in South Korea," 12 December 1979.

[121] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Your Memo to the Secretary for the PRC Meeting," 22 May 1980.

[122] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Korean Focus: Consultations with Congress," 12 June 1980.

[123] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "U.S. Comment on Kim Dae Jung Verdict," 5 September 1980.

[124] Author's interview with Armacost, 28 February 1997.

[125] Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997.

[126] Lee, McLaurin, and Moon, *Alliance*, 38.

[127] Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997.

[128] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, 22 February 1979.

[129] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Kim Young Sam Criticizes President Carter's Visit and Embassy," 17 September 1979.

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The State Department had its own opinions. Robert Rich noted that while the Iran analogy existed at the White House and congressional level, at State it was felt that there was "no possibility" of Korea becoming another Iran.[130] Gleysteen echoed this skepticism, pointing out that the analogy that was drawn depended on the orientation of the person making it. Those who believed the United States should take an active role in promoting Korean liberalization argued that a public perception by the Korean population that the United States is too closely tied to the Korean government could produce anti-American outbursts like those in Iran. Others used the Iran example to warn against pressing too hard on the Korean government.[131]

Meanwhile, newspapers in the United States were drawing their own conclusions in editorials that found their way into State Department telegrams to Seoul.[132] Heavily influenced by Congress and the press, the White House feared the destabilizing effect of unbridled demonstrations, because after Iran "another failure would have been disastrous."[133] On 4 December, Richard Holbrooke directed Gleysteen to work to moderate the opposition's actions:

> I have been talking privately with key Senators and Congressmen, including [Sam] Nunn, [John] Glenn, [Lester] Wolff, [Richard] Stone, and a few others about our strategy. We have their full support at this time. Their attitudes, like everyone else's, are dominated by the Iranian crisis and, needless to say, nobody wants another "Iran"—by which they mean American action which would in any way appear to unravel a situation and lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally. . . . What we have in mind is your sending a clear message to Christian dissidents who are now stirring up street demonstrations. . . . Even when these are in fact not demonstrations, but rather just meetings in defiance of martial law, the U.S. Government views them as unhelpful while martial law is still in effect. . . . The purpose of the message to the Christians is to alert them to the fact that they should not automatically count on the same degree of American support now that they might have had a few months ago. . . . The purpose of this approach, quite frankly, is to enhance U.S. credibility with the leadership on the eve of some tough decisions.[134]

Though Gleysteen refused to issue an explicit message to opposition leaders, he wrote back to Holbrooke: "We have been doing something which resembles your reftel proposal."[135] Thus, the Iranian crisis not only gave Gleysteen a freer

[130] Author's interview with Rich, 27 February 1997.

[131] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Anti-Government Demonstration at YWCA Hall and Leaflets Distributed at Seoul National University," 26 November 1979.

[132] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Hankuk Ilbo Article on Treatment of ROK Reporters," 13 October 1979; and telegram from Vance to Gleysteen, "New York Times Editorial on Korea," 16 December 1979.

[133] Author's interview with Gleysteen, 27 February 1997.

[134] Telegram from Vance to Gleysteen, "Korea Focus—Nudging ROK Political Leaders," 4 December 1979.

[135] Telegram from Gleysteen to Holbrooke, "Korea Focus—Nudging ROK Political Leaders," 7 December 1979.

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hand, but helps to explain why the human rights-conscious Carter administration in 1979 changed its policy of asserting overt pressure on the Korean government for liberalization.

Public Pressure in the Second Cycle of Liberalization

In the aftermath of Park's assassination, Gleysteen was keenly aware of the potential for igniting a strong anti-American reaction if the opposition believed the United States was not supporting liberalization.[136] However, he seemed to fear an anti-American reaction within the Korean military even more. As a result, he argued against pushing "too hard and too crassly" for liberalization.[137] The pivotal event, though, that would cause anti-American sentiment to "explode" and become a significant factor in domestic politics was the Kwangju incident.[138] Amid their struggle in May 1980, the citizens of Kwangju believed that America should and would actively intervene to enforce justice and bring about a much-desired end to military rule.[139] But the United States chose not to intervene beyond approving the use of CFC forces to put down the uprising. American authorities were well aware that this action risked fanning anti-American sentiment.[140] The perception of American collusion with the military authorities was further bolstered by the Reagan administration's hasty move to invite General Chun to be the first foreign head of state to visit the White House.[141] An anti-American backlash that Gleysteen had feared would come from the military came instead from the opposition and quickly spread to mainstream Koreans.[142]

Anti-Americanism conditioned the second cycle of liberalization as Koreans became increasingly disillusioned with America's continued military, diplomatic, and economic support for the Chun regime. Many who had in the past looked to the United States as an example of participatory democracy came to

[136] Ibid.

[137] Telegram from Gleysteen to Vance, "Initial Reflections on Post-Park Chung Hee Situation in Korea," 28 October 1979.

[138] There is widespread agreement on this point. See Lee, McLaurin, and Moon, *Alliance*, 10; Nam, *South Korean Politics*, 223; Kwak Tae-Hwan and Wayne Patterson, "Security Relations Between Korea and the United States 1960–1984" in Lee Yur-Bok and Wayne Patterson, eds., *One Hundred Years of Korean-American Relations, 1882–1982* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1986), 120; Hyun Sing-il, "Anti-Americanism in Korean Student Movement" in Kwak and Lee, *Forty Years*, 36; Bandow, *Tripwire*, 42; and Jameson, "U.S. Reportedly," 12.

[139] Bandow, *Tripwire*, 42; and telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Kwangju Riot and Political Stability," 21 May 1980.

[140] Telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "May 22 Meeting with FonMin," 22 May 1980.

[141] Lee, McLaurin, and Moon, *Alliance*, 11.

[142] Nam, *South Korean Politics*, 223; Doug Bandow in Bandow and Carpenter, *U.S.-South Korean Alliance*, 80; and telegram from Gleysteen to Muskie, "Kwangju Riot and Political Stability," 21 May 1980.

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believe that the United States was actually "part of the problem."[143] As student unrest increased between 1985 and 1987, radicals began to target American citizens and institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce and U.S. Information Agency. In the street demonstrations of 1987, many protesters blamed America "not only for the political intransigence of the Chun government but for its very existence."[144] Even in the aftermath of Roh's 26 June declaration, demonstrators in Seoul pulled down an American flag and burned it on the balcony of a hotel amid "wild applause" and a "roar of approval among the hundreds of thousands of protesters."[145] The effect of this increased anger toward America was the sense that anti-Americanism itself represented "a long-range problem in Korean-American security relations."[146] Thus, the rise in anti-American sentiment was probably an important catalyst that contributed to the decision to use public pressure. However, it is difficult to believe that this entirely explains the dramatic change observed in the second cycle of liberalization. What conditions existed that would have caused the change in 1987?

Just as the failure of Iran made the Carter administration more risk averse, the success in the Philippines caused the Reagan administration to be more aggressive in South Korea. Before the Philippine events, public criticism would have won little favor as a diplomatic tactic directed toward a friendly foreign government.[147] However, the cry of "people power" in the Philippines reached all the way to Washington.[148] Pressure from the Congress came from Representatives like Stephen J. Solarz, who said: "like the Philippines, South Korea is an example of a country where we can more effectively protect our strategic interests by promoting our political values."[149] The press echoed these sentiments in editorials that called on the government to "replicate its success" from the Philippines in Korea by abandoning "quiet diplomacy."[150]

Pressure to draw the analogy was so strong that one State Department document noted: "[Ronald Reagan] has difficulties with comparisons that are sometimes made between Korea and the Philippines" and tried to outline the reasons they were different.[151] Despite this attempt to draw a distinction, the administration's experience in the Philippines was clearly an important factor in leading to the belief that public speeches and statements were their "major instrument of persuasion" in Korea.[152] "The impact of the Aquino accession on

[143] Vincent S. R. Brandt in Lee Chong-Sik, ed., *Korea Briefing, 1990* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), 92.

[144] Bandow, *Tripwire*, 28.

[145] Harrison, "Political Alliance," 123–124.

[146] Kwak and Patterson, "Security Relations," 125–126.

[147] Oberdorfer, "U.S. Policy," 179.

[148] Bedeski, "State Reform," 63.

[149] Olsen, "The Challenge," 173.

[150] Raymond Bonner, "It's Time We Start Backing Democracy in South Korea," *New York Times*, 28 June 1987.

[151] Memo, ID#390429SS, FG001, WHORM: Alpha File, Ronald Reagan Library.

[152] Oberdorfer, "U.S. Policy," 179.

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South Korea would be difficult to exaggerate.... Though [the opposition] knew that the United States did not topple [Ferdinand] Marcos and install [Corazon] Aquino, they understood clearly the United States role as facilitator of the process."[153] Thus, the influence of the Philippines may help to explain why the security-conscious Reagan administration in 1987 changed its policy of avoiding overt pressure on the Korean government for liberalization.

Conclusion

As the story of democratization continues to unfold in South Korea, more and more of its citizens will come to appreciate the freedoms they enjoy and will wonder why the transition did not occur during the Seoul Spring in 1979 and 1980. Participation by the middle class and labor in civil protest seems important because the demonstrations in 1987 were somewhat larger and more national in scope than those in 1980. However, we find that both labor and the middle class were also active in demonstrations in 1980. The memory of the Kwangju incident may have constrained hardliners in 1987, but if so we must explain why the memory of the student revolution did not restrain them in 1980. Similarly, world attention drawn by the Olympics may have constrained hardliners in 1987, but it might equally have encouraged them to enforce order more strictly. We might also posit that the weakness of Choi Kyu Hah made a critical difference, but his weakness seemed to be due more to a lack of strength of reformers in the military. None of these explanations is entirely implausible; each probably played a role in determining the outcome. However, they typically do not address the force that drove the transition: the increased strength of reformers within the Korean military meant that they could stand down hardliners in 1987.

The decision by the United States to "approve" the use of CFC forces appeals to many as a reason for a delayed transition, but it is doubtful that opposing the redeployments would have changed the outcome. The lack of reformers who might have been energized by a strong U.S. stand against a crackdown highlights the real role the United States had to play. From Rhee to Roh, public statements issued by the United States had catalyzed the opposition and strengthened the hand of reformers. Yet from November 1979 to January 1987, the United States was conspicuously silent. This silence seems to have been overlooked as a crucial reason that the transition failed.

Contrasting the first cycle of liberalization with the second, we are left with a puzzle. Why was public pressure muted in the first cycle but used in the second? Though Gleysteen always tried to moderate the statements that came out of Washington, public pressure on the Carter administration to avoid "another Iran" ultimately caused it to abandon the use of public pressure. And while rising anti-Americanism in Korea may have increased the Reagan administra-

[153] Olsen, "The Challenge," 173.

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tion's interest in pressuring Chun to democratize, public pressure to repeat the success in the Philippines made the government realize that they had abandoned a powerful tool.

This analysis of South Korea's delay in transition yields three important results. First, external public pressure can be very important in determining the interactions of domestic factions, especially insofar as public pressure affects the relative strength of reformers. Even when strategic reasons prevent a country like the United States from using economic or military sanctions to encourage liberalization, the power of verbal sanctions and public signals should not be underestimated. As ephemeral as public statements might be, in Korea they were used successfully to exert influence and were sorely missed when they were not used.

Second, foreign policy can be driven by less-than-perfect analogies, even if the people who implement policy do not believe in them. At no time did officials at the State Department believe that analogies between South Korea and Iran or the Philippines were valid. Yet pressure from the press and Congress (and perhaps by extension, the American people) caused the policy to change anyway. In spite of the best efforts of policy makers to treat each situation as unique, they are constrained by a populace and their elected officials who use analogies to cope with understanding complex political situations.

Finally, though President Carter is widely known for his commitment to human rights and President Reagan is better known for his commitment to security, we should be very wary of such facile generalizations. The Carter administration clearly abandoned an important human rights tool in the name of security long before Reagan took the reins. Moreover, the Reagan administration would ultimately risk security by using this tool to promote the transition. These counterintuitive changes under presidents that seemed ideologically pure indicate that both administrations were reacting to rather than driving international changes.*

* I would like to thank my professors, Marc Trachtenberg and Leonard Wantchekon, for their continuous support and helpful suggestions; Sandy Peterson for her help in acquiring the declassified documents; and the participants at the 3rd Annual Boston Area Graduate History Symposium for an insightful discussion of the implications of this research. Though the article could not have been written without these individuals, I should emphasize that the views expressed are my own.

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A Snapshot of Family Homelessness Across America

RALPH NUNEZ
CYBELLE FOX

Homelessness remains one of the most misunderstood and least documented social policy issues of our time. For almost two decades, the majority of efforts to understand the issues surrounding homelessness have focused solely on transient men. Yet over the last fifteen years, the country has seen the rise of a new poverty: homeless families. Each year since 1993, the U.S. Conference of Mayors has reported that this group comprises the fastest growing segment of the homeless population.[1] Today there are 400,000 homeless families in shelter, representing 1.1 million homeless children across America.[2] Many Americans refuse to believe, however, that entire families are homeless in the richest country of the world. This collective denial has had grave consequences for homeless children and their families. The lack of hard data has not only obscured the complex nature of family homelessness, it has led to a crisis of policy in the dark. Policy prescriptions that are politically expedient have dominated public discourse. However, these policies are long on rhetoric and short on a reasoned appreciation for the myriad factors that contribute to and sustain family homelessness.

In response to this gap between research and public policy, this study was designed to take a national snapshot of family homelessness: to describe the typical homeless family; to identify common trends in income, housing, educational and employment histories of homeless families across regions; and to es-

[1] The United States Conference of Mayors, *A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in American Cities: 1998,* Washington, DC, December 1998, app.

[2] The Institute for Children and Poverty, *A Tale of Two Nations: The Creation of American Poverty Nomads,* New York City, 1996.

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tablish a foundation for future longitudinal analysis of these trends as they are influenced by changing economic forces and social policy measures.

The Study

Seven-hundred and seventy-seven homeless parents, with 2,049 homeless children, were surveyed.[3] Families were drawn from a total of fifty-eight residential and supportive service facilities for homeless families located in ten cities: Atlanta, GA; Chicago, IL; Dallas/Fort Worth, TX; Milwaukee, WI; New York, NY; Norman, OK; Salem and Eugene, OR; San Antonio, TX; San Francisco, CA; and South Bend, IN.

Parent Demographics

The typical homeless family in America today consists of a single mother, about thirty years old, with two or three children averaging five years of age. Though less than a tenth of the homeless families surveyed fit this profile exactly, most homeless families share this general demography. To begin, the vast majority—95 percent—of heads of household in shelter surveyed are female. While 29 percent of the families interviewed resided in facilities that said they only served women, the percent of men among heads of households rose only 1.5 percent when facilities with these requirements were excluded. Thus, eligibility requirements did not have a significant impact on the survey sample. In addition, over 81 percent of homeless parents nationally are between twenty and thirty-nine years old, with a median age of twenty-nine. While 7 percent of the families interviewed resided in facilities that did not admit parents under the age of 18, these restrictions had no effect on the mean or median age of the parent population. Few cities depart significantly from this national trend with one exception: in New York, the average age among parents dips to twenty-four, with 37 percent between the ages of nineteen and twenty-one.

African Americans are heavily over-represented among homeless families, and whites are significantly under-represented. Nationally, over half (58 percent) of homeless families are African American (compared to 12 percent in the general population), followed in frequency by whites (22 percent of homeless families—74 percent in the general population) and Latinos (15 percent of homeless families—10 percent in the general population).[4] Indeed, African Americans make up the largest racial group in seven of the ten cities, comprise the majority of homeless families in six, and are over-represented among homeless families in all of the ten cities examined. (See Figure 1 in the Appendix.) Racial representation varies dramatically between cities. African Americans,

[3] All tables and figures may be found in the appendix at the end of this article.

[4] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1997,* Washington, DC, 1997, table 46.

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for example, make up only 3 percent of homeless families in Salem and Eugene, but 92 percent in Chicago. The highest proportions of homeless African American families are seen in large southern, midwestern, and eastern cities; the highest proportions of Latino homeless families in New York and the Southwest; and the highest proportions of white homeless families are seen in the Northwest and in smaller cities such as Norman and South Bend.

The vast majority (81 percent) of homeless parents across the ten cities examined are currently single. In fact, 78 percent of all families surveyed are headed by single mothers; only 19 percent are two-parent families. Single fathers made up the remaining 3 percent. Married parents represent the minority in every city studied, peaking at 42 percent in Salem and Eugene and plummeting to 5 percent in Milwaukee. Marital history among parents also varies significantly along racial and ethnic lines: 62 percent of homeless African-American parents and 44 percent of homeless Latino parents have never married. That percentage drops to 28 percent when one looks at white homeless parents. More significant variations are evident in the marital history of those currently single. Nationally, 62 percent of single homeless parents have never been married, while 38 percent are separated, divorced, or widowed. In New York, far more single parents—87 percent—have never married, while in Norman only 30 percent have never married.

An overwhelming majority of homeless parents are U.S. citizens, both native born and naturalized. In fact, only 5 percent of homeless parents nationally are not U.S. citizens, but rather green card holders or other legal immigrants (only 1 percent identified themselves as illegal immigrants).[5] Although one might expect high proportions of non–U.S. citizens in the Southwest or in large urban areas, Salem/Eugene, somewhat surprisingly, has the highest rate of non–U.S. citizens at 14 percent. In addition, while 22 percent of homeless parents nationally are not native English speakers, only 7 percent identify themselves as being less than fluent in English. New York and the southwestern cities are home to more parents who are not native English speakers than other parts of the country.

Housing

Homelessness is not a brief and isolated episode for many families. More than a third (37 percent) of homeless families nationally have been homeless more

[5] Self-reporting and the project's definition of homeless families as families in shelter likely result in an underestimation of the frequency of language and immigration issues among homeless parents. Families fearful of deportation are likely to be more hesitant to turn to shelters when they lack housing. They are also less likely to acknowledge any citizenship questions, even for an anonymous survey. No provisions were made within the project to ensure that fluent surveyors would be available to meet the needs of parents speaking languages other than English. Participating shelters were encouraged to make use of their bilingual staff in completing the surveys, but it is possible that some families who did not speak English were excluded from the research.

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than once, with the percentage of those returning to shelter for at least the second time ranging from a low of 20 percent in Atlanta to a high of 63 percent in San Francisco. (See Figure 2.) More than two in five (42 percent) parents first experienced homelessness while still twenty-five years of age or younger, and 8 percent became homeless before turning eighteen. On average, these families had been homeless for eight months at the time of their interview. It also appears that many may have spent time in more than one shelter since the onset of their current bout of homelessness, as 83 percent reported staying at their current shelter for under six months.

For many families who become homeless, residential instability is a problem before they ever enter the shelter system. Forty-three percent of homeless parents have never rented or owned their own residence. Locally, this rate varies from a high of 58 percent in New York to a low of 23 percent in Norman. More than two in five (44 percent) homeless families were living doubled- or tripled-up with family and friends prior to entering the shelter system. (See Figure 3.) For most families, these arrangements did not represent stable, long-term alternatives to maintaining their own homes. Almost half (48 percent) of the homeless parents interviewed had been in their previous residence for under six months prior to becoming homeless, and only 19 percent had stayed in their previous home for over two years. Families who lived in their own homes before entering the shelter system tended to have lived in their own homes longer—74 percent stayed more than six months—than those whose last homes were with friends or relatives, where only 40 percent stayed more than six months.

Only 4 percent of parents indicated that they spent time on the streets or in abandoned buildings before turning to a shelter. While many members of the public are accustomed to thinking of these as the traditional indicators of homelessness (as they frequently are among single individuals), anecdotal evidence points to the likelihood that families are more likely to avoid the streets at any cost, for fear of losing their children to foster care placement. Thus, families are more likely to depend on friends or family members for long and often dangerous or uncomfortable periods before entering the shelters.

These trends toward doubled-up living arrangements and the problems that ensue are reflected in families' reasons for leaving their last residence. Over half of homeless families—56 percent—cited a combination of the following reasons for turning to shelter: a disagreement with someone else in the household (31 percent), domestic violence (22 percent), or overcrowded living quarters (19 percent). Sixteen percent of homeless families cited job loss or reductions in public assistance as a cause of their homelessness. Only 7 percent, however, cited physical housing problems, such as substandard housing or a one-time emergency such as a fire.[6]

[6] It should be noted that while substance abuse was not included as a category in this multiple choice question, an additional twenty-three respondents volunteered this information. This significant anecdotal evidence will be formally addressed in future surveys.

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Although two-parent households have been touted nationally as providing more stability for children, this research reveals the fallibility of that assumption. Among parents who lived with a spouse or partner, more than three-quarters (76 percent) left for domestic violence, overcrowding, or disagreement reasons. Even more significant is the fact that domestic violence alone was cited by more than half (57 percent) of these homeless parents. Among those who lived doubled- or tripled-up with friends or family, almost three-quarters (74 percent) cited a combination of the following: a disagreement with a member of the household (50 percent), overcrowding (33 percent), or domestic violence (13 percent).

Education

Educational achievement among homeless parents is beneath that of nationwide statistics. While 75 percent of persons twenty-five and over in the general population have completed high school, that number drops to 68 percent among homeless parents age twenty-five and over. This disparity grows to 63 percent when one takes into account all homeless parents. While national comparative statistics only apply to individuals twenty-five and older, homeless parents of all ages should be included in any analysis, as the responsibilities of parenthood and independence do not provide an exemption based on youth. On average, those who did not complete high school left school in the tenth grade. Locally, less than half (47 percent) of all homeless parents in New York have completed high school or received their general equivalency diploma (GED), while homeless parents in Atlanta and Salem/Eugene had the highest rate of matriculation at 77 percent and 75 percent, respectively.

Though many factors contribute to under-education, teen pregnancy ranks among the leading explanations. More than half (53 percent) of homeless parents who first had children while in their teens have less than a high school education, while 72 percent of those who waited to have children until they were at least nineteen or older have at least their high school diploma or GED. Of those parents who left school before completing twelfth grade and never earned their GED, the leading reason given for leaving school was conflict with parenthood: 47 percent said they left because they were pregnant or lacked child care. This was followed by two disparate explanations: family pressure, cited by 22 percent of parents (which might be interpreted as either lack of educational support in the household or conflicting family obligations, such as sibling care or need for extra income); and not liking school, cited by 23 percent of parents. An additional 13 percent said they needed to get a job. Only 8 percent said they failed out or were expelled.[7] (See Figure 4.) More than half—53 percent—of those who said they failed out or were expelled from school also said they left because of family pressures. While trends in each of these areas

[7] Respondents could give multiple reasons for leaving school; all percentages do not add to 100.

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varied dramatically by city, one trend remained constant: between 30 percent and 44 percent of homeless parents in each region said they left school due to pregnancy. In fact, pregnancy was the primary reason cited for parents' leaving school in eight out of ten cities, and the secondary cause in the remaining two cities.

While undereducation is likely to present an obstacle to many homeless parents, most of the parents interviewed recognize the value of education. Over 72 percent of parents responded that a high school diploma or higher is necessary for independence, and 36 percent believe a college degree or more is the minimum. The bridge between belief and action is limited, however, with only 19 percent currently taking steps to overcome these obstacles by participating in educational programs.

EMPLOYMENT/INCOME

Nearly four out of five (79 percent) homeless parents nationally are currently unemployed. (See Figure 5.) While the vast majority—72 percent—have worked at some point in the past, more than one in four (28 percent) have never worked. Those who previously worked have been unemployed for an average of one year, and 12 percent have been unemployed for over two years. While high rates of long-term unemployment and inexperience with work are consistent across the cities studied, these rates still vary dramatically by city. The employment picture is brightest in Norman, where 30 percent are currently employed, only 13 percent have never worked, and the remaining 57 percent have been out of work for an average (median) of only five months. Local unemployment rates were at a low of 3.3 percent at the time of the survey. Employment is bleakest in New York, where only 8 percent are currently employed, 34 percent have never worked, and the remaining 58 percent have not worked for an average of twelve months. Local unemployment rates were at a high of 9.2 percent at the time of the survey.[8]

Homeless families face many barriers to employment. The leading reason cited (41 percent) by homeless parents for current unemployment is lack of child care or pregnancy. Indeed, lack of child care or children too young to leave in child care is the most frequently cited reason for unemployment in seven out of the ten cities, and the second or third in two of the remaining cities. The second most frequently cited cause of unemployment results from poor matches between job skills and available jobs—not being hired or not being able to find jobs to apply for (31 percent). The next most frequently cited reason for unemployment is a lack of permanent address—cited by 27 percent of re-

[8] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Local Area Unemployment Statistics," Table 1: Civilian labor force and unemployment by state and metropolitan area (http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/metro.t01.htm), March 1998.

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spondents.[9] Lack of transportation creates significant barriers to employment as well, ranking in the top three in seven of the ten cities, and cited by 17 percent of the homeless families nationally. Fifteen percent cited illness, disability, or substance abuse. Only 3 percent said they were unemployed because welfare paid more, and an equal percentage said that they simply did not want to work. (See Figure 6.) The reasons for leaving previous employment are similar in percentages to those given for current unemployment, with one omission: almost one-third (29 percent) left their last job because they were fired or laid off.[10]

A strong determinant of workforce participation among homeless parents is education. A full 79 percent of the homeless parents who are currently employed have at least a high school education. Only 12 percent of those with less than a high school education are currently employed in a nonworkfare job, compared to 27 percent of homeless parents with a high school diploma. (See Figure 7.) Neither marital status, race, the age of a mother when she first had children, nor even number of children seems to have an impact on work participation rates for these homeless families. These findings do not suggest that issues of discrimination and teen pregnancy, for example, have no effect on overall employment. However, among homeless families only education seems to be correlated to employment.

While these unemployment rates and histories begin to explain the circumstances that contribute to and sustain poverty and homelessness among families, work schedules and income in current and previous employment paint a fuller picture. One-third (34 percent) of parents currently employed are working only part-time or in temporary positions, with this portion rising to 71 percent in Chicago and 80 percent in New York. Unemployed parents who previously worked experienced similar rates of underemployment, with 33 percent having last worked only part-time or in temporary employment, rising to 61 percent in San Francisco. Median weekly income in current and previous employment is $220. This amount is 86 percent of the federal poverty level for a family of three, which is $256.35 per week (or $13,330 per year). (See Figure 8.) Among all the incomes reported for either current or previous work, 67 percent were at the poverty level or under, and only 11 percent of parents earned over 150 percent of the poverty level.

Irrespective of employment status, the vast majority (84 percent) of homeless families receive some sort of public assistance to support their families, and more than half (51 percent) cited public assistance—including Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), food stamps, Women Infants and Children (WIC), and Medicaid—as their only source of income. In particular, more than half (59 percent) of homeless families currently receive TANF, while the vast majority (81 percent) have received TANF or Aid to Families with Dependent

[9] Seventy-two percent of these respondents had been unemployed before they became homeless. This might suggest that this is not the primary reason for their current unemployment.

[10] Respondents could select more than one reason for current unemployment and for leaving previous employment; as a result, percentages may add up to more than 100 percent.

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Children (AFDC) at some point in their lives.[11] For a few, additional sources of income include gifts (8 percent) and child support (8 percent). Strangely, 18 percent of those who said they receive income from work (4 percent of the total parents surveyed) reported that they were not currently working. One possible explanation is that they are working in an unofficial capacity in order to bring in unreported, untaxed income to support their families. Finally, it is also noteworthy that single mothers who are separated or divorced are nearly twice as likely to receive child support as women who have never married (13 percent and 7 percent respectively).

CHILDREN

While the mean number of children per family (2.7) is slightly higher than the mean among the general population, the vast majority (77 percent) of homeless families have three children or fewer.[12] Various correlations were discovered explaining the size of homeless families. For obvious reasons, parents who are older tend to have more children than younger parents. Parents who were younger at the birth of their first child also tend to have more children than those who waited until they were older. Finally, parents with lower levels of education have more children than parents with more education. What is not evident from the data is whether early parenthood determines educational attainment or whether educational attainment determines a parent's number of children.

Most homeless parents began their families when they were quite young. Specifically, 84 percent of parents had their first child when they were twenty-five or younger, and more than half—52%—had their first child when they were nineteen or younger. Of note, 10 percent of the parents interviewed were currently pregnant. Dallas/Fort Worth has the lowest percentage of pregnant homeless parents with 6 percent, while Atlanta has the highest at 22 percent.

Young children are over-represented among homeless children. In fact, nearly half (48 percent) of all children in shelter are under age five, compared to 28 percent of all children (under eighteen) nationally.[13] While the median age for all children of the parents interviewed is seven years old, this falls to six years old when one asks for the age of children under eighteen, and to five years old when one asks about children under eighteen in the shelter. Families in Salem and Eugene have older children in general, averaging age seven in shelter. New York has the youngest, averaging age four in shelter.

The vast majority—80 percent—of children under eighteen live with their parents in shelter. Those children under eighteen not living with their parent

[11] With the advent of welfare reform, the program formerly known as AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) is now called TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy Families). Both will be referred to as TANF throughout this report.

[12] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract,* table 77.

[13] Ibid., table 33.

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or parents are most likely staying with another relative (9 percent) or with their other parent (6 percent). An additional 3 percent are in foster care or kinship care, with percentages ranging from 0 percent in Norman and San Antonio to 14 percent in San Francisco.

Nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of parents interviewed said they do not currently use child care on a regular basis. This rate varies dramatically by region, with over 55 percent saying they use child care in San Antonio to under 20 percent reporting child care use in Chicago (19 percent) and Milwaukee (16 percent).[14] Of those who use child care, the majority (57 percent) say they use a child care center, followed by a relative (16 percent), and a paid baby-sitter (10 percent). While these three child care sources dominate in each city, the distribution of users among them varied dramatically. It may be likely that the type of child care used by homeless parents is dependent on child care availability within local shelters.

Those parents who do not use child care frequently explain that they want their children to be with them (33 percent), or they do not trust their children to strangers (34 percent). More homeless parents cite these personal reasons than any sort of availability issues. While one could speculate that substandard child care might be the reason for lack of trust in organized child care, only 3 percent cite substandard child care. A significant number of parents (30 percent) report that they are not able to afford child care, but only 8 percent cited unavailability of child care.[15] Of those who said child care was substandard, all (100 percent) were older than twenty-five, 80 percent had completed high school, more than half (56 percent) were white (none were Latino), and more than half (56 percent) had four or more kids.

Welfare

Fifty-nine percent of homeless parents currently receive TANF. (See Figure 9.) An additional 8 percent of families do not currently receive TANF but experienced reductions in public assistance within the six months prior to their interview, indicating that their benefits had been cut off entirely. In fact, a total of 29 percent of all parents who ever received TANF had experienced a reduction in or elimination of public assistance within the six months prior to being interviewed for this study. (See Figure 10.) While 22 percent of these parents reported finding work as a result of these reductions or eliminations in public assistance, they earned a median annual income of only $9,250—69 percent of the poverty level for a family of three. Another 49 percent said they became homeless as a result of their public assistance cuts. (See Figure 11.)

[14] Fifty-three percent in Atlanta also reported using child care. These responses, however, include parents drawn from one facility that is primarily a day care center. Once these responses were controlled for, the rate of child care use dropped to 38 percent in Atlanta.

[15] Respondents could give multiple reasons for not using child care frequently; all percentages do not add to 100.

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CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that family homelessness is not simply an issue of housing. The causes of homelessness are a complex web of issues and problems that vary widely by community. However, race, low educational levels, poor employability, and welfare dependence emerge as common themes in these findings. This study shows that although African Americans represent only 12 percent of the general population, they comprise more than half of the homeless family population. Furthermore, homeless families lag behind the general population in education and income levels. Homeless parents have tumultuous work histories at best, if they have work experience at all. Lastly, most homeless families depend on welfare for survival and face serious consequences as their benefits are eliminated.

The U.S. Conference of Mayors recently reported a 15 percent increase in family homelessness during the last year alone.[16] Despite various initiatives spanning the last decade and a half, the number of homeless families continues to rise. In order to begin constructing realistic solutions to family homelessness, a formal quantification of the problem is needed; this study is a first step. These findings provide a broad, national picture of homelessness and serve as a foundation for additional research leading to policies that can begin to curb the numbers of homeless families.

[16] The United States Conference of Mayors, *A Status Report*, appendix.

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APPENDIX

Figure 1: African Americans as a Proportion of the General Population and as a Proportion of the Homeless Family Population (with Percent Over-Representation)



African Americans are over-represented among homeless families in each of the ten cities studied. Even in Salem and Eugene, where African Americans make up only 3 percent of the homeless population, they are still over-represented by at least 100 percent.

Figure 2: Homeless Parents' Number of Times Homeless, by City



Nationally, more than a third of homeless parents have been homeless more than once, with the percentage of those returning to shelter for at least a second time ranging from a low of 20 percent in Atlanta to a high of 63 percent in San Francisco.

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Figure 3: Homeless Families' Previous Living Situations*



* An additional 6% lived in other unspecified situations.

Nationally, more than two in five homeless families were living doubled- or tripled-up wih family and friends prior to entering the shelter system.

Figure 4: Homeless Parents' Reasons for Leaving School*†



* *Includes only those respondents who did not earn a high school diploma or a GED. Respondents gave multiple reasons for leaving school; all percentages do not add to 100.*

† *The remaining categories—including fear of violence and lack of transportation—were each cited by fewer than 4% of the respondents. 14% left school for other unspecified reasons.*

N=276

The majority of homeless parents (59 percent) have never graduated from high school or earned a GED. Parents most frequently cite pregnancy and/or lack of child care (47 percent) as their reason for dropping out.

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Figure 5: Homeless Parents' Employment Histories



Nationally, nearly four out of five homeless parents are currently unemployed. Many, in fact, have never been employed.

Figure 6: Homeless Parents' Reasons for Current Unemployment*†



* *Respondents could give multiple answers; all percentages do not add to 100.*
† *Of the remaining categores, illness/disability/substance abuse was cited by 15% and welfare pays more, doesn't want to work, and language problem were each cited by 3%. Another 14% cited other unspecified reasons for unemployment.*

N=545

The reasons most frequently cited by homeless parents for not working are a lack of child care and an inability to find appropriate employment.

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Figure 7: Homeless Families' Relationship Between Education and Employment



N=756

Though there is a high rate of unemployment among all homeless families, attainment of a high school diploma or GED increases the likelihood that a homeless parent will be employed by 125 percent.

Figure 8: Income Distribution
Homeless Families vs. Non-Homeless Families



N=341

Homeless families fared far below the national average in incomes for current or previous employment. Three quarters (77 percent) of homeless families make under $15,000 per year, compared to only 21 percent of families nationwide.

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Figure 9: Homeless Parents' Length of Time on TANF



Though almost one in five homeless families have never received TANF, 35 percent have relied on TANF for more than two years.

Figure 10: Benefit Reductions/Suspensions Among TANF Recipients



Twenty-nine percent of all homeless parents surveyed experienced reductions or suspensions of their TANF benefits in the last six months prior to the interview.

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Figure 11: Results of TANF Benefit Reductions/Suspensions



While 22 percent of families found a job directly as a result of their TANF sanctions, 49 percent reported becoming homeless.

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Table 1: National Demographics, Homeless Families vs. General Population

Homeless Parents		General Population	
Families Surveyed	777	**Families with Children**	34,296,000
Head-of-Household Gender		**Head-of-Household Gender**	
Female	95%	Female	22%
Male	5%	Male	78%
Parent Age (Median: 29)		**Parent Age**	
15 - 24	30%	15 - 24	6%
25 - 34	43%	25 - 34	31%
35 - 44	24%	35 - 44	44%
≥ 45	3%	≥ 45	19%
Race/ Ethnicity		**Race/ Ethnicity**	
African American	58%	African American	12%
Asian	1%	Asian	3%
Latino	15%	Latino	10%
Native American	2%	Native American	<1%
White	22%	White	74%
Other	2%		
Marital Status of Parents		**Marital Status of Parents**	
Married	19%	Married	76%
Single	81%	Single	24%
Never Married	*50%*		
Sep./Div./Wid.	*31%*		
Education Level (for Persons 25 and Over)		**Education Level (for Persons 25 and Over)**	
Less than High School	32%	Less Than High School	25%
High School or More	68%	High School or More	75%
Employment (for Women 16 and Over)		**Employment (for Women 16 and Over)**	
Employed	21%	Employed	59%
Unemployed	79%	Unemployed	41%
Median Annual Income (Current or Previous Employment)	$11,440	**Median Annual Household Income**	$34,076
Age of Children in Shelter		**Age of Children in U.S.**	
Under 5	47%	Under 5	28%
5 - 17	53%	5 - 17	72%
Number of Children Per Family		**Number of Children Per Family**	
1	26%	1	41%
2	28%	2	39%
3	23%	3	14%
≥ 4	23%	≥ 4	6%

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Table 2: Demographics of Homeless Families in Ten Cities

	Atlanta	Chicago	Dallas/ Fort Worth	Milwaukee	New York	Norman	Salem & Eugene	San Antonio	San Francisco	South Bend
Families Surveyed	78	76	143	101	137	30	78	63	60	21
Gender										
Female	93%	95%	93%	93%	98%	100%	91%	95%	88%	100%
Male	7%	5%	7%	7%	2%	0%	9%	5%	12%	0%
Parent Age	Median: 29	Median: 29	Median: 30	Median: 29	Median: 24	Median: 34	Median: 31	Median: 27	Median: 35	Median: 31
15 - 24	25%	30%	27%	21%	53%	17%	23%	32%	17%	19%
25 - 34	51%	50%	39%	50%	35%	38%	42%	50%	31%	52%
35 - 44	21%	17%	29%	25%	11%	42%	34%	16%	46%	29%
≥ 45	3%	3%	5%	4%	1%	3%	1%	2%	6%	0%
Race/Ethnicity										
African American	84%	92%	52%	91%	66%	24%	3%	19%	48%	52%
Asian	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	6%	5%
Latino	1%	3%	15%	3%	31%	10%	13%	49%	12%	0%
Native American	4%	0%	1%	0%	1%	3%	5%	3%	2%	5%
White	8%	4%	26%	6%	1%	60%	78%	26%	24%	38%
Other	3%	1%	3%	0%	1%	3%	1%	3%	8%	0%
Marital Status										
Married	18%	8%	22%	5%	17%	33%	42%	20%	20%	14%
Single	82%	92%	78%	95%	83%	67%	58%	80%	80%	86%
Never Married	*46%*	*64%*	*35%*	*69%*	*72%*	*20%*	*25%*	*40%*	*55%*	*43%*
Sep./Div./Wid.	*36%*	*28%*	*43%*	*26%*	*11%*	*47%*	*33%*	*40%*	*25%*	*43%*
Education Level (for Persons 25+)										
Less than H. S.	17%	40%	25%	44%	42%	25%	22%	37%	31%	35%
H. S. or More	83%	60%	75%	56%	58%	75%	78%	63%	69%	65%
Employment Rate (for Women 16+)										
Employed	30%	22%	25%	22%	8%	31%	27%	13%	19%	29%
Unemployed	70%	78%	75%	78%	92%	69%	73%	87%	81%	71%
Median Annual Income	$13,104	$10,400	$11,440	$12,740	$10,400	$10,062	$11,440	$9,880	$14,105	$10,316
Age of Children in Shelter										
Under 5	55%	40%	44%	38%	62%	25%	30%	47%	31%	49%
5 - 17	45%	60%	56%	62%	38%	75%	70%	53%	69%	51%
Number of Children Per Family										
1	32%	14%	25%	12%	42%	27%	15%	33%	33%	29%
2	18%	23%	36%	24%	32%	40%	30%	26%	22%	24%
3	26%	24%	21%	29%	14%	17%	22%	30%	25%	28%
≥ 4	24%	39%	19%	35%	12%	16%	33%	11%	20%	19%

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Table 3: Aggregate Data

Number of Times Homeless (Including Current)	One Time	63%
	Two Times	23%
	Three or More Times	14%
Age When First Homeless *(Median: 27)*	< 18	8%
	18 - 25	34%
	26 - 30	22%
	> 30	36%
Ever Leased/Owned Own Residence	57%	
How Long Since Left Last Residence *(Mean: 8 months)*	< 1 month	12%
	1 month - 6 months	53%
	6 months - 1 year	19%
	> 1 year	16%
Why Left Last Residence	Overcrowded	19%
	Disagreement	31%
	Domestic Violence	22%
	Substandard Housing/Disaster	7%
	Lost Public Assistance	6%
	Lost Job	12%
Weekly Earnings, Current or Previous Employment	< $150	21%
	$150 - $250	45%
	$250 - $350	21%
	> $350	13%
Parents Currently Pregnant	10%	
Age of Parents at Birth of First Child	<18	24%
	18 - 25	60%
	25 - 30	10%
	> 30	6%
Location of Children Under 18	With Parent in Shelter	80%
	With Other Parent	6%
	With Relative	9%
	Kinship of Foster Care	3%
	In Institution	<1%
	With Adopted Family	1%
	On Own	<1%
	Other	1%

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The Claude Pepper Foundation seeks applicants for its visiting scholar's program, which provides financial assistance for researchers working at the Claude Pepper Center's archives at Florida State University. The Claude Pepper Library's holdings include papers, photographs, recordings, and memorabilia of the late U.S. Senator/Congressman Claude Pepper and his wife, Mildred Webster Pepper. Pepper served in the U.S. Senate from 1936-1950 and the U.S. House of Representatives from 1962 - 1989. Topics that can be studied include Social Security, Medicare, elder affairs, age discrimination in the workforce, labor issues such as minimum wage/maximum hours, health care reform, National Institutes of Health, Civil Rights, crime, international affairs, FDR's New Deal and World War II. The visiting scholar's program is open to any applicant pursuing research in any of the areas related to issues addressed by Claude Pepper. Application deadlines are April 15th and October 15th. For additional information and an application form, contact:

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Warren Christopher's *In the Stream of History*: A Review Essay

CHARLES HILL

"Every man looks at his woodpile with a kind of affection," Henry David Thoreau said. Every secretary of state views his speeches that way too, a fact perhaps fully appreciated only by those staff aides who stoically endure the excruciating production of draft after draft, solicitation of colleagues' comments, the clearance process, the proofreading, teleprompting, and backgrounding of the press, whose reporting is "embargoed until delivery." And then they are dismayed when the public pays scant attention to what has been so carefully prepared.

Every former secretary of state is tempted to collect and publish all those speeches to give the world a second chance to see what important substance they set forth in such elegant style. And just as invariably the ex-cabinet officer is prevailed upon by friends, colleagues, and literary agents to forget about it, because speeches don't sell; only a "real" memoir can fulfill one's debt to history.

Warren Christopher has not heeded such advice. He has done it his way, in a handsome volume of thirty-seven speeches, each preceded by a brief essay.[1] Although none of these speeches is likely to be considered by William Safire for his next collection of rhetorical gems of the genre, they are (almost) jargon-free models of clarity and serious purpose in which now and again the distinctive Christopher voice can be heard. At just those points when the listener's attention is about to flag, a freshly apt word or phrase pops up. The man behind the thesaurus seems to be Christopher himself, for we are surprised to learn at

[1] Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

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the outset that his first foray from law into politics in 1959 was as a speechwriter for California's Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown. Thus the authority of experience lends weight to the author's convictions that in government the written word is what makes things happen. Let the media ignore these statements; bureaucrats will take them to heart, diplomats will cable home close analyses of them, and American ambassadors will endlessly repeat their formulations to foreign counterparts. And sometimes a speech will make or change foreign policy.

This indispensable compendium assesses through as favorable a lens as possible the record of American foreign policy in the first Clinton administration, led by a president elected in part because in contrast to his incumbent rival, he would not focus on foreign policy. Warren Christopher, it was assumed in 1992, had been chosen to employ his proven problem-solving skills to keep the world from distracting the president from his domestic agenda.

For this reason, and assertions in the media that he somehow lacked the stature of his predecessors, Christopher's secretaryship cannot have been a comfortable one. But the first feelings these pages induce are appreciation and admiration for his intelligent, dedicated, and solid service to the country. Christopher's central achievement lies in the mainstream functions of the post, the grinding daily work of strengthening and extending the core institutions of international cooperation, those entities with appellations too long to spell out in a brief review, but whose acronyms mean little to the public: OECD, APEC, NAFTA, GATT, WTO, and so on. In such important, time-consuming work Christopher is at his best. This basic block-and-tackling, however, can also trap a contemporary secretary of state into a procrustean schedule—the sheer number of visitors to meet, the trips that must be taken, all those agreed annual consultations. These easily become all consuming, creating a false sense of achievement as one long day's work follows another. Christopher undoubtedly is good at it and is tempted to do more. One can almost see his schedulers wince when he proposes "periodic cabinet-level consultations" with the Chinese.

In this sense the title, *In the Stream of History,* drawn from Justice William O. Douglas's advice to his law clerk to get out there and "swim as fast as you can," suggests unintended connotations. The current of history in the 1990s has been far too powerful for a solitary swimmer. Making headway against it requires an expansive vision capable of summoning a strong national and multinational effort. This was not provided by the president during the years covered here, and there is scarcely any sign of it in these pages. To his credit, however, Christopher recognized in his confirmation hearing that not since the late 1940s had the nation faced such a need to build a new structure of international relations. Yet, as he left office in late 1996, the post-cold war period was ending and no such structure had been built. Indeed, for the first time in modern history, from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia to the post-Napoleonic wars' Congress of Vienna, to the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, to the U.S.–led effort twice after World War II (creating the UN in 1945 and NATO in 1949), a major world

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conflict—the cold war and its postwar period—ended with no new structure achieved or seriously undertaken. This is likely to become history's severest judgment on the Clinton-Christopher stewardship of American foreign policy.

In several early speeches, Christopher mentions the need for a coherent grand strategy, but what emerges in practice lacks consistency or even common sense. Christopher credits Clinton for taking up former President Richard Nixon's challenge, expressed in his 1992 post-Moscow trip memorandum, to the United States to provide billions to help Russia's transition from communism. This sent Moscow the message that we, not they, ultimately would be responsible for Russia's economic performance. Thus was born the administration's bailout policy, which from Mexico to Thailand encouraged risk-prone decisions that brought the global financial crisis of 1998.

Similarly, Christopher spoke out strongly for democracy and human rights, declaring at the Vienna Human Rights conference, that "we cannot let cultural relativism become the last refuge for repression." If democracy takes hold, Christopher rightly pointed out, human rights will follow. But the United States made little or no effort to refute the assertions of one-party leaders, particularly in Asia, that economic progress could and should precede democracy, which would automatically follow at some future time, say 2015. The transparency and critical expression that democracy would have engendered were stifled, with disastrous economic and political consequences.

For Christopher, the administration's most significant strategic decision is the expansion of NATO. Here, as with other major issues, the book's format makes it hard to sort out just how and when key decisions were made. The speeches are in chronological order, but the preceding commentaries may range back and forth over the four years of Christopher's term. In trying to follow the NATO expansion process, it is oddly heart-warming to discover that in among these dry paragraphs Christopher emerges every bit as quick to claim credit and obfuscate failure as any of his predecessors. He takes credit for originating the concept of NATO expansion but fails to clear up the question of its relation to the Partnership for Peace proposal. In retrospect, Christopher says, Boris Yeltsin may have mistakenly concluded from his October 1993 meeting with him that Partnership for Peace meant no NATO expansion. The reader wonders whether Christopher himself was clear on this point, or whether the confusion is caused by a slight rewriting of history. Throughout the many passages devoted to NATO expansion there is no trace of historical awareness or concern that failing to give Russia a stake in this expanded security arrangement could be repeating the fateful error of the failure at Versailles in 1919 to give Germany a role in the future of the West.

Similar elisions are scattered throughout this collection. Christopher stresses how carefully he worded his remarks on the Middle East peace process to signal to Syria that it "could not be the immediate priority," yet shows no awareness of how his more than twenty meetings in Damascus allowed Hafez

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al-Assad to trifle with a secretary of state and debase the currency of American diplomacy.

On Bosnia, Christopher proudly cites U.S. air strikes in August 1995 as ending the fighting and leading to the Dayton Agreement (in which Christopher, we learn, played the critical "closing" role). He says nothing about the thirty previous months during which U.S. indecisiveness allowed ethnic cleansing to proceed while the White House used the disabled UN presence there as both shield and scapegoat. The bizarre result was that after unarmed UN peacekeepers had been sent to deal with an ongoing war, combat-ready U.S. troops arrived to police the ceasefire.

As for the debacle in Somalia, Christopher lends his support to Clinton's shameful blaming of the UN for the disastrous 3 October 1993 U.S. Ranger raid into South Mogadishu during which eighteen American soldiers were killed, an operation planned and carried out entirely by the United States. And in a stunning evasion, Christopher praises Clinton for ordering the U.S. military to central Africa in July 1994 to provide humanitarian aid to refugees from the Rwanda genocide of three months earlier, saying nothing about the administration's failure to fulfill its treaty obligation to intervene to stop genocide. Examples like these point up the distance between rhetoric and reality during these four years of American foreign policy. At the outset we hear Christopher in his confirmation testimony affirm "that the discreet and careful use of force" and "its credible threat in general" would be essential to the success of American diplomacy. In reality, repeated threats of force by the administration were defied without consequence, and the United States proved most successful at airlifting supplies to the victims of violence that should have been stopped at its earliest appearance.

Christopher portrays the 1996 White House decision to oust the secretary-general of the United Nations as motivated solely by its dedication to UN reform. He says nothing about this relentless effort, which puzzled and antagonized so many foreign governments, having taken place at the height of the American presidential campaign after Bob Dole had repeatedly scored political points with the preposterous charge that Clinton had allowed Boutros-Ghali to become the commander-in-chief of the American armed forces. As the number of such silences mounts up in these pages, the former secretary of state begins to appear in the role of one more White House spin doctor.

The portrait that emerges is that of a dedicated, public servant whose considerable contributions to his country are blighted by his involvement with a president willing to risk American credibility and to evade responsibility at one decisive point after another in the post-cold war period.

Like Thoreau, Christopher wants the logs from his woodpile to warm him twice, once when first cut and again when he sits reflectively by his hearth. There is much that is illuminating in this book, but it provides little warmth.

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Book Reviews

The Collapse of the Soviet Military *by William E. Odom. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 528 pp. $35.00.*

William Odom has written a definitive history of the final years of the Soviet military organization. Synthesizing a variety of sources, ranging from the recently published memoirs of the involved actors to his own extensive interviews with officers, Odom paints a detailed picture of the political, economic, and ideological battles that surrounded defense affairs during the years of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership.

Odom shows how Gorbachev's original push for a restructuring of the Soviet military budget, when combined with the tactic of *glasnost* (publicity) in order to justify the need for change, led inexorably to an expansion of political participation in the area of defense affairs. The plethora of new actors voicing opinions in this formerly secret policy realm in turn generated a fog of contradictory rhetoric and crosscutting political pressures for the command to sort through, as senior officers struggled to maintain control over the situation and to discover exactly whom to cultivate in order to ensure the safety of their careers. The result, according to Odom, was a loss of clear direction. What began as an exercise in strong leadership by a single individual, Gorbachev, ended in disarray and ruin as political expediency overtook sound strategic planning.

While the basic outlines of this story are well known, Odom fills in a wealth of encyclopedic detail that will be of use to specialists as much as it is to the general reader. His discussion of the use of military troops for domestic purposes against nationalist protesters throughout the Soviet republics in the Gorbachev era is particularly well done, as he painstakingly demonstrates how new factors changed the surrounding political environment, and thus the effects of these actions, as time went on. Some of the most interesting and novel pieces of Odom's history are the brief summaries of what he learned from his interviews with individual officers. For example, former Defense Minister Yevgenii Shaposhnikov tells Odom how his own sense of identification with Communist party ideals declined as his career ascended and argues that officers from different service branches were likely to have varying relations to Communist ideology.

Odom uses sources well and is careful in the footnotes to specify the likely biases of individual officers whose stories he reports. His discussion of the August 1991 putsch is especially notable for its objectivity. He examines all of the available interpretations about who was responsible and what their motives may have been, and comes to the conclusion that the putsch resembled the Kornilov affair of the revolutionary era of 1917: some conservative

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military leaders took political action believing they did so in the name of a leader (in the latter case, Gorbachev) who turned out not to support their goals.

Throughout, Odom's analysis is consistent and for the most part convincing, as he demonstrates how central the military organization was to the Soviet state's definition of itself. The only argument here that is less incontrovertibly supported by the evidence is Odom's claim that the underlying ethic of both state and party was geared toward "overthrowing the bourgeois international order, not merely to ensure the security of the Soviet state within that order" (p. 390). The debate between those who see the developed Soviet state as revolutionary and those who see it as defensive continues to this day, and some of the best work emerging from an examination of the archives concludes that both motives coexisted uncomfortably within the Soviet mindset. This book does not fundamentally challenge that newly emerging consensus.

Both the clarity and comprehensiveness of Odom's research and analysis make this book an outstanding reference source, and it is recommended for both novices and experts interested in why the cold war ended as it did.

KIMBERLY MARTEN ZISK
Barnard College

All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime *by William H. Rehnquist. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. 254 pp. $26.00.*

The ubiquitous, complicated, and essential line drawn between individual and societal rights and responsibilities informs and inevitably troubles the *raison d'etre* of this excellent, insightful, reflective book by the chief justice of the United States. William H. Rehnquist is not only a distinguished jurist, who prior to his appointment to the Court in 1972 had seen service in the executive branch of the national government; he is also an informed and skillful student of history, as his writings amply demonstrate—most recently his well-received tome on the impeachments of Associate Justice Samuel Chase, 1804–1805, and President Andrew Johnson, 1868 (*Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson*). He may well have the opportunity to consider the addition of a chapter on the impeachment of President Bill Clinton.

The Latin maxim, *Inter arma silent leges* (In time of war the laws are silent), represents the wrenching gravamen of the book, and it deservedly becomes the title of the concluding chapter. Written in a no nonsense manner, utterly devoid of the professional jargon that characterizes so much of lawyers' penmanship, the work addresses and analyzes the need to find an appropriate balance between freedom and order during times of war. The chief justice does this by focusing on a number of case studies for which he applies his own evaluation and analysis—more often than not, but by no means always, sympathetic to a tilt toward "order" in wartime, yet not uncritically. He does not preach; he explains in a comprehensive, readable manner.

His case studies and commentaries encompass eighteen relatively brief chapters, the most significant being devoted, first, to the presidential suspension of the seminal writ of *habeas corpus* by Abraham Lincoln in 1861, shortly after his assumption of office, and the accompanying imposition of martial law, both highlighted by the two well known Supreme Court cases *ex parte Merryman* (1861) and *ex parte Milligan* (1866). Second is the assault

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upon and prosecution of antidraft and antiwar speech during World War I, as manifested in such Court decisions as *Schenck v. United States* and *Abrams v. United States* (both 1919); third, the compulsory evacuation, relocation, and internment of ethnic Japanese residing on the Pacific Coast, both the Issei (first generation of Japanese immigrants) and the Nisei (born in the United States and thus American citizens from birth), including curfews and military rule in Hawaii, following the attack on Pearl Harbor. They presented issues adjudicated in *Korematsu v. United States* and *ex parte Endo* (both in 1944) relative to relocation, and in *Hirabayashi v. United States* (1943) and *Duncan v. Kahanamoku* (1946) with regard to Hawaii.

In the eight key cases listed above, the pro-government side emerged victorious in the Supreme Court in four (*Schenck*, *Abrams*, *Korematsu*, and *Hirabayashi*, unanimously so in *Schenck* and *Hirabayashi*, but with two dissents in *Abrams* and three in *Korematsu*). In the four others (*Merryman, Milligan, Endo*, and *Duncan*) the civil libertarian side not only triumphed but unanimously so in each. Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzes and critiques each of these decisions with clarity and objectivity, generally agreeing with the outcome of the eight, although usually with some caveats. For example, while he sanctions the civil liberties Civil-War-period holdings by the Court in *Merryman* and *Milligan*, he does so only in part, criticizing the expansive sweep by Chief Justice Roger Taney in the first and Justice David Davis in the second. The *Merryman* case featured an epic struggle between Lincoln, who had suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*, and the aging and ill Taney, who determinedly ordered Lincoln to reinstate it, noting that the Constitution gave only Congress that authority. John Merryman was never tried and was ultimately released from prison. His case, a monument to the battle for final authority between the executive and judicial branches of the government, provides the primary title of Rehnquist's book: "All the Laws But One." It is taken from the famous defiant response of the president to the chief justice in a message to a special session of Congress on 4 July 1861: "Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated"? Although Lincoln prevailed, notwithstanding Taney's opinion and ruling, the latter's stance had a significant impact. The Japanese relocation cases, headed by the controversial decision in *Korematsu v. United States*, again illustrate Rehnquist's willingness and ability to see both sides of the issue at hand. He seconds the Court's 6:3 upholding of enhanced executive and legislative power in wartime, but he criticizes the failure of the government to distinguish between the Issei and the Nisei.

Chief Justice Rehnquist has given us a fascinating account of the struggles of our democracy in times of war. He does so with lucidity, historical and legal acumen, and admirable judiciousness. America's highest judge deserves warm plaudits for his efforts to understand our past and our present.

HENRY J. ABRAHAM
Univeristy of Virginia

Changing Patterns of Voting in the Northern United States: Electoral Realignment, 1952–1996 *by Robert W. Speel. Philadelphia, Penn State University Press, 1998. 218 pp. $35.00.*

The United States has undergone in the last forty years a major political realignment, but its extent has been underrecognized. Robert W. Speel, who teaches political science at the

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Behrand College, the Penn State campus at Erie, takes issue with this underrecognition and seeks, successfully I think, to set the record straight with regard to one key aspect of the realignment—that involving the positions of America's regions in the party competition. The changes of the last several decades in regional support for the major parties are among the most dramatic in the country's history. Indeed, they may be the single largest realigning shift the United States has ever experienced.

Speel concentrates on the move of the Northeast, especially New England, away from the Republicans into the Democratic camp. The move is certainly striking. I was raised in southern Maine, and I remember often seeing reproduced in my boyhood a photograph of a sign posted on the bridge across the Piscataqua River from Portsmouth, New Hampshire to Kittery, Maine just after the 1936 presidential election: "You are now leaving the United States." The witticism was prompted, of course, by the fact that Maine was one of only two states to back the Republican presidential nominee, Alfred Landon. Vermont was the other—prompting the famous revision of historical lore: "As goes Maine, so goes Vermont." That seems a long time ago. Maine, Vermont, and the other New England states are now a key part of the Democratic heartland.

Historically, New England was first the most Federalist section of the country, then the most Whig, and in the Civil War era, the most Republican. The region retained its strong Republican loyalties through the New Deal period and well into the postwar era. Today, New England remains exceptional politically, but now as the most Democratic section of the United States. The region's shift from the first off-year election of this century (1902) to the last (1998) is extraordinary. The Middle Atlantic states have also moved Democratic over this century, though not as strongly as New England.

Equally extraordinary is the shift of the South over this span away from the Democratic party to the Republicans. In 1902, the six states of the Deep South had no Republican senators, no Republicans in the U.S. House, and were a near cipher in the state legislatures of the region. Now Republicans hold majorities of U.S. House and Senate seats and have made big advances in the state houses. The Rim South also shifted Republican, though not quite as dramatically as the Deep South.

By emphasizing the extent of New England's (an in general the Northeast's) shift to the Democratic party, Speel helps us better appreciate the extent of the regional realignment that has played so large a part in redefining contemporary American politics. His book deserves a wide reading by students of American regionalism and its role in the country's electoral competition.

The one dimension of this issue that Speel doesn't discuss sufficiently is why the great post-New Deal regional realignment has occurred. To begin to understand it, one needs to note that New England and the Deep South have always been this nation's most dissimilar sections. Consider the issue of slavery. New England was home to the Abolitionist Movement, while the Deep South gave the strongest backing to the maintenance of slavery in the years leading up to the Civil War. Today, New England remains ideologically distinct. Though the slavery issue is happily long since past, it is the most liberal section of the United States—with the possible exception of parts of the urban Pacific coast. This is true both for political elites (members of Congress) and the general public. On the other hand, the states of the Deep South are in all regards the country's most conservative. Both regions have maintained their ideological distinctiveness and much of their underlying character. But this positional continuity ideologically has carried them in opposite directions in party support.

It would take far more space than I have available to explain why New England's move from what some historians have mistakenly labeled "conservative" to its present position,

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called "liberal," has not in fact involved any fundamental shift in the defining properties of the region's culture. But the essential factor is that throughout U.S. history, New England has been America's liberal individualist heartland.

EVERETT LADD
University of Connecticut

Passages to the Presidency: From Campaigning to Governing *by Charles O. Jones. Washington, DC, Brookings Press, 1998. 180 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $16.95.*

Charles Jones, emeritus professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, has written many penetrating books on the presidency, and as part of his year in residence as Douglas Dillon Visiting Fellow in Governmental Studies at the Brookings Institution, he studied presidential transitions. His focus was not on the nuts and bolts of the transition itself, nor on its organization, but rather the broader question of how the election winner makes the transition from successful candidate to president.

To study this issue, Jones provides a set of topical chapters, whose main ingredients consist of his own insightful statements about presidential campaigns and their aftermath, combined with retrospective observations in the form of lengthy quotations by participants in four transitions: Johnson to Nixon in 1968; Ford to Carter in 1976; Carter to Reagan in 1980; and Bush to Clinton in 1992. Jones has organized the subject analytically, provided the framework and the lessons to be drawn, and then culled useful supporting evidence from his interviews. It is a BOGSAT (bunch of guys sitting around a table) book, but one that is useful precisely because it offers the voices of experience.

The most significant research result, as far as I was concerned, was that Democrats focused primarily on the transition process while Republicans concentrated on the substance of the transition: developing new ideas and bringing into government personnel committed to carrying out specific programs or mandates. This seemed to me counterintuitive, since many studies of presidential politics have emphasized that Republican presidents often emphasize the process of decision while Democrats focus on substance at the expense of process.

Jones comes up with a major reinterpretation of transitions. The conventional view, he explains, is that transitions should be concerned with the nuts and bolts of taking control of the machinery of government. As he sees it, the changes in American politics require a change in the focus of the transition. If presidential politics increasingly involves moving public opinion, and if there is a permanent campaign for public support conducted by the White House, then the transition itself must find a way to better incorporate the personnel of the campaign into the governance structures at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. His idea is important, and I would have liked much more analysis and extension of the argument.

This book is written by and for Washington insiders. In a sense it is arguing the case of the young media-oriented campaigners out on the campaign trail as they confront the old Washington hands who await their assignments from the comfort of Brookings, university sinecures, and K Street firms. It takes the size and complexity of the modern presidency as a given, and its questions are instrumental: how best to dismantle the campaign organization without being unfair to the campaign warriors; how best to construct a transition organization that can bring good people into government. Missing are any questions about the size

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and complexity of the presidency itself: Does the modern presidency really need 500 or so staffers? So many counsels and councils? Can any transition organization succeed when a president has to find 1,000 or more people for his administration? Can it succeed when so much of domestic and foreign policy making is expected to be "presidentialized" rather than delegated out to the departments?

Even as an insider book, however, Jones's treatment is ultimately disappointing. It has far too much on how to game the system (which will be useful reading for the next group to take power), but far too little useful information on how to hit the ground running. Jones himself recounts the story that when Clinton took over, new staffers on the first day could not perform the simplest functions: parking the car in the garage, getting into the office (passes were validated), turning on the phones and computers. While these mundane aspects of transitions can be left to the secretarial staff, it seems that useful transition analysis would focus on how to get control of the appointments process so as to speed it up and make it less demeaning for prospective nominees; how to leapfrog over the outgoing president's budget and gain control of the budgeting and spending processes in the departments; how to establish immediate legislative and regulatory clearance, and so on. Because the book lacks this kind of specificity, I'm afraid that in spite of its sensible framework and useful observations, it too will share the fate of so many transition studies and wind up in the dumpster.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

Secrecy: The American Experience *by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 265 pp. $22.50.*

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has long been concerned with excessive secrecy in the American polity. He sponsored legislation that led to the creation of a Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy that met from 1995 to 1997 and wrote for its report a lengthy appendix on secrecy in American policy and its historical roots, which forms part of the basis for this book. The book is unusual, in that an introduction by Richard Gid Powers represents more than a quarter of the entire text. Moreover, there is overlap between the discussion in that essay and the following chapters by Moynihan. There is some chronological inconsistency among chapters. Notwithstanding such presentational flaws, the authors present a strong case that secrecy has not only been excessive but harmful in many respects.

On the prevalence and persistence of secrecy, Moynihan notes that an official 1996 report discloses that while there had been a recent decline in the number of classification-initiating authorities and of original classification decisions, the total number of classified documents had risen by over 60 percent, owing to the large number of "derivative" or carryover classifications from one document to another. The most important criticisms, however, concern not the scale but the impact of excessive security classification.

Moynihan had learned of the existence of decrypted Soviet intelligence communications from the 1940s (code-named Venona) and urged their release; he was present when the CIA did so at a public conference in 1996. He argues that much of the national trauma surrounding the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Alger Hiss cases could have been obviated

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if that evidence of their guilt had been made publicly available. Yet even when it was learned in 1950 that the Venona decryption had become known to Soviet intelligence through an American cryptographer spy, tight secrecy continued for nearly half a century. The one startling new finding is that General of the Army Omar Bradley, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a decision in 1949 that not even President Harry Truman (or Director of Central Intelligence Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter) should be notified of the Venona materials (pp. 70–71).

The authors argue that one of the most serious adverse effects of excessive secrecy was a growing distrust of the U.S. government by the public and academic community. Powers, in particular, argues forcefully that secrecy led to public suspicion and rejection of official policy explanations and abetted academic revisionists in blaming the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, for the cold war. Now, Powers argues, we have reached "the final irony of government secrecy in the Cold War: originally imposed largely as a ritual to delegitimize critics of Cold War policies, secrecy was transformed by revisionists into a counter-ritual to discredit America's role in the Cold War—only to end, when the secrets were finally revealed [in recent declassifications], as a vindication of the original architects of the [cold] war" (pp. 57–58). Although this argument may have some merit, it also has serious flaws, not least that secrecy was *not* originally imposed to delegitimize critics of U.S. cold war policies.

Moynihan presents a strongly argued case for the advantages of openness and the strengths of an open society. He argues that even most military and technological secrets inevitably have a short half-life, while secrecy about them tends to become entrenched. When he calls for a "culture of openness" to replace a "culture of secrecy," he makes a powerful case. He does not, however, answer the question of how to define the line between necessary and appropriate secrecy, no matter how limited its sphere, and excessive secrecy. Ultimately, of course, this is a matter of judgment. Others can and no doubt will argue the case for secrecy with respect to particular matters. Moynihan has given us a passionate, informed plea for shifting the burden of proof on to those who do call for secrecy, and for making openness the norm to provide security to an open society.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Brookings Institution

The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations From World War I to 1998 *by Robert Olson. Costa Mesa, CA, Mazda Publishers, 1998. 105 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $19.95.*

The approximately twenty-five million Kurds living as minorities in Turkey (some 20 percent of that state's population), Iraq (23 percent), Iran (10 percent), and Syria (8 percent) constitute the largest nation in the world today without its own state. Situated on geostrategically located oil and water reserves, the increasingly restless Kurds represent a significant threat to the territorial integrity of these four states. The Kurds also present an important problem for U.S. foreign policy, because Turkey is a NATO ally of the United States. Iraq, Iran, and Syria are officially listed by the U.S. State Department as supporters of international terrorism. This results in a "good Kurd-bad Kurd" dilemma for U.S. foreign policy that will become increasingly problematic as the long-running Arab-Israeli conflict winds down and the Kurdish problem continues to heat up.

Olson's short but useful study analyzes this question by arguing that "the Kurdish nationalist movements have constituted major threats to Iran and Turkey and, in the case of Tur-

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key, the major threat to the state since its founding in 1923" (p. 12n). He asserts that modern Turkey and Iran have been built upon "the suppression of Kurdish identity" (p. 22) and that "an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq . . . would be a dagger aimed at the bosom of each country" (p. 45).

Based on such geopolitical and strategic trends as population growth, agricultural base, and diverse developed economies, Olson heuristically asserts that "Turkey and Iran are fast becoming the most important countries in the Middle East," while "the influence the Arab countries gained in the twentieth century will be diminished in the twentieth-first century" (p. 36).

Olson also argues that Syria's and Iran's usage of the Kurds "has become increasingly difficult with the new alliances between Turkey and Israel. . . . This in turn jeopardizes the manner in which the two countries would like to play their Kurdish cards" (p. 63). Given Turkey's ability to force Syria to expel Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan and his PKK (rebel Turkish Kurds) guerrillas in October 1998, Olson's analysis appears prescient.

Although this reviewer tends to agree with Olson on most of his broader points, he would question the author's characterization of omni-balancing as "one of the most suitable theories" (p. 11) to analyze the Kurdish question. Indeed, Olson himself concludes that "the internal threat of the Kurdish problem . . . modifies the omni-balancing paradigm" (p. 85). Olson's distinction between the intrastate Kurdish problem and the interstate Kurdish question also seems confusing and unnecessary.

In addition, the author's population estimates for Iran at 60 million (p. xix)—which is less than Turkey's—and the Azeris in Iran at only 16.5 percent of the total Iranian population (p. xx) seem too small. In one place Olson estimates the Turkmen population in northern Iraq at 250,000 (p. 46), but less than ten pages later he doubles it (p. 55).

Elsewhere Olson accepts the Alevis in Turkey as a "branch of Islam close to the twelve shi'ism predominant in Iran" and concludes that the "Turkish Alevis find attractive the Islamist discourse emanating from Iran" (p. 76). While the assertion of a common identity between the Shiites and Alevis superficially is assumed by many, closer analysis indicates that the Alevis may not really even be Muslims, while their embrace of staunch secularism certainly makes them anything but amenable to Iran's Islamic sections.

Olson also would seem to overplay his argument in claiming that Teheran's opposition to increased Baku-Tel Aviv relations makes its opposition to the Turkey–Israel–U.S. alliances pale in comparison" (p. 78). While Iran certainly would not want Israel to begin to meddle with its internal Zaeri minority, the Islamic Republic's current fear of the latter alliances obviously remains stronger.

Uneven righthand margins in numerous places and the repeated misspelling of "theoretical" in the page headings of Chapter One are unfortunate. Olson's study concludes with a bibliography of secondary sources and a short index.

MICHAEL M. GUNTER
Tennessee Technological University

Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba *by Donna Rich Kaplowitz. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 247 pp. $49.95.*

This book provides a thorough description and assessment of the U.S. policy of comprehensive sanctions on Cuba from the policy's start in 1960 until about 1997. The chapters are

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arranged chronologically to narrate the policy's evolution and to indicate both the major and the minor modifications adopted over time. The book highlights four principal historical periods that correspond roughly to the four decades of President Fidel Castro's rule.

In the 1960s, the United States imposed the embargo, made it increasingly comprehensive, and sought to multilateralize it with some limited success. In the 1970s, the United States dropped the extraterritorial dimension of its sanctions policy toward Cuba and made some attempts to find a basis for accommodation with the Castro government. In the 1980s, the United States tightened its sanctions policies yet again.

Cuba suffered economically, but the United States did not achieve its main political objectives: the Castro regime did not fall, its key domestic policies were not reversed, the properties of U.S. citizens and firms were not returned, the Soviet-Cuban alliance was not severed. Cuba supported revolutionary movements and revolutionary states vigorously, even deploying hundreds of thousands of troops to Africa during the Carter and Reagan presidencies. The harshness of authoritarian rule in Cuba declined somewhat over time but mainly as the result of the regime's consolidation.

In the 1990s, several of the principal U.S. political objectives in Cuba were achieved thanks to an exogenous event: the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuba terminated its support for revolutionary movements. It repatriated its troops that had supported revolutionary states. The Cuban-Soviet alliance died. The U.S. policy of sanctions returned to its original goal of toppling Castro, but this goal has yet to be achieved.

Kaplowitz succeeds less, however, at explanations. She employs, in essence, a check-list compilation of insights drawn from other scholars who have engaged in the comparative study of sanctions policies to understand their likelihood of success. Some of the arguments she proposes to apply specifically to the Cuban case are either underdeveloped or unpersuasive. For example, she claims that the U.S. embargo has been always undermined by interagency conflicts within the U.S. government, but she provides little plausible evidence. She asserts that presidential campaigns serve as "architects" (p. 79) of policy toward Cuba. That was certainly the case in 1960, 1980, and 1992 but not in other instances, yet she does not provide an explanation of the reasons for such variance.

She forgoes the opportunity to widen her scholarly horizon. For example, she could have compared the inefficacy of U.S. economic coercion on Cuba to the striking efficacy of Soviet economic coercion on Cuba the one time this occurred (in 1968, over an array of issues in Soviet-Cuban relations). She might have considered the hypothesis (not mentioned even once) that the embargo was the "moderate" alternative at critical junctures to avoid employing U.S. military force against Cuba, and that this may explain its long endurance as the least-bad policy option. This is a plausible interpretation of U.S. decisions in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the missile crisis. It is one way to understand why the Reagan administration did not use U.S. troops to "go to the source" in 1981–1982 despite its high alarm over Cuban support for Salvadoran guerrillas. And it is a reasonable interpretation for the Clinton administration's acceptance of the 1996 Helms-Burton Act (which tightened and codified U.S. sanctions policies) right after the Cuban Air Force shot down two unarmed civilian airplanes over international waters.

This book should, nonetheless, serve as a helpful reference work for those who seek evidence concerning one of the longest-lasting and least successful U.S. policies ever conducted.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ
Harvard University

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The Politics of Unfunded Mandates: Whither Federalism? *by Paul L. Posner. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1998, 246 pp. $55.00.*

Paul Posner's book is a pioneering quantitative and qualitative study of a hot intergovernmental topic—federal mandates on state and local governments. Posner examines mandates enacted by Congress from 1983 through 1990 and in 1996. During 1996, staff of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) prepared a report, as required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), which recommended altering or terminating some mandates. Approximately 300 social welfare, environmental, labor, disability, and related interests opposed the report and flooded an ACIR conference on mandates. Especially visible were wheelchair-bound individuals. The commission killed the report in a party-line vote orchestrated by the White House. When a Democratic ACIR member seemed poised to support the report, another Democrat blurted, "Didn't the White House tell you how to vote?" Three months later, Congress defunded the thirty-eight-year-old ACIR—a move orchestrated by House Republicans. Such is the politics of mandates.

Posner discusses the rise of mandating since the mid-1960s and surveys the political and socioeconomic forces that foster mandating. Emphasis is given to changes in the party system that disconnected members of Congress from their historic moorings to state and local government interests. A useful addition to the analysis would have been the "one person, one vote" revolution of 1962–1964 which, together with the rise of the media and primaries as well as the equality revolutions of the 1960s, reoriented political incentives from the interests of places (states and localities) to the interests of persons. This thread ties together the rise of mandating in both Congress and the state legislatures, along with the shift in grants-in-aid from places to persons.

For Posner, mandates include direct orders, crosscutting requirements, crossover sanctions, partial and total preemptions, and major grant conditions. This definition broadens the book's scope but stretches the usual definition of mandates as direct orders and goes beyond UMRA's coverage. The author really analyzes federal encroachments on state and local powers, not all of which are unfunded mandates.

Of key value is Posner's analysis of House and Senate roll-calls. Mandates prevailed in 55 percent of the votes. Republicans supported mandates more than Democrats. Republicans and conservatives tended to endorse mandates that restricted welfare, preempted state and local regulation of the economy, and legislated moral and social policies nationwide. Democrats and liberals tended to oppose such mandates while supporting stricter environmental mandates, requirements that state and local officials implement policies according to national rather than local priorities, and, to a lesser extent, mandates that shifted costs to state and local governments.

This summary cannot do justice to Posner's analysis or convey the full extent of mandating because, as Posner notes, only thirteen of thirty-one significant mandates went to roll calls. Therefore, he provides case studies of two broadly supported mandates: asbestos removal from schools and preschool education for handicapped children. The forces at work in mandating are well illustrated, including occasional state and local support for mandates. State and local officials rarely defeat unwanted mandates, but they often secure modifications during legislative consideration.

Posner also analyzes 1996 congressional action in order to test UMRA's impact. Overall, UMRA has not been reliably prophylactic, although it has enhanced the leverage of opponents of particular mandates. Posner concludes that Congress's centralization hares are still outrunning its devolution turtles.

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Ideally, the analysis would have included mandates from 1965–1982 when Democrats prevailed in Congress and in state and local organizations. The empirical results might have been a bit different. Nevertheless, this superb study should be read by every student of American federalism. Its breadth also makes it classroom friendly.

JOHN KINCAID
Lafayette College

Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil *by Anthony W. Marx. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 408 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $18.95.*

As the twentieth century draws to a close, race remains nearly as potent a force as when W. E. B. Du Bois identified it as the problem of the century almost 100 years ago. In *Making Race and Nation*, Anthony Marx seeks to account for the continued salience of race and the nature of race relations in three countries over the last century. He attempts to answer three questions: How and to what extent were such relations prefigured by earlier history? How did political and economic processes during this century shape divergent racial orders? And how did challenges from below emerge, interact with, and force changes in racial domination from above? Ultimately, Marx links race making to nation building, arguing that the impetus for resolving conflict by means of nation-state building was integral to race making and to the unmaking of legal racial domination. Marx also suggests the reverse: that issues of race have been integral to nation-state building.

The book investigates three cases: the United States, South Africa, and Brazil. In three different sections Marx examines how the enactment or not of legal racial domination during the twentieth century was shaped by earlier experiences of colonialism, slavery, and miscegenation; the circumstances that shaped the particular racial orders that were enacted in each place; and finally, how state policy shaped and was shaped by black protest.

In brief, Marx finds that early historical practices and cultural distinctions did not automatically determine the future trajectory of race relations in the three societies. "Only the legacy of greater colonial unity and stability in Brazil, contrasted with violent division in South Africa and the United States, proved persistently determinant" (p. 79). Instead, the divergence in postabolition experiences—the relative lack of formal racial domination in Brazil compared to Jim Crow in the United States and apartheid in South Africa—is attributed to the degree of internal conflict in the three countries. In the United States and South Africa, racial domination was used to foster unity among divided populations (North-South divisions in the USA, Afrikaans-English antagonisms in South Africa) and so to consolidate the state. In Brazil, not riven by such divisions, official race discrimination was not established; rather, the nationalist project included blacks within an official racial democracy, despite continued discrimination. Black protest eventually forced changes in all three countries, with the nature and timing of that protest depending greatly upon the level of racial domination and identity consolidation. In all three cases, Marx contends, black protest emerged during periods of flux—transitions in state rule and race policies. As Marx notes in his conclusion, the findings of his book suggest the need for further research into the way in which other legal exclusions may have been used elsewhere to reinforce nation-state unity.

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Making Race and Nation is an example of comparative politics at its very best: careful comparative historical analysis, theoretically informed and creatively interpreted. The book is thoroughly researched and documented and persuasively argued. Moreover, Marx has written in a lucid and engaging style, thereby making it accessible to a wide range of readers. Not only is *Making Race and Nation* a major contribution to our understanding of these three cases, it is also a significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of identity, race, and the state.

GRETCHEN BAUER
University of Delaware

Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism *by Margaret Levi. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 255 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

In a democracy, military conscription represents one of the greatest demands that a government can make of its citizens. Thus, citizens' decisions about whether or not to accept such a demand can be seen as an important test of the relationship between these actors. In *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism*, Margaret Levi attempts to explain differing citizen responses to conscription or other government demands, while also examining the development of military service policies. Through the study of this issue, the author seeks to develop a rational choice model that would contribute to democratic theory. The result is an informative and ambitious study, but one in which the methodology at times obscures the findings rather than elucidating them.

Levi argues that whether or not citizens comply with government demands depends in large part on whether or not they perceive the government to be fair. The concept of fairness and "contingent consent" is integrated into a rational choice model. According to Levi, "contingent consent" means that citizens cooperate with the government only if they trust the government and they believe that "other citizens are also engaging in ethical reciprocity" (p. 19). Lacking these conditions, citizens may demand changes in conscription policy or may refuse to comply.

Yet it is the author's approach, rather than her argument, which seems to form the centerpiece of this book, and this is perhaps the work's major shortcoming. While the methodology is certainly interesting, it appears to take undue precedence over the substantive explanation, at times preventing the author from using her data as thoroughly as she might. Levi does carefully consider alternative arguments, such as economic motivations for participation in the military. However, her rigorously deductive approach seems to preclude incorporating alternative argument. For example, when explaining differences between the postures of francophone and anglophone Canadians during World War II, the author refers to varying loyalties toward Great Britain, noting the greater loyalty of anglophones, especially those who were born in Great Britain. Yet despite her inability to disprove this hypothesis, she continues to emphasize the francophones' lack of trust—a condition that would appear logical, given the background information presented, but does not appear to be a more persuasive cause for differing behaviors. Convincing alternative arguments are neither entirely discarded nor incorporated.

If utilizing evidence is one difficulty in this book, providing evidence is another. Levi presents little independent evidence for "trust" or "consent." Instead, compliance (the de-

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pendent variable) seems to simultaneously work as an indicator of consent and as a consequence of consent. The author does document well reasons that citizens might be inclined to trust or distrust government, but while helpful, this information still does not provide an adequate substitute for actual measurement of the independent variable.

Another problem with the study has to do with case selection. The author draws her case material from Anglo-Saxon states, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the United States, along with France, but gives very little explanation of her choices. While these cases do seem to provide some variation, the lack of systematic selection precludes using the comparisons for much more than demonstration purposes. One is left wondering whether these cases actually cover the range of possible conscription models and whether a broader selection might generate a different causal argument.

Despite the problems, Levi's study provides substantial and valuable information on the evolution of conscription policies and reactions to these policies in a number of interesting cases. Her model also provides a thought-provoking integration of the concept of fairness with more standard rational choice theory, contributing important insights to how democracy works.

DEBORAH L. NORDEN
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China's Security: The New Roles of the Military *by Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 348 pp. $59.95.*

As their preface makes clear, the authors reject the "China threat" hypothesis and state that their intention is not to debate the matter. Rather, they aim at analyzing what the rise of China means, and is most likely to mean, for its military forces. Chapter titles are loosely grouped around this theme: civil-military relations, an overview of security policy since 1980, military doctrine, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) as entrepreneur, armaments and arms control, military power and foreign policy. There is an extensive bibliography, most of it from secondary sources.

Gurtov and Hwang conclude that those who see China as a threat to its neighbors often and mistakenly assume a direct connection between capabilities and intentions, and between hardware numbers and fighting capabilities. However, the PRC's neighbors see double-digit increases in China's defense budget even when its economy is in deflation, and they are aware of the security flashpoints of its actions on Mischief Reef and in the Taiwan Strait. They may, perhaps, wonder if Gurtov and Hwang are not mistaken. The authors advise that, while the United States and Japan must accept the PRC's insistence on equality and respect for sovereignty to which its "senior status" in post-cold war Asia entitle it, Chinese decision makers who would engage in threatening and destabilizing behavior need to be restrained. How and by whom, if not by warnings from those countries, is not mentioned. Few in the Chinese leadership will want to discourage the hawks from policies that seem to be succeeding. Advice to the United States is similarly abstract: the president must find ways to restrain China so long as Beijing does not threaten Taiwan's security. The authors do not seem to have considered the possibility that Taiwan's security may be undermined by more subtle means than brute force—for example, the mainland's refusal to accept visits abroad by Taiwan's leaders, harangues to international organizations to reject any participation by

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the island, creative reinterpretation of the meaning of comminiqués jointly signed with other governments, and using its economic leverage and vote in the UN Security Council to induce Taiwan's allies to switch recognition to Beijing.

There are some startling statements. The assertion that before Mao's death in 1976 it would have been extremely hazardous for a Chinese leader to suggest that China modernize quickly in order to catch up with major economies will surprise those who endured the Great Leap Forward of 1958, which was characterized by slogans such as "catch up with Britain in coal (or steel) production in ten (or five, or three) years." And the name of the emperor of Japan is Akihito, not Akahata (p. 68). The latter means "Red Flag" in Japanese; it is probably best known as the name of the newspaper of the Japanese Communist party.

Although the book bears a 1998 publication date, the latest date of the information it contains is 1996. Hence speculation on the power relationships after Deng Xiaoping's death lose relevance: the patriarch passed away in February 1997. The chapter on the PLA as entrepreneur has been overtaken by President Jiang Zemin's decision to sever the military from its business connections. And the founding of the General Equipment Department has weakened the power of the Commission on Science and Technology for National Defense.

The authors make an interesting point that is well worth pondering. U.S. officials maintain that if China wants to lay claim to great-power status, its behavior must start conforming with global norms, including the transfer of technologies and materials that can produce mass-destruction weapons. This, they note, misses the essential point: Chinese leaders see resistance to demands by the number one world power for conformity with its norms as an ingredient of great-power status. Given the fundamental incompatibility of these views, mutual accommodation may be elusive.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER
University of Miami

Inside Terrorism *by Bruce Hoffman. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 288 pp. $24.95.*

Bruce Hoffman is one of the foremost authorities on contemporary terrorism. He has produced a book on this complex subject that is replete with fascinating detail and that is accessible, clearly written, and extremely well researched. Indeed, the great strength of this book lies in the footnotes, which reflect a prodigious range of research and introduce the reader to a long literature on diverse aspects of terrorism. For this reason Hoffman's book provides a good starting point for someone interested in pursuing the subject further.

The chapters are organized around central broad themes, such as the past, the future, and the internationalization of terror; the role of media and religion; and the terrorist mindset. Hoffman has many interesting points to make on all of these themes, but he seems unclear as to whom the book is addressed, and this undermines its impact. As a general introduction it is both too diffuse and too detailed. As a guide to policy makers, the recommendations are too lacking in specificity to be very helpful. As an academic text it does not take on the analytical difficulties of studying this multifaceted phenomenon. The student, the policy maker, and the expert will all gain from reading this book, but they would have gained a great deal more had it been more clearly directed at one of them.

This is, above all, an idiosyncratic book. The title, *Inside Terrorism*, is something of a misnomer. A title like "Reflections on Some Aspects of Terrorism" might be a clearer indi-

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cation of the nature of the book. Given the vastness of the subject, Hoffman understandably selects different aspects and groups to focus on, but the criteria for inclusion appear simply to be what strikes the author as interesting. This can be dissatisfying for the reader who has no idea what to expect next and who uncovers a series of detailed and fascinating accounts of different events and movements but without a clear theme or organizing principle tying them together. The movements that are considered, moreover, are entirely Western, yet there is no explanation, explicit or implicit, of why terrorism in Africa or Asia is excluded.

The reflections are loosely brought together into a few chapter headings, but even within chapters the analytical focus is difficult to discern. Take the chapter on religion and terrorism, for example. This is a subject on which Hoffman has written incisively elsewhere. But in this book, movements with only the most tenuous religious connections are cast in with religiously motivated movements. In this account, the Oklahoma City bombing becomes an act of religious terrorism and the American militia movement a religious terrorist movement. But their goal is to restrain not to overthrow the secular state and certainly not to replace it with religious law, as is the case of religious motivated terrorists as generally understood. This coverage completely underestimates the political forces driving most terrorist movements. Hoffman's argument that religion is the main driving force behind international terrorism in the 1990s can only be supported when, as he does, one throws together all those groups for whom there is a religious component to their ideology.

This work would have been very much enhanced by more rigorous editing. The inclusion of so many at best tangential points while so many central cases, like the Tamil Tigers, are excluded seems difficult to justify. Hoffman concedes that the Unabomber is not a terrorist yet discusses him anyway. He even credits terrorists with precipitating the Suez crises, a claim that is exceedingly difficult to reconcile with the facts. The description of Princess Diana seems strangely out of place. While *Inside Terrorism* lacks focus and analytical acuity, it provides a great deal of insight and many riveting examples of contemporary terrorism. The seventy pages of notes and bibliography are invaluable.

LOUISE RICHARDSON
Harvard University

World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification *by John S. Duffield. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1998. 385 pp. $49.50.*

The sight of a rich, unified, but almost completely self-effacing Germany minding its own business in the heart of Europe has posed a problem of almost existential proportions for students of international relations. By the lights of the neorealist theory we used to illuminate the cold war, we somehow ought not to be seeing what we are seeing. And so our discipline has blinked and looked again. But the apparition does not go away, and we are left to wonder: Are our eyes deceiving us? Or is there something wrong with our theories, that we think ourselves deceived?

Duffield's answer is an unequivocal no to the former question, but yes—as many others have also been saying—to the latter. Unlike those who predicted that Germany's 1990s would resemble its 1890s, Duffield convincingly surveys the major areas of security policy—armed forces, alliance policies, relations with its neighbors, and so on—to show that there

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is little to fear on that score. With luck, Duffield's book will put this perceptual problem to rest once and for all.

But Duffield is not content with this admirable service: he, like other authors of recent years, such as Peter Katzenstein, wants to know what was wrong with our theory that we could not recognize Germany for what it is. That problem Duffield identifies as a failure to include ideational or domestic factors of one kind or another. And so Duffield recommends that we examine international institutions and what he calls political culture to correct this oversight. Unfortunately, several conceptual difficulties undermine the utility of these innovations, at least as Duffield himself uses them. The first is a tendency to blur cause and effect, and the second is a failure to confront how ambiguous German sovereignty—and perhaps German democracy—has been and may still be.

As an example of blurring cause and effect, consider Duffield's summary of the place of international institutions in his schema: "One leading cause of the continuity and restraint that have characterized German security policy has been the international agreements and organizations in which Germany has voluntarily participated" (p. 233). Mingling causality and voluntarism in this way typifies how unclear it is throughout the book whether the international institutions in which Germany is involved (and there are a lot of them) explain policy or represent the policies to be explained.

Moreover, Duffield tends to group all institutions together, even though he provides evidence suggesting distinctions need to be made. Shouldn't the fact that Germany rearmed and joined NATO at the behest of its erstwhile conquerors and in the face of massive domestic protests make NATO as an institution less "voluntary" (whatever that might mean) than the two-plus-four talks which lead to unification? Duffield concedes these institutions look very different, but such concessions don't lead him to more nuanced analytical categories.

This contrast between NATO and unification points to the limits of Duffield's second variable, political culture. Duffield means to use political culture to bring domestic-level politics back into international relations theory. But as we have seen, German policy makers have on key security issues run roughshod over German public opinion and produced policies mostly popular with its allies. Duffield's methodology—elite interviews—shrewdly results from this realization. He recognizes that broad survey research—the stock-in-trade of political culture theorists—wouldn't get him very far, except perhaps to show how much elite attitudes differ from the full spectrum of German opinion. But while this approach helps document elite consensus, it cannot explain why elite attitudes reflect only a subset of all German attitudes, or how potential elites with unconventional beliefs become marginalized.

Given that the German electorate directly removed a chancellor from office only once—and that just last year—Duffield should certainly not be faulted for using research that ignores mass political culture or attitudes. But is this really bringing domestic politics back in? The self-imposed limits of Duffield's approach shouldn't stop us from believing there is room for domestic explanations of another sort. Such explanations would probably focus on how electoral, parliamentary, and party-political laws reliably produce, as they did last year, technocratic Social Democratic chancellors and Green foreign ministers who resemble nothing so much as their avuncular Christian Democratic and Free Democratic predecessors. Duffield's highly readable book begins this task, but there is much more to be done.

PETER A. JOHNSON
Columbia University

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From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment *edited by Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Domínguez, and Andres Serbin. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1998. 161 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $19.95.*

This short collection of essays provides a broad yet brief sketch of the changing Caribbean security landscape. Even though the volume represents an eclectic mix of approaches, issues, and conceptions of security, a few interrelated themes stand out that help unify the essays. The most obvious is the end of the cold war and its profound impact on the region. Traditional security concerns have taken a back seat to a range of "new security" issues, such as drug trafficking, mass migration, and the environment. These issues are not new, of course, but their centrality on the policy agenda certainly is. Another dominant theme is economic restructuring, global and regional market integration, and the roll-back of the state. Also highlighted in the volume, not surprisingly, is the powerful shadow of the United States in determining the fate of the region.

Changes in the global political economy play a central role in the chapters by James Rosenau, Anthony Bryan, and Andres Sorbin. While perhaps overstating the newness of the transformations of recent decades, Rosenau rightly emphasizes the growing importance of nonstate actors and the global technological and economic developments that are reshaping the region. Bryan makes the most explicit case for linking economic development and security concerns. While endorsing the process of economic liberalization that has swept through the region, Bryan also acknowledges that there is a serious "downside"—for example, the increased ease of money laundering through the banking system, a problem that unfortunately receives little attention in the rest of the volume. Serbin suggests that the old definitions of the region that have traditionally shaped the thinking of Caribbean elites are increasingly at odds with post-cold war economic realities.

Jorge Domínguez's chapter is the most historically grounded, allowing the author to trace key patterns of continuity and change over time. For example, Domínguez points to the continuities between the pirates of the past and the drug traffickers of the modern era. Now as in the past, nonstate actors thrive throughout the region, but now they wield more military force than at any time since the Napoleonic Era. External intervention marks the Caribbean, but unlike the past, one great power—United States—is now militarily uncontested.

In his contribution to the volume, Ivelaw L. Griffith argues that geonarcotics, not geopolitics, defines the geography of the region, as drug traffickers compete and cooperate with each other for the strategic Caribbean bridge that links South America (one of the world's leading drug supplying regions) and North America (the world's leading drug consuming region). Richard Bloomfield's chapter stresses the urgent need to create more effective collective security regimes (and the inadequacy of the old ones) to deal with these kinds of new security challenges.

Michael Desch concludes the volume on a pessimistic note, agreeing with many of the other contributors that the immediate future of the region will likely be defined by continuing turbulence. Overall, this edited collection provides a useful—if also somewhat limited and sometimes superficial—overview of some of the most significant challenges facing the nations of the Caribbean at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

PETER ANDREAS
Harvard University

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Keeping the People's Liberties: Legislators, Citizens, and Judges as Guardians of Rights *by John J. Dinan, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 1998. 259 pp. $35.00.*

For most of us who teach civil liberties, the nineteenth century was a time when little happened, because so few Supreme Court opinions were generated for our casebooks. Now comes John J. Dinan to set us straight.

One reason we have not mined this history is the daunting task of where to start. So many states; so little time. Dinan's solution is to plumb just four: Massachusetts, Virginia, Michigan, and Oregon. This could lead to skewed impressions, but his sample is well chosen and he covers many other states as well. The result is a richly detailed survey of decisions made and measured passed.

Dinan is concerned not only with how civil liberties have been protected by state governments, but who protected them, and how well. He concludes that judicial protection of civil liberties at the state level is relatively recent development. During the nineteenth century, constitutional conventions and state legislatures largely carried the burden. Enforcement of state constitutions against state officials by state judges was relatively rare; common law or statutory claims were the litigant's best bet well into the twentieth century.

Today we tend to assume that only courts (particularly federal courts) can protect civil liberties properly. Legislatures are too dominated by special interests, while right-wing groups use ballot questions to abolish affirmative action and repeal gay rights laws. Dinan suggests that these impressions are too simple and that we should be careful not to read them backwards into history. His study of populist ballot questions during the early twentieth century is especially informative.

Leaving Jim Crow and labor law aside, Dinan concludes that "representative institutions generally achieved a commendable level of rights protection [during the nineteenth century]: they prevented encroachments on existing rights, permitted the recognition of newly discovered rights, and provided a forum for [deliberation] (p. 169)." They did less well protecting voting rights or resisting voter prejudice. The direct democracy of ballot questions was best suited to advancing voting rights over the resistance of self-interested legislators, but for the most part responded to the same demands as legislatures. Judges, not surprisingly, have proved most effective at resisting popular passions in times of crisis, but otherwise have tended to reflect the values of the political coalitions that put them on the bench. On some occasions they have proved less realistic than legislatures, particularly in developing effective remedies. Dinan concludes, sensibly enough, that civil libertarians should look upon rights protection as a three-branch enterprise and not dismiss ballot questions as invariably hostile to liberty.

Keeping the People's Liberties is a valuable dissertation on what civil liberties measures were being advanced at the state level during both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It also shows what legislatures were able to accomplish before the politics of big money and high exposure. Missing, however, is much sense of why certain issues were not addressed and how different branches and levels of government influenced each other on such salient issues as sedition, fugitive slaves, slavery, abolition, labor organizing, red scares, mass internments, and discrimination. For in-depth treatment of these issues, we must look elsewhere, perhaps until Dinan's next book.

CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE
Mount Holyoke College

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Change and Continuity in the 1996 Elections *by Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1998. 330 pp. Paper, $28.95.*

Since 1984, this team of scholars has produced a sweeping and systematic overview of each American national election. Packed with historical detail of presidential election outcomes, contemporaneous data analysis from National Election Studies data, and a solid synthesis of the research literature on voter behavior, all of these volumes from 1984 through 1996 deserve a place in the bookshelves of scholars and students of American and electoral politics. This most recent edition of this continuing series continues the tradition of high quality established in their books on the previous three presidential election cycles.

People familiar with the format and style of the editions on the 1984, 1988, and 1992 national elections will find the 1996 election volume very similar. Beginning with three chapters covering the 1996 presidential election (the nomination campaigns, the general election campaigns, and an overview of the final national and state-by-state results), this book then moves into a very detailed examination of the underlying voter behavior driving the election results. This second section covers turnout, social factors and voting, issues voting, presidential performance and the vote, as well as how party identification factored into individual voter behavior. The third major section covers the 1996 congressional elections.

The similarity between this book and the editions focused on earlier elections will clearly benefit those who have used these books in courses on American politics and voter behavior in the past. With the same structure, approach, and style, it will be very easy to substitute the 1996 elections book for the 1992 elections book, and thereby quickly and efficiently upgrade many different courses. I have used the 1988 and 1992 books in my advanced undergraduate and graduate courses with a great deal of success, since the authors deal with a great deal of subject matter in a very clear and concise manner, and have updated my reading list to include this book on the 1996 elections. It should be widely assigned in undergraduate and graduate courses on American politics and voter behavior.

The continuity in style and structure, though, does make it difficult for the authors to easily integrate new political trends and scholarly advances into successive volumes in this sixteen-year series. For example, much has been written in the popular press and in the political science journals about the reasons for the Ross Perot candidacy and the dynamics of his degree of success in 1992 and failure in 1996. While there is some material on Perot in the 1996 volume, I found it insufficient for both teaching and research purposes. More generally, significant political or scholarly advances tend to find their way into the later volumes of this series in the form of copious endnotes and a long suggested reading list, rather than make their way into the text itself.

This book faces serious competition, since there are at least five other books currently available on the 1996 American national elections, all of which are suitable for both research reference and teaching. However, the seasoned team of Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde have again produced the best all-purpose book amid all of this competition. By continuing their practice of writing the material themselves, by presenting a thorough and sophisticated analysis of the full presidential election process and the congressional elections as well, and by presenting all of this material in a very clear and coherent manner, this team has put together the most authoritative book on the 1996 American national elections imaginable.

R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ
California Institute of Technology

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Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City *by Michael Jones-Correa. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1998. 246 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper $17.95.*

The ongoing surge in U.S. immigration forces the nation to revisit two questions absent from political discussions since the early 1900s: How are immigrants balancing their loyalties between their countries of origin and the United States? Are immigrants becoming U.S. citizens and participants in U.S. politics? Michael Jones-Correa's analysis is based on ninety-five formal interviews with first-generation Latino immigrants (primarily Colombians and Ecuadorians), seventeen interviews with nonimmigrants, and eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in Queens, New York.

Jones-Correa seeks to identify why so many immigrants remain outside of U.S. politics and, in particular, why so many fail to naturalize. He finds the answer both in the structure of state incorporation and in the immigrant experience. At the federal level, the burden for incorporation falls almost entirely on the immigrant. At the state and local level, political parties have atrophied. They no longer compensate for the failure of federal recruitment by assisting immigrant naturalization.

Immigrants themselves also shape their distance from the United States. Like immigrants of earlier eras, they seek to maintain ties to their home countries. Contemporary transportation and communication networks make it easy to maintain these ties. The process of immigrant socialization, of course, does not occur in a vacuum. Jones-Correa finds that the interactions between non-Latinos and Latino immigrants reinforce the distance that many immigrants feel from the United States. Natives define community territorially, with the Latino immigrants violating their territory. Latino immigrants define community as all co-nationals and not restricted to a physical space. This immigrant community is built partially of a "community of memory" (p. 21).

Jones-Correa investigates Latinos in this liminal state between new immigrant and naturalized citizen. He identifies two strategic roles that shape immigrant incorporation, one followed by Latino men and the other by Latina women. Men, he finds, seek leadership positions in community-based organizations. Women, on the other hand, serve as intermediaries between their co-ethnics and U.S. political institutions.

Between Two Nations raises provocative questions about the immigrant experience, some of which cannot be answered from Jones-Correa's research, but some of which can be and are not. Most important among these is the participation of immigrants in the needs of their children, particularly in the schools and in issues of public safety. While these may not on their face be political, they offer immigrants experience in demand-making around issues in the United States and access to networks that cross ethnic and nativity lines. Existing scholarship on immigrant political adaptation makes convincing arguments that these concerns offer a common path to U.S. political activity among immigrants.

A second unaddressed question is the role played by U.S.–born co-ethnics of the immigrants under study in providing a conduit to U.S. participation in community and electoral politics. All Colombians and Ecuadorians in Queens are *not* recent arrivals. The scholarship on the immigrant experience outside of Queens indicates that U.S. political socialization comes from U.S.–born co-ethnics. Discussion of this phenomenon does not appear in Jones-Correa's narrative.

Finally, Jones-Correa does not analyze why his findings differ from findings of survey research on Latino immigrants. These studies show that Latinos desire U.S. citizenship at rates much higher than they attain it and hence are not as liminal as Jones-Correa finds.

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The questions asked in *Between Two Nations* are fundamental to the future of the polity. Michael Jones-Correa offers a solid contribution to the emerging study of immigrant political adaptation. His research needs to be replicated in other immigrant-receiving communities.

LOUIS DESIPIO
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Privatizing Social Security *edited by Martin Feldstein. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998. 488 pp. $60.00.*

This volume collects the papers delivered at a conference sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Although there is much of interest in the individual contributions, there is no overview to link the insights or distill the possible implications for the United States. The whole is simply the sum of the parts.

The first half of the volume (some 180 pages) contains papers describing public retirement system reforms in five countries: Chile, Argentina, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Australia. The papers are informative and generally balanced summaries of the problems that motivated the reforms, their current status, and benefits apparently gained, and the shortcomings that have emerged. One quibble is a tendency to focus more on macroeconomic impacts than on how reform affected the adequacy of the retirement income system.

The international material will prove interesting to those who enjoy following developments abroad or are involved in social reform efforts in developing economics, but the relevance for the current U.S. debate is limited. One problem is the missing overview already noted. Another is that the sample is a bit off-target. Any study of privatization is obliged to discuss Chile, and the U.K. does have relevance for the United States, if largely to show the dangers of inadequate regulation and the pitfalls of making individual accounts voluntary. But the relevance of Australia and Latin America is questionable. Australia is implementing an approach (an employer mandate) that has essentially no political support in the United States at this time. The reforms in Latin America largely respond to a history of political, economic, and institutional failures that has no parallel in the United States. Of far greater relevance to the current debate in the United States, but not covered in this volume, are the model of partial privatization developed in Sweden and the Federal Thrift Plan model developed for U.S. government employees.

The second half of the volume is devoted to papers exploring particular privatization issues. Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick claim to show that replacing the current U.S. system with individual accounts would be surprisingly easy and inexpensive. Their result relies, however, on the rather optimistic assumption that everyone earns inflation-adjusted returns of 9 percent per year, net of administrative charges, and that the transition can be financed by diverting a good portion of the property and income taxes otherwise paid by businesses to all levels of government. Those interested in understanding the fiscal challenge involved in a transition to partial privatization would do better to look at the analysis contained in the Report of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security.

Laurence J. Kotlikoff follows with a paper more germane to the current debate. Using a computer simulation of the stylized behavior of multiple generations, he concludes that

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full privatization could eventually lead to gain in total social welfare if the transition is handled correctly. The gain is not huge, however, and it may disappear entirely if the transition is handled incorrectly. Much of the current political debate involves proposals that would probably qualify as "incorrect" under Kotlikoff's criteria.

Two final papers explore issues of administrative costs and worker asset-allocation decisions. Both are rich in information about the operation of the current, voluntary system of individual retirement and 401(k) accounts. The current system covers essentially the more highly educated and better compensated half of the work force, however, and is found mainly among larger employers. As the authors themselves recognize, it is hard to know how well these predict the results under a universal and mandatory program.

LAWRENCE H. THOMPSON
The Urban Institute

Dollars and Votes: How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy *by Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1998. 256 pp. Cloth, $59.99; paper, $19.95.*

The authors' highly readable book does an excellent job of documenting modern corporate political campaign contributions—via hard money political action committees (PACs) and soft money (to the national parties). The authors put forth two hypotheses about the role of business in the political process. First, business enjoys a privileged position in the polity regardless of campaign contributions via its economic power. Second, campaign contributions by business are better characterized as gifts in a system of social obligation than as "direct purchases" of public policy outcomes or candidates.

The authors draw upon four primary sources: interviews from 1988 and 1989 of corporate PAC managers about how they run their PACs; analysis of Federal Election Commission (FEC) soft money data for the 1992, 1994, and 1996 election cycles; analysis of FEC PAC data from 1979-1996; and a mail survey of corporate PAC directors conducted in 1986. With the exception of the soft money contributions, these formed the basis of a similar book by two of the authors—Dan Clawson and Alan Neustadtl with Denise Scott, *Money Talks: Corporate PACs and Political Influence.*

The strengths of the book are its thoroughness and readability about current campaign financing. The authors competently explain the law (or lack thereof, in the case of soft money) surrounding campaign financing. They also smoothly integrate the aggregate numbers on corporate campaign contributions with firm-level ancecdotal evidence gathered from their interviews. The authors' recommended solutions to current campaign financing emphasize systemic features rather than rogue behavior by a few business interests or legislators. Overall, for scholars and students as well as the general public, this is a solid and up-to-date book about business campaign contributions.

There is an irony, however, in the authors' view that business enjoys a position of power without making any campaign contributions and the fact that business as a whole is the largest contributor to political campaigns. The puzzle is if business interests have so much power, why do they contribute even one penny? Or why do they respond to the pleas of politicians asking for money with the implicit acknowledgement that a payback will be forthcoming?

The answer, I believe, is that the authors overstate the efficacy of business managers in the political process. A more accurate picture of how corporate managers deal with political

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institutions, including interactions through campaign contributions, is not as strategic manipulators of the system but as rational decision makers facing organizational constraints and operating in a highly uncertain political environment. Recent literature suggests that organizational processes and routines may be more important in explaining corporate political behavior than external political and economic factors. Thus, some of the networking that PAC managers do may be more explained by standard operating procedures and uncertainty avoidance than by strategic intent to achieve a policy goal.

The authors also assume that business is united in its policy position. This view ignores both the collective action and differential impacts of public policy (across types of business firms) literatures. Since public policies can have an impact on one firm favorably while harming another, some forms may attempt to use political activities as a method of nonmarket competition against their rivals. Thus, rather than unity, the lack of business unity may be a better explanation of corporate campaign contribution behavior.

DOUG SCHULER
Rice University

Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another *by Spencer R. Weart. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 432 pp. $35.00.*

Of all the works published to date on the "democratic peace proposition," Spencer Weart's is the most ambitious. Weart intends to demonstrate conclusively that whenever democratic republics (DRs) have emerged from the fifth century B.C. on, they have never fought one another; and to supply the definitive explanation as to why that is so.

Weart's republics are states in which "political decisions are made through public contestation by a body of citizens who hold equal rights" (p. 28). Republics come in democratic and oligarchical varieties (DRs and ORs), depending on the proportion of adult males holding the franchise. One of the most striking findings emerging from Weart's copious data is that ORs have enjoyed a separate peace almost as perfect as their democratic counterparts. Another is that medieval Italian cities ceased their frequent wars around 1350 as they suddenly became sovereign ORs. In seeking to establish that DRs have a perfect record of peace with one another, Weart weighs possible exceptions and finds them all wanting. Some will question his classifications, for example, that in the American Civil War the Confederacy was oligarchical and the Union democratic, even though both allowed slavery. But his research is massive and careful, and he at least shows that there are no clear exceptions to the democratic peace.

The ultimate cause of the peace, Weart argues, is the peculiar political culture that republics embody. In diplomacy as in domestic affairs, the leaders of republics tolerate dissent and forgo physical coercion in favor of negotiation and compromise. Leaders depart from the norm when dealing with authoritarian and anocratic states, because such states cannot themselves be relied upon to compromise. In effect, republics form an in-group whose members trust one another but suspect the out-group of being prone to violence. Republics accept a given state into the in-group if it tolerates domestic opponents, although a republic occasionally misperceives a fellow republic as authoritarian. Much of Weart's theory has appeared elsewhere as the "normative" explanation for democratic peace, but he synthesizes skillfully and mounts a compelling argument in dozens of case studies that cooperation among republics is a product of political culture.

For all its considerable virtues, *Never at War* is not without problems. Some will dislike Weart's inductive method, wherein he derives his theory from his cases but never tests it

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deductively. Thus we cannot be sure that leaders' political culture varies with domestic institutions as significantly as Weart predicts. He concedes both that leaders of nonrepublics may practice republican-style diplomacy and that leaders of republics may not. Here Weart might have considered the role of republican institutions as constraints that complement norms. Moreover, if political culture is all, then Weart's strong conclusion that a world of democracies would enjoy universal peace is premature. Not only may DRs misperceive one another's regimes as authoritarian, but should the out-group of nondemocracies disappear, the in-group of DRs would die with it (Weart disagrees, p. 269). Since Weart treats states as more or less republican, he would have done well to treat republican peace as a strong tendency rather than an iron law, and perpetual peace as approachable rather than achievable. Even as a strong tendency, democratic peace is most impressive.

So is this capacious work. Its importance goes beyond the democratic peace: it suggests both that culture matters in IR and that republican culture is not as temporally and spatially bounded as many think.

JOHN M. OWEN IV
University of Virginia

Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics *by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1998. 228 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $15.95.*

Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy *by Jeffrey Knopf. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 287 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

The field of international relations has long since moved beyond the traditional billiard ball model that once dominated the discipline. Few scholars today would take issue with the assertion that "domestic politics matters" when it comes to explaining foreign policy behavior. Yet our understanding of just how societal actors influence international politics continues to evolve and expand. A growing number of studies have documented the significance of domestic forces at both the elite and mass levels of opinion. Yet much of this literature continues to treat societal actors as mere constraints on the policy-making process rather than as potential instigators of policy change.

Cases such as the recently victorious campaign to ban land mines suggest that even this framework is too narrow to capture the full impact of societal actors. The land mine campaign was transnational, rather than merely domestic, in scope. In contrast with elite interest groups that lobby on behalf of narrowly self-regarding goals, the land mine campaign united a network of grassroots activists around the pursuit of normative objectives. Nor did this network merely serve to constrain the range of policy options available to state decision makers. The land mine campaign placed a new issue on the international agenda, one that had previously received scant attention.

The land mine ban campaign is neither unique nor unprecedented. Grassroots domestic and transnational networks have long served as sources of international change, although the numbers and effectiveness of such groups have certainly grown over time. Only recently, however, have scholars begun to develop theories and methodologies that could account for and measure the significance of such phenomena.

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The two books under review each make a major contribution to our understanding of the role that grassroots politics can play in international relations. Jeffrey Knopf examines the impact that citizen protest against nuclear arms has had on U.S. arms control policy. He finds that the presence of an active and visible peace movement at home often stimulated or accelerated American planning for new arms control initiatives. This was true in varying ways and degrees in the cases of the test ban negotiations of Dwight Eisenhower's second term, the SALT negotiations of the early 1970s, and the START talks of the Ronald Reagan era. Knopf concludes that citizen activism can serve to shift state preferences and behavior in favor of international cooperation.

Knopf's evidence for domestic influence on arms control policy is strongest in the case of the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s. Widespread grassroots protest forced clear changes in the Reagan administration's initially bellicose approach to nuclear weapons and arms control. The test ban movement of the late 1950s also appears to have accelerated a shift in the Eisenhower administration's priorities in favor of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Yet the ban on atmospheric testing ultimately reached under President John F. Kennedy fell considerably short of the comprehensive halt to testing that activists had demanded. Knopf assigns a weaker but still significant role to domestic factors in explaining the Nixon administration's decision to push forward the SALT I talks. Yet given the absence of a grassroots antinuclear movement during this period, even Knopf's modest claims for the role of citizens' activism seem exaggerated in this case.

Knopf's book has its flaws. The author offers few original theoretical insights. His attempt to develop a quantitative model to test the impact of domestic protest on policy is awkward and unconvincing. The case narratives are sometimes repetitive and a bit wooden in tone. Knopf gives insufficient weight to the transnational ties connecting the American antinuclear movement with those abroad, especially Western Europe.

In one very important respect, however, Knopf makes a truly significant contribution. Scholars interested in the domestic sources of foreign policy have faced difficult problems in establishing causation. We can document societal activism. We can correlate this with policy change. But it is difficult to establish that the former is responsible for the latter, especially since other variables seldom remain constant over the relevant time period. While Knopf does not entirely resolve this problem, he offers perhaps the most sophisticated discussion to date of how one might go about tracing and measuring the impact of societal activism on foreign policy. Knopf's approach focuses on three potential routes of influence: an electoral pathway, an elite coalition-shift pathway, and a bureaucratic utilization pathway. He provides a detailed examination of the pre-conditions necessary for effective influence along each pathway and the level of policy—whether general or specific—most open to change along that route. When combined with established case study methods involving structured, focused comparisons across multiple cases, Knopf's framework provides extremely useful guidance for scholars seeking ways to measure societal influence in a more rigorous manner.

Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink examine the emergence, workings, and effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks. These are densely connected collections of individuals and groups united across national boundaries around the pursuit of some particular set of principled ideas. Their book offers chapter-length case studies of networks devoted to human rights, environmentalism, and opposition to violence against women. The authors also discuss the implications of their conceptual and empirical work for evaluating existing theoretical paradigms or approaches in international relations, such as realism, liberalism, the English school, constructivism, and world polity theory.

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Keck and Sikkink hypothesize that transnational networks often emerge when aggrieved domestic societal actors are first denied access to political processes at home. This leads to a boomerang effect, whereby isolated or repressed domestic groups in a particular country appeal to sympathetic groups abroad, who then enlist in a transnational effort to bring international pressure upon the recalcitrant regime. Governing elites thus find that growing repression at home only produces increasing criticism and pressure from abroad.

The most interesting theoretical contributions of the book concern the workings and effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks. The authors distinguish among four major types of transnational politics, each of which draws upon different sorts of network resources: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. They also examine how the effectiveness of advocacy campaigns varies according to the characteristics of the issues and actors involved. The most successful networks, for instance, tend to focus on issues that involve bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or the denial of legal equality of opportunity.

The authors resist the temptation to idealize or oversimplify their discussion. Keck and Sikkink recognize that not all principled ideas fall near the liberal end of the political spectrum as, for instance, when they discuss the mobilization of a transnational anti-abortion network centered around the Catholic Church in connection with the 1995 United Nations Conference on Women held in Beijing, China. Keck and Sikkink also acknowledge that transnational networks sometimes fail in their objectives. One of the more interesting parts of their book contrasts the largely failed campaign to eradicate female circumcision from parts of Africa with the earlier and more successful effort to end the practice of female foot-binding in China. Finally, the authors forthrightly address the tensions that arise within the human rights, environmental, and women's movements based upon differences in culture and economic status. These conflicts often center on North-South cleavages and typically result in difficult negotiation and compromise among groups that may bring quite unequal resources to the bargaining table.

All in all, *Activists Beyond Borders* is a rich and rewarding book that provides scholars with a sophisticated set of conceptual tools for analyzing transnational grassroots politics. These two books together remind us that idealism can sometimes be quite realistic.

DAVID SKIDMORE
Drake University

To Strike at a King: The Turning Point in the McCarthy Witch-Hunts *by Michael Ranville. Troy, MI, Momentum Books, Ltd, 1998. 301 pp. $29.95.*

This narrowly focused exploration of one major incident in the life of one minor figure in American history makes a fairly large claim. The title gives it away: The attempt by the Air Force to cashier Lt. Milo Radulovich from the Air Force Reserve marked the beginning of the end of Senator Joseph McCarthy's career as a political marauder.

Unquestionably, the Red-baiting aura of the early 1950s made the action by the Air Force a natural bureaucratic response. Here was a serviceman who could not be trusted to do his duty because he was encumbered with a father and a sister who had ties to communism. Never mind that he had served honorably and well enough to earn a commission after enlisting in the Air Force in 1944 following graduation from high school in Detroit. Never

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mind that he had been cleared for a top-secret assignment in Greenland as an officer. The problem, said the Air Force, was his close and continuing association with his father and sister. His father read a Serbian-language newspaper that favored the communists in Yugoslavia. His sister was a militant left-winger who once picketed a Detroit hotel for its refusal to accept Paul Robeson as a registered guest.

So in August 1953, Radulovich was informed he could resign his commission quietly (but with the knowledge his permanent record would show that he had no choice) or he could face formal discharge. He could contest the action before an Air Force board, but he would have to provide his own counsel. The lieutenant, then married and taking courses in meteorology at the University of Michigan, chose to fight back.

The story of that fight extending over about three months is told by the author in diary form. He chronicles the events as they occurred day by day. In the process he introduces the lawyers who served pro bono as counsel to the beleaguered lieutenant. He quotes extensively from their comments before the Air Force board appointed to hear Radulovich's defense against the charges. And he notes how little hope the officer had of winning his fight until one attorney introduced him to a reporter at the *Detroit News* who listened to Radulovich's story and then wrote about the Air Force cashiering an officer for associating with his own family.

That turned the tide. Other reporters telephoned him to seek interviews. A radio talk show asked the lieutenant to appear, and all three Detroit newspapers quickly picked up editorial cudgels in Radulovich's behalf. The story began to spread across the land, and one reader was Edward R. Murrow, the host of the television program *See It Now*. Murrow and his top producer, Fred Friendly, immediately recognized the potential of the story as a weapon against the witch-hunting of McCarthy. Before the end of October they were on the air with the saga of the Air Force's railroading of Lt. Radulovich. Murrow's closing comments on the program left little doubt where truth and justice lay. Public opinion and media pressure did the rest. The Air Force hearing board had dutifully supported the high command's decision to discharge Radulovich, but when its findings were presented to Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, he reviewed them and concluded otherwise. The officer was not a security risk and could remain a reservist.

Within a year, Wisconsin's notorious Red baiter had self-destructed in hearings into alleged subversions in the Army. And Edward Murrow, emboldened by the positive reaction to the Radulovich story, had tackled the senator's conduct head-on in another famous *See It Now* program.

More than four decades later, in a post-Soviet world, it is hard to fathom how overwrought our security guardians—and indeed the American people—had become over the communist menace. Michael Ranville's fast-paced, factual account is a sobering reminder of how our freedoms were once curtailed.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Electronic Whistle-Stops: The Impact of the Internet on American Politics *by Gary W. Selnow. Westport, CT, Praeger Press, 1998. 264 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $19.95.*

This book examines the role of the Internet during the 1996 election and the Internet's potential impact on American politics. The author's reference point is conventional mass me-

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dia, and his observations about the Internet are largely shaped in relation to mass media. He characterizes conventional mass media as centralized, closed, and typified by a one-way flow of information; the Internet is open, decentralized, and amenable to a two-way flow of information. Selnow believes that these characteristics of the Internet will have both a positive and negative impact on American politics.

Positively, the open, decentralized nature of the Internet combined with the two-way flow of information promises increased public access for all candidates and the development of new forms of interaction between public and candidates, as well as among the public. Where the centralized and homogenized nature of conventional media restricts which individuals and points of view can be heard, the heterogeneous, diffuse, and, due to the relatively low entry costs, easily accessible Internet creates the possibility that every candidate and every point of view can be heard by a broad cross section of the public. The two-way flow of information on the Internet enables the public directly to express opinions to candidates while enabling campaign sites to tailor their presentation of information to the interests of a particular site visitor. At the same time, the ease of communication creates new avenues for the creation of communities and interest groups by promoting communication among like-minded people.

Negatively, Selnow fears "the Internet's ability to ultratarget runs the risk of fragmenting the population" (p. 191). Although Selnow criticizes the homogenized and centralized nature of conventional mass media, he also points out that they created a "common meeting ground for American audiences . . . [which] unified the country around shared agendas . . . [and] implanted in the nation a common set of issues" (p. xxx). The advent of cable TV and 100-plus channels has already begun to fragment the audience, and the Internet with its millions of "channels" may fragment the audience even further, leading to isolated individuals lacking common reference points, chasing down "narrow agendas," and totally oblivious to either the larger context or major events.

Beyond a doubt, these are important observations about the potential impact of the Internet on American politics; but they can be easily developed, explored, and supported within the space of one or two articles. Nonetheless, Selnow has deemed it necessary to devote over 200 pages to discussing these. As a consequence, much of the book is *not* focused on the impact of the Internet on American politics but devoted to long and largely irrelevant descriptions of web sites and how reporters and politicians used the web in 1996. In other words, the bulk of the book does not hold up to the promise of the title: the title promises an analysis of the impact of the Internet on American politics, while the majority of the book is a description of the use of the Internet during the 1996 campaign. One can't avoid suspecting that the real purpose behind this book was to write a book-length work and not to provide an in-depth analysis of the impact of the Internet on American politics.

CARL H. A. DASSBACH
Michigan Technological University

Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
by James C. Scott. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 460 pp. $35.00.

Some of the failings of modern states are easy enough to see—the potential for bureaucratic ineptitude and the possibilities for coercion and cruelty. But how do we explain why states

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end up causing misfortune when they seek to do good? James Scott explains why tragedy frequently results from state efforts to simplify and standardize people and things. Modern states proceed from a conviction that scientific principles and technical procedures make their goal of creating all encompassing order plausible. The opportunity for human suffering is exacerbated when an authoritarian government confronts a weak civil society.

Scott presents five main examples of state intervention: scientific forestry in Germany, France, and the USSR; urban planning in nineteenth-century Paris, Le Corbusier, Brasilia, and Chandigarh; the Russian Revolution, including Lenin's ideas about party leadership and the critiques by Rosa Luxembourg and Aleksandra Kollontay, as well as Soviet collectivization; village resettlement in 1970s Tanzania and Ethiopia; scientific agriculture in the United States, West Africa, and the Andes. The examples span efforts to control natural and social worlds. Scott warns us of the dangers of specialized production, whether of forest timber or hybrid strains of grain, which destroy the biological diversity typical of habitats unmarked by human intervention and the resistance such ecologies have against disasters. He considers the political failures to create specific social environments premised on radical simplifications of both urban and rural settings. Scott's insights into the parallels between social complexity and natural diversity guide the reader through the similar perils attending human efforts to diminish either in order to exert control.

The basic argument is creative and the wide range of evidence is compelling. Modern states do violence to social and natural environments, even when official intentions are to improve the quality of life. The constant counterpoint to progress has been a danger of eroding the diversity and richness of social and biological life. Scott also recognizes the positive benefits brought by states to their subject populations and the virtues of scientific method and technological progress. No Luddite he, mindlessly smashing the machinery of material advances. But he is an advocate for using our scientific tools more carefully, for tempering their application with a strong dose of practical knowledge, what he calls after the Greek "metis" (pp. 313). Practical knowledge is what the farmer has about his local soil and climate, what the sailor has about winds and waves, what all disaster specialists understand about responding to crises. Practical knowledge is difficult for states to create or control, because its situation-specific nature conflicts with state preferences for simplicity and generality.

A work this sweeping and challenging raises many new problems. Here very briefly are three. First, while states in principle seek simplicity and generality, they in practice engage in all manner of distinction making that bedevils efforts to simplify or generalize, making difficult, when even possible, choices among several proposals for different purposes. This too is part of seeing (or *not* seeing) like a state. Second, Scott suggests that his critique of modern states and their efforts to simplify in order to control applies to global capitalism as well. But differences between markets and administrative manipulation also merit attention. Just as planned cities depend for long-term success on social organizations outside the plan, so too in administratively centralized economies, resources and products are allocated in part on gray and black markets. Third, a distinction between scientific method as interpreted by large organizations and practical knowledge as used by local people can be sharply posed, but delimiting the actual boundaries between the two kinds of knowledge is difficult and promoting border crossings a challenge. If people take on useful products of science (Scott lists sewing machines, matches, flashlights, kerosene, plastic bowls, and antibiotics) can states for their part create spaces for practical knowledge?

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James Scott's tantalizing treatise invites us to ponder carefully the tragedies of modern state interventions as we struggle to recognize the resources people have to qualify those efforts and pursue possibilities for improving the future.

R. BIN WONG
University of California, Irvine

The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security, and the Making of Postwar International Order *by Robert Latham. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 281 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.50.*

Robert Latham has written an important and interesting book that raises the question: How do we conceptualize and explain central aspects of world order(s)? The author proposes a new, hermeneutic approach, informed by critical theory, and he advocates a renovated liberal perspective to guide American foreign policy.

Latham's basic argument is far-reaching: questions of security need to be placed in the wider context of a "project" of liberal modernity that goes back to the nineteenth century and in the twentieth is associated with the expansion of American power. The project was as much civilizational as strategic or economic. It involved the creation of what Latham calls the "constitutive presence" (p. 61-2) of external elements of U.S. state and civil society in making the infrastructures of world order. This process combined consent and coercion to create a Gramscian form of transatlantic hegemony, institutionalized in NATO (that is, U.S. hegemony was not global). The American constitutive presence was reflected in the promotion of individual freedom, open commerce, republican democracy, and national self-determination, with the "free world" as its ideological fulcrum. It was reinforced by the coercive capabilities of the Pentagon, the CIA, and U.S. bases and alliances throughout the world. Latham describes a dialectic between the long time span of liberal aspects of modernity and the particular conjuncture after 1945 that produced a new synthesis—"the Liberal moment." By developing a more complex object of analysis for international relations, Latham claims he goes beyond orthodox reductionist American theories, which have been unable to capture the broad dialectic of world order—a claim that is largely sustained in this far-reaching work.

Latham also argues that he is better able to specify agency in the making of American foreign policy through his concept of "the external state" and the way its policy discourse was formed by the battle between "nationalists" and "internationalists." Here Latham is on weaker ground, because other critical works have already analyzed these processes as well as extended their analyses to the transnational politics of class and state formation and the making of alliances, for example, Kees van der Pijl, Craig Murphy and Enrico Augelli, William Robinson. Although Latham claims his approach enables a better specification of political agency, one is left wondering whether he has really accounted for the real coalitions of social forces that actually made and articulated world order visions, not just in the United States but also across the Atlantic in a historical process that constituted the making of world order.

In this context, Latham's attempt to provide a multidimensional, poststructuralist analysis falls short of a compelling historical account. He correctly highlights issues of identity

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and the discursive power but often fails to integrate this with a political economy to explain the constitution of the policies that have emanated from what Librarian of Congress Daniel Boorstin called "the great democracy of cash." In this sense, Latham's book is ideological in so far as it fails to fully acknowledge how the power of capital has been crucial to strategic and civilizational aspects of liberal modernity in the twentieth century.

What are the implications of Latham's approach for policy? In his conclusion he implores the United States to develop "a foreign policy approach that highlights decentralization, efficacy, experimentation, local entrepreneurial effort, and caution regarding commitments" (p. 209). However, this ignores fundamental components of the American constitutive presence in a Clintonite, relativist, post-cold war world of economic globalization led by giant corporations. So although Latham's book has much to commend it, it ends up far from the tradition of radical scrutiny of power that once characterized critical thought in the United States.

STEPHEN GILL
York University

Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering *by Mark J. Rozell and Clyde Wilcox. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999. 170 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

For obvious reasons, we often like to make grand claims that we are witnessing qualitative shifts in the nature of the world. This book, which is an undergraduate text and may be excused for partaking in this practice, starts very much in this vein. The title promises to tell us about the new face of electioneering. In the initial chapter, the authors are quick to state that we might view the 1996 elections as perhaps "marking the beginning of yet another era . . . [where there is] a change from elections centered on candidates to elections centered on interest group politics" (p. 5). Indeed, we are warned that interest groups are taking over and that accountability is being lost.

Yet the actual discussion is considerably more measured and documents changes in the real world that are far more incremental. As such, the three core chapters that form the heart of this text are quite balanced. We are told in Chapter Two that contemporary party rules offer opportunities for groups to play a role in party politics, that groups work with their preferred candidates both in communicating preferences and in mobilizing support, and that those with broader agendas may pursue grander objectives than those with narrower goals. Chapter Three provides much of the contemporary wisdom about campaign contributions. While some groups are access motivated and others are electorally motivated, all want to be heard and to communicate. Most money goes to incumbents, hurting challengers in the process, and campaign finance regulation may influence the distribution of resources. Chapter Four documents in straightforward fashion how interest groups may try to influence their own members and other voters and, additionally, illustrates how issue advocacy has increasingly created another wrinkle that threatens to produce changes in the electoral status quo.

When attention is turned to making concluding statements about the role of groups, the authors seem to have forgotten their initial foreboding comments. We are told that "the current and evolving role of interest groups has positive and negative implications for the

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conduct of American elections and for democracy more broadly" (p. 148). There are some warnings that without change things could deteriorate; nonetheless, the authors conclude that interest groups are essential.

As a text oriented toward undergraduates, the book fills a niche in the market for courses on interest groups or elections. The authors effectively document the kinds of things that organized interests do in their attempts to guide the behavior of political parties, candidates, and voters. Indeed, the book is organized around the theme of telling us to whom interest groups communicate their political messages and to what end. The text is readable, and corresponding data are presented in an accessible fashion. Rozell and Wilcox also provide a feeling for some of the contemporary issues, notably the increasing prevalence of soft money, that have lately received a great deal of attention. Like most books on interest groups, there is the frustrating punch line [or lack thereof] regarding the impact on actual politics and policy: groups are portrayed as positive and negative, as effectual and ineffectual. But as a succinct statement about grand changes in contemporary American politics and the new face of electioneering, I am more hesitant. The substance of the text and the existing literature point much more to evolution than to revolution.

LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG
University of Rochester

The Managed Care Blues and How to Cure Them *by Walter A. Zelman and Robert A. Berenson. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 1998. 240 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.95.*

Over the past ten years, managed care has transformed the American health care system. The speed of change and growing concerns over the quality of care provided in this new system, however, have generated an antimanaged care backlash.

Walter A. Zelman and Robert A. Berenson are unabashed partisans of managed care. But they too view the current environment with alarm. In *The Managed Care Blues and How to Cure Them*, Zelman and Berenson argue that without the active participation of government and health care purchasers, managed care will fail to live up to its potential. Instead, consumer responses to this revolution may erase all the advantages of managed care and leave only a system that controls cost at the expense of quality.

The Managed Care Blues is an engaging and even-handed examination of managed care that marshals a range of facts and stories to provide a coherent argument for a nonexpert reader. By contrast with the old fee-for-service medical care system, managed care, the authors argue, has the tools to generate value—"quality at a reasonable cost"—in the health care market (p. 47). They place particular emphasis on selective contracting, the practice of limiting patient choice to a restricted panel of providers. Selective contracting can generate tightly integrated networks of providers. These integrated plans, Zelman and Berenson assert, can then make the best use of a range of other managed care tools, such as capitation payment and coordinated disease management programs.

Much of Zelman and Berenson's overall confidence about managed care centers on the potential of these highly integrated traditional plans to combine cost containment with quality improvement. Unfortunately, as they admit, tightly integrated traditional HMO plans are shrinking as a share of the managed care market. Instead, consumers have elected plans

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with broad, loosely structured networks that allow them a choice among many physicians and hospitals. Zelman and Berenson lament that this "cult of choice" (p. 142), often reinforced by legislation, may doom tightly integrated plans, eliminating the potential for managed care to contain costs, reducing the usefulness of guidelines and protocols, and making "choice based on health care quality less meaningful" (p. 155).

Why do consumers prize choice so highly? As Zelman and Berenson acknowledge, consumers value choice of provider because tremendous variations exist in plan quality, and consumers have few means to sort out the excellent from the terrible. To date, the potential for managed care to improve quality—and communicate that improvement—"still lies more in its logic than in its practice" (p. 135). This creates a dilemma. Unless consumers can be assured of managed care quality, they will demand choice of provider; but if consumers continue to demand choice, they may never get managed care quality.

This dilemma is the core of the book. The authors suggest that the problem might be solved by transforming choice—giving cost-conscious consumers a choice not of health care provider but among a variety of types of plans that operate within some form of purchasing coalition. These purchasing coalitions would manage the health insurance market by regulating payment methods and placing restrictions on benefit design. This management function would smooth the functioning of the market and serve to discourage plans from selecting only healthy risks. Governments would fund outcomes research, promote malpractice reform, and produce a national quality report card.

Zelman and Berenson are alumni of the Clinton health reform process; if these proposals seem familiar, it may be because many of them are basic components of "managed competition," the health reform strategy that formed the foundation of the Clinton plan. Opponents deployed the rhetoric of choice to defeat that plan. By reasserting the role of institutional structures in the health care market, Zelman and Berenson hope that they can keep choice from defeating managed care altogether.

SHERRY GLIED
Columbia University

Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe *by Vladimir Tismaneanu. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, 126 pp. $29.95.*

Euphoria following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and collapse of the communist regime in 1989 gave way quickly to difficulties and insecurities in the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Vladimir Tismaneanu, professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park, conducts an eloquently erudite intellectual inquiry into the competing liberal and chauvinist myths of ways to a better world propounded in response to "the shock of modernity, the difficult adjustment of individuals to the collapse of traditional communities and solidarities, and the inner tensions of still-fragile democracies" (p. 28).

As detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, the "vindictive myths" and "scapegoating fantasies," exclusionary, chauvinist, hate-filled, anti-Western ethnic nationalism, with their culprits for present troubles among various minorities, have been taken up as a means to power by various parties across the area, notably by some top leaders in the Balkans like Slobodan Milosevic.

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Competing pro-democracy myths originate with the other side of the intelligentsia, the former antitotalitarian and now marginalized dissenters like Adam Michnik and Vaclav Havel. It is they, Tismaneanu reminds us, who first gave life under communism to the nascent civil societies and ideals of free expression without which democracy goes under. "Liberals emphasize the civic bonds, whereas militant nationalists focus on ethnic purity based on common origins and presumed common destiny. The former favor dialogue, tolerance, and inclusion; the latter champion assimilation, segregation, or exclusion of those with different ancestries" (p. 66). Usually, these intellectuals have opposed trials for former communist leaders.

Readers should come to this book already knowledgeable about Eastern European history and politics. The author writes: "This book is not about everyday politics, in post-communist societies, but the spiritual reactions to the discomfitures of the transition" (p. 14). Tismaneanu concludes, on the one hand: the "liberal project, or the Enlightenment agenda associated with modernity, is indeed in danger in post-communist societies (and not only there) . . . democracy remains vulnerable, coexisting with strong populist, nationalist, and authoritarian trends" (pp. 35, 47). On the other hand, Tismaneanu rejects an apocalyptic scenario for Eastern Europe as a whole as "somewhat dubious" or "much too hyperbolic" (p. 62). He tells us that in Central Europe and the Baltic states, the new political class has succeeded in marginalizing ethnocentric movements" (p. 162). (This is questionable in Latvia, especially). Without more data on public opinion (none) and party alignments (a few allusions), it is impossible from this reading to assay the potential of the "anti-liberal collectivist trends" in various countries (p. 53).

Knowledge of regional politics will better equip the reader to apply Tismaneanu's hypothesis that "the more developed the reformist wing of the ruling elite during the post-totalitarian stage, the more articulate and coherent its economic and political propositons, the better the chances for a consensual transition toward liberal democracy" (p. 158). Even where this is not true, there are a few good signs in less promising countries beyond this book's time frame. Slovakia's chauvinist, Vladimir Meciar, accepted his electoral defeat in 1998. Slovakia is relatively tolerant and open now on religious issues. Macedonia became a notable exception, at least for the time being, to Balkan exclusivism, when in 1998, leaders of extremist Albanian and Macedonian parties reconciled sufficiently to form a new governing coalition. The government of Montenegro rejects, at its possible peril, Milosevic's policy of aggressive chauvinism. And overall, as the author notes, Western Europe's attractiveness provides support for the democratic myth.

PETER JUVILER
Barnard College, Columbia University

Warlord Politics and African States *by William Reno. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 257 pp. $52.00.*

This is a chilling book, carefully researched and devastating in its implications. It is sort of an academic's Robert Kaplan (pessimistic travelogue author of *To the Ends of the Earth*) made of facts rather than impressions, specifics rather than suppositions, concepts rather than generalities; and so the message has a sound basis and a hard impact. That message is that collapsing state leaders find it irresistible to divide up government functions, privatizing

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security in exchange for natural resource concessions and totally neglecting the representational, developmental, and bureaucratic functions of the state. Leaders are abetted in this process by the international financial institutions, whose insistence on debt repayment reinforces the security-for-finances exchange and ignores the rest.

The story is told through profiles of four African states in various stages of collapse—Samuel Doe's and then Charles Taylor's Liberia under siege, Sierra Leone shrinking under a succession of military and civilian rulers, Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire and early Laurent Kabila's Congo, and Sani Abacha's Nigeria. Sierra Leone (on which Reno previously wrote a solid work, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*), Liberia, and Congo are the cases that fit the thesis most tightly, since they illustrate an additional element of his analysis, the role of warlords. Zaire and Nigeria are extensions (or inversions) of the thesis, since both Mobutu and Abacha were national military leaders who acted like warlords once they came into power.

There are two parts to this study. One consists of wide-ranging research in English, French, and local sources on the political and financial linkages and broader strategies of warlords and governments with private security companies. The other consists of the implications of these networks, particularly for the nature and process of state collapse and reinstatement. Reno shows that what is involved is not merely a weak state, where security, development, and other collective goods, though badly furnished, are still within the purview of the bureaucratic state. Instead, an entirely different political system limits government to a private contract between the rulers and their security agency, and the rest of government functions are performed only by local collectivities, if at all. Even the patron-client networks on which much of developing politics is based are useless in this context, and the only thing that fills the void outside the rulers' castle is local warlords, some of whom rise to challenge the national warlord and take his place.

There are a few weaknesses to be noted. Procedurally, the writing is not as smooth as it could be. Substantively, the notion of warlord is not sufficiently developed; warlords who rise to the top of the pile are analyzed, but the thesis rests on those who occupy lower niches in society, and these are not well identified or discussed.

The real value of the work is the conceptual setting it provides for thinking about remedies. In an analysis inspired by the sense of rational choice reasoning, Reno shows that in this system it is in no one's—least of all the government's—interest to work on development and political reform. He shows the shock necessary to break away from Abacha's system, lest it imprison his successor, as Mobutu's system conditioned his replacement. In between these two cases is Liberia, where everything would indicate that any successor to Doe—Thomas Quiwonkpa or Taylor or any of the lesser Taylors who sprang up in his wake—would have a systemic as well as personal hard time imposing a more responsive state. The optimists who have to live within us are challenged to find the analytical paths out of this situation, whose threat to the post-cold-war state system extends well beyond Africa.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
The Johns Hopkins University

Multi-Party Politics in Kenya *by David Throup and Charles Hornsby. Athens, Ohio University Press, 1998. 660 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $19.95.*

Kenya is one of the paradigmatic cases of both the potential and problems of political liberalization in Africa. Facing growing internal opposition and united Western donors' de-

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mands for political change, the government reluctantly agreed to legalize opposition parties in 1991 and called an election for December 1992, which it won. *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya* is the definitive work on that election and surely the most detailed study of any African election in the current reform era. The authors tell the tale of how difficult it is for donors to demand democracy and how capable a recalcitrant regime can be at insuring that it survives the process with at least most of its power intact. The first three chapters give a succinct political history of Kenya to the eve of the democracy movement that sprang forth in 1990. The rest of the book's thirteen chapters are largely a detailed chronology of the struggle to force the regime to give up its legal single-party rule, the 1992 campaign and elections, and an analysis of "Why KANU [Kenya African National Union] Won" (Chapter 11).

The book's principal contention is that in spite of the ethnic and personal divisions within the opposition, KANU won mainly by outsmarting the international community that was watching the elections so closely, fighting an unfair campaign and rigging the polls as necessary. This conclusion is based on an extremely detailed analysis of the campaign and election returns across the country. While one can quibble with the conclusions in particular cases, the overall argument is quite convincing and may provide a useful methodology for similar studies elsewhere. Carefully using corroborating evidence for each claim, the authors rely on a combination of anomalies in voter registration and election return data, press accounts, legal challenges, and interviews to conclude that election rigging inflated KANU's parliamentary majority by just enough (at least fifteen seats) to give it a working majority.

Another useful lesson coming out of the book is its detailed portrayal of the inner workings of neopatrimonial politics. Political scientists have long seen patron-client ties as the heart of African politics, in Kenya and elsewhere. While Throup and Hornsby do not add anything new theoretically, they describe in great detail the complicated national and local battles among Big Men and their followers. Because neopatrimonial rule and personal patronage networks, largely along ethnic lines, are the core form of political loyalty and mobilization, both the ruling party and opposition are fraught with divisions and constantly shifting alliances. This makes it difficult to apply the usual models of democratic transition, with "reformers" lined up against "hardliners." The real world of Kenyan (and African) efforts at political reform is clearly much more complicated.

Perhaps because the principal author (Throup) is an historian, the book makes no major theoretical contribution, which may frustrate political scientists. At 600 pages, it is also extremely long and could have used further editing. The timing of its publication—written before the December 1997 general election but published after—is unfortunate. The authors predict that the 1997 election would see KANU returned even stronger, arguing that 1992 was the height of opposition power. While the opposition has fragmented even more, and in that sense is weaker, KANU's share of parliamentary seats has actually dropped, giving it a razor-thin parliamentary majority. Furthermore, negotiations over changes in the constitution, while far from certain, are nonetheless sputtering forward as a result of pressures that arose in the run-up to the 1997 election. Kenya is far from fully democratic, but Throup and Hornsby's declaration that little has changed since 1990 may be overstated.

Throup and Hornsby's careful documentation of a crucial transitional election is not only important for scholars of political reform in Africa, but also for analysts of Western foreign policy and aid conditionality. The book tells a very cautionary tale about the power of outsiders to demand reform, as well as the ability of international observers to detect abuse in the process. The book could also become important to Kenyans' understanding of their own efforts and political history. When and if democracy finally succeeds in Kenya, Kenyans will

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write their own history of the political reform effort, and this book will be a major tool for them in that process.

STEPHEN ORVIS
Hamilton College

Israel and the Bomb *by Avner Cohen. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 470 pp. Paper, $27.50.*

Nonproliferation is all the rage in Washington these days, and with good reason, for nothing menaces American security more than the spread of nuclear arms. Washington was not always that keen on preventing proliferation, however. It has even encouraged proliferation by giving critical help to Britain and France, by considering assistance to India and others in the 1960s, and by looking the other way when Pakistan nuclear-armed in the 1980s. Yet nothing better reveals the American ambivalence about proliferation than top officials' ostrich-like stance toward Israel since the 1950s. Taking their cue from the top, intelligence officials showed a stunning lack of curiosity about the Israeli effort, even as it acquired a nuclear arsenal that today rivals France's.

Nuclear history is cloaked in secrecy everywhere. Americans are only now beginning to learn about our own nuclear past, and most theorists still opine about deterrence with very little understanding of nuclear plans and practices. Yet no country has gone further in its determination to obscure its nuclear history than Israel. Many details became known after Mordecai Vanunu, a technician in the Dimona reprocessing plant, defected and went public in 1986. Seymour Hersh, America's preeminent investigative reporter, revealed much of what is publicly known about Israel's nuclear history in 1991. Now Avner Cohen, an Israeli scholar, has added to this knowledge with his well-researched book.

Cohen's most significant discovery is that Israel had two bombs in the basement on the eve of the 1967 war. His discussion of the role of the bomb in that war is particularly instructive. Far from serving as a deterrent, Dimona was a target for Egypt, much like the American fleet at Pearl Harbor was for Japan. It was that target, Cohen suggests plausibly, that the air force commander ordered attacked on 27 May, an order countermanded by Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser. Israeli concern about two Egyptian reconnaissance flights over Dimona, Cohen argues convincingly, helped trigger a cabinet decision to preempt six days later. In the interim, Israeli officials considered and rejected a proposal by Shimon Peres, a pivotal figure in Israeli's nuclear program, to demonstrate the bomb, or as he cryptically puts it, "a certain proposal to which . . . would have deterred the Arabs" (p. 275). Yet, says Avner, that would have delayed Israeli preemption without providing any offsetting military benefit. "The reluctance to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons," concludes Cohen, "reinforced the resolve of the handful of Israeli political and military leaders who were aware of the nuclear issue, to push a preemptive war without delay" (p. 276).

Cohen is out to strip away what he calls Israeli's "nuclear opacity," the conscious effort to keep its nuclear program "in secrecy, officially unacknowledged, and insulated from Israeli domestic politics" (p. 1). Whether that would be good for Israeli deterrence, as Cohen believes, is arguable. Unquestionably, however, understanding the past is essential for promoting nonproliferation in the future.

Had Israel declared itself a nuclear power or openly conducted a nuclear test, it might have exposed American nonproliferation efforts as a sham and impeded efforts to negotiate the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty. Indeed, that may have been Edward Teller's motive in 1968 when he told Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms that Israel had the bomb.

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His disclosure prompted the drafting of a new National Intelligence Estimate, but Helms, aware of the sensitivity of Israel's nuclear status, reported the conclusion to President Lyndon Johnson without disseminating it. Johnson, like Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, was unwilling to use his considerable leverage to stop Israel from nuclear-arming. The shadow of the reluctance haunts American nonproliferation efforts today.

LEON V. SIGAL
Social Science Research Council

Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties *by Bruce J. Dickson. Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1998. 276 pp. $69.00.*

Among the many questions raised by scholars studying the most recent wave of democratization is one relating to Leninist political parties. Can they adapt to pressures brought on by liberalization and democratization? Why is it so difficult for Leninist parties to adapt to changes in their environment? Bruce J. Dickson examines the Kuomintang (KMT) on Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and provides valuable insights into the question of Leninist parties and political adaptability.

The KMT-CCP comparison is an interesting one. Both parties are Leninist in their organization and in their efforts to establish the supremacy of the party over the government. Indeed, both have promised to build a modern China. But as Dickson points out, the two parties have responded very differently to similar political pressure.

Dickson makes a strong case in showing that both KMT and CCP elites have been good at formulating and implementing economic policies. While both have proved an ability to promote economic change, the KMT has been more adept in responding to demands in the political environment than the CCP has. This is because the KMT allowed for new leaders to take charge of reform policies. They held frequent elections and employed other feedback procedures that informed party leaders of political demands both inside and outside key party circles. This enabled leaders to implement reforms that smoothed a path to democracy even as it brought an end to their exclusive rule. Reforms undermined the Kuomintang's Leninist power base, but enabled the KMT to participate as a democratic party in a liberal environment.

The CCP leadership has proved unwilling to adopt political policies that might undermine its political authority. It has failed to develop viable feedback mechanisms to assess the formidable challenges it faces. Hence, it is unable to adapt to the political environment and cannot expect to survive the same kinds of challenges the KMT faced successfully.

While most of Dickson's claims are well defended, there are minor weaknesses. A claim is made, for example, that external threats never helped liberalize the KMT or the CCP. But human rights organizations report that notwithstanding Beijing's protests, continuous pressure on CCP authorities has resulted in movement toward greater acceptance of international human rights norms. On Taiwan, both former opposition and KMT leaders speak of the long-term positive impact Washington had in criticizing Taipei for human rights abuses during the 1980s. In the cases of Taiwan and China there are probably instances when rights rhetoric was productive and other times when it was counterproductive. But it is unlikely that external pressure failed to have a positive impact in liberalizing either regime. There is also little attention to ideology. Dickson is essentially right in his rendering of KMT and CCP ideology. But his organizational analysis would be enhanced with more attention to the important role ideology plays in a Leninist party. This factor more than any other

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lends insight into the advantages of political flexibility that the KMT enjoys compared to the CCP.

Though Dickson's thesis is not a new one, the clarity and organization of his argument provide us with an invaluable tool for understanding the development experiences of Taiwan and China. They also give us insights into the crises of legitimacy and authority other Leninist states have experienced or now experience. In short, Dickson has given us a book that is rich in political theory and convincingly argued. It is the best political comparison of the KMT and the CCP to appear in some time.

STEVEN J. HOOD
Ursinus College

The Psychology of Political Communication *edited by Ann N. Crigler. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996. 262 pp. $44.50.*

Bringing together leading scholars of political communication from the fields of political science and communication studies, this book explores the active roles played by elites and lay audiences in the construction of political meaning. Despite its expansive title, the book focuses less on mainstream work in media effects and political psychology than on research questions and methods that have been underappreciated in these literatures. Presenting a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of communication, chapters aim at uncovering how journalists construct the news and how lay audiences interpret and assimilate media messages in making sense of political issues.

While space does not permit a summary of all the chapters, a few deserve special mention. W. Lance Bennett and John Klockner examine how journalists construct the public's voice through selective reporting of opinion poll data. They find that poll results tend to be reported for domestic issues like abortion and school prayer that are thought to be relevant to "average" people, but are almost completely neglected in coverage of foreign issues and complex domestic policy problems. Richard Perloff's review of research on the third-person effect—the presumption among elite and lay audiences that "a persuasive communication will exert a stronger impact on others than on the self" (p. 178)—is an excellent introduction to the findings and implications of an important literature that is still little known outside the ranks of communication scholars. Such effects can be especially important to elite decision making, and the general relevance of this work to the political science discipline makes this chapter especially deserving of attention from a broad readership.

Other chapters challenge the assumption that message exposure, reception, and recall are the key processes of interest for understanding the psychology of political communication. William Gamson suggests that media discourse is but one of three resources that working-class people use to make sense of politics. Personal experience and popular wisdom are often combined with media discourse in ways that lessen the influence of media converge on people's opinions and frames of reference. Michael Delli Carpini and Bruce Williams reveal that television viewers often do not distinguish between fictional and nonfictional media content when discussing their views on environmental issues, and that media messages are conditioned by personal experience and interpersonal discussion in ways that fail to produce uniform effects. Taken together, the chapters on audience interpretation provide a convincing demonstration that messages received often bear little resemblance to messages sent, that the opinions of audiences are less dependent on media content than com-

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monly supposed by political scientists, and that audiences tend to assimilate a wide variety of media messages into a limited number of interpretive frames.

As is common with edited works, the book seems more a collection of stand-alone studies than an integrated and unified whole. Consequently, the book does not quite achieve the editor's aim of presenting "a constructionist approach to political communication" (p. 1). The contributors themselves rarely refer back to the larger theoretical concerns raised in the editor's introductory essay, and when they occasionally use terms like "construct" or "construction," they do so largely without reference to a set of distinctive theoretical propositions. What seems common to these chapters is a general interest in the ways people organize narratives about politics, a rich topic deserving of further study.

In short, this provocative and stimulating book challenges some assumptions made by political scientists about communication processes and outlines several new and promising directions in political communication research. It will be most relevant to readers with established interests in public opinion, political communication, and political psychology, and seems especially suited to readers unfamiliar with recent developments in the political communications field.

SCOTT L. ALTHAUS
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences *by Laurie A. Brand. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998. 320 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $18.50.*

Laurie Brand undertook this comparative study of liberalization's impact on Tunisian, Moroccan, and Jordanian women not only to challenge the dominance of cultural studies about women in the Middle East, but also to question assumptions about the region's cultural exclusiveness. Brand decries the fact that edited volumes on women and democratization routinely include Asian, East European, and Latin American cases but routinely omit the Middle East. Her book represents an important first step toward the inclusion she envisions.

Brand has written a clearly organized volume that is accessible to nonspecialists. Scholars of other world regions and policy makers in government and nongovernmental organizations will find it a valuable handbook on recent changes in women's citizenship status and on the dilemmas facing those seeking reform in the three countries. Each country-case is divided into three chapters: background on recent moves toward liberalization; background on women's status and mobilization; and discussion of selected "junctures" that illustrate the political process whereby women's reforms were either adopted or rejected. Research in archives and periodicals are enriched by Brand's numerous interviews with participants in each country. Brand is forthright in presenting and defending her own biases in the study: She has no sympathy for Islamists; she believes a liberal, civil society is a prerequisite to improving women's status; and she asserts the importance of focusing on national-level politics, although she admits that such a focus excludes women in rural areas and lower classes whose grievances and agendas may differ from those of national movements led by urban, elite women.

Brand succeeds admirably in making her basic point—liberalization has not necessarily benefited women. Indeed, political openings that promote civil society can have unloosed

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conservative movements that threaten women's status. Brand identifies several key factors that determine the fate of women in liberalization: the state's relationship with women and with conservative forces before the transition; state policies on women before the transition; the speed of transition; and the strength of women's movements, especially during the transition. On a spectrum of possible outcomes, Brand argues that the Middle East lies somewhere between Eastern Europe's retreat on women's rights with the dismantling of communist regimes and Latin America's advances on women's status with the demilitarization of government. Like Eastern Europe and unlike Latin America, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco have weak women's movements that have not played a primary role in promoting liberalization. Similarly, liberalization in the Middle East has featured strong rightist movements, namely Islamists, who vaunt tradition much as Eastern Europe's nationalists and Catholics have done. Middle Eastern women have thus been unable to secure the political gains that their Latin American counterparts have.

The book's worthy attributes are also its weakness. Its schematic structure and emphasis on presenting basic data leave little room for nuanced analysis. For instance, Brand leaves us with a conundrum: she calls Tunisia's liberalization the most threatening to women's status because it occurred so suddenly and briefly, because the state discouraged women's independent mobilization, and because Tunisian ruler Ben Ali flirted with compromise with his Islamist opponents. Yet, Tunisia has enacted far more reform than Jordanian and Moroccan women could ever dream of. Brand, in keeping with her liberal model, condemns Tunisia for its weak civil society and merely attributes the reforms to the "whim" of its rulers. She does not explain how or why Tunisia, in stark contrast to all other Arab states, has managed to advance women's equality so far. Brand's model leaves the reader with many questions to ponder; however, by setting out a provocative terrain for comparative analysis, it may and should inspire more research to help address the dilemmas it so successfully elucidates.

ELIZABETH THOMPSON
University of Virginia

Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties *by Nico Schrijver. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 452 pp. $89.95.*

This book examines the conceptual, legal, and political history of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources since the 1950s. The author hopes to identify international legal signposts for dealing with the economic and ecological aspects of natural resource issues in an increasingly interdependent world. He concludes that the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, having struck a balance between the rights and duties of states, can serve as an important cornerstone of emerging international sustainable development law. This conclusion is somewhat unexpected, given that the notion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is a product of the postcolonial and fiercely nationalist international lawmaking of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The first part of Schrijver's book documents the emergence of permanent sovereignty over natural resources under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, then dominated by newly independent states. Predictably, at first the emphasis was on rights, as former colonies sought to extend their sovereignty to actual control over their natural resources, culminating in the 1962 Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. An initial impulse to grant control over natural resources to peoples as well as states weakened, as states fueled by nationalism began to claim this right entirely for themselves. Schrijver describes

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the bitter fights of the 1960s and 1970s over the control of direct foreign investment, the commodities trade, and the exploitation of natural resources. Where industrialized countries largely condemned the nationalization of private assets on the part of developing host states as a violation of the doctrine of *pacta sunt servanda* (preexisting agreements to be observed), the host states defended such actions on the basis of having to consolidate their fragile independence and satisfy pressing economic development needs. Decolonization, they argued, represented a fundamental change in circumstances that justified the abrogation of treaties entered into earlier.

In the late 1970s, this mutual antagonism began to give way to more pragmatic interpretations of permanent sovereignty over natural resources that acknowledged the necessity of international cooperation. Part II identifies such trends toward pragmatism in multilateral codes of conduct on foreign investment, the law of the sea, and international environmental law. In the environmental arena, for example, states no longer enjoy "absolute" or "full" sovereignty in the sense of an unfettered freedom of action. Here, as in the other areas examined in this book, the principle of sovereignty over natural resources has given rise in international law to both rights and duties of states.

Having traced the genesis and subsequent transformation of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the final part of the book performs the largely conceptual task of balancing rights and duties in international law in order to meet the demands of an increasingly interdependent world. This is the most interesting part of the book for readers who are not international lawyers or diplomatic historians. Schrijver leaves behind the immediate texts and interpretations of permanent sovereignty resolutions and delivers a very engaging discussion of the emerging international legal rights and duties of states. His conclusions are of a vaguely hopeful but modest kind. For example, while governments wishing to harvest timber or minerals must consult with affected indigenous peoples, the latter remain objects rather than subjects of international law, which limits their capacity to seek redress for the destruction of their homelands. Indigenous peoples, let alone trees, still have no standing in international law.

The infusion of permanent sovereignty over natural resources with duties and obligations is welcome news. Schrijver's modest conclusions, however, reflect the limits of the state system as a vehicle for achieving effective global environmental governance. Even though environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) stand to benefit from the new pragmatism in permanent sovereignty law, the focus of international law is necessarily a statist one. Recent work on global governance and global civil society reminds us, however, that the actions of ENGOs operating below the level of the state system, not international law, may represent our best chance for making individual behavior the world over more consistent with sustainable development goals.

CHRISTIAN HUNOLD
Drexel University

The War for America's Natural Resources *by William R. Nester. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997. 256 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $18.95.*

Contemporary environmental policy derives from what used to be called "natural resource policy," as might be seen in the writings of Norman Wengert. Nester does a service to political scientists by putting the terminology of natural resource disputation into language that political scientists can use. Teachers of public administration or policy need some substance

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to help urban undergraduates—most of whom have never seen a cow except in the movies—understand agency actions. And, if they want to learn about range policy, they will find it useful to know about animal-unit months (AUMs): "the monthly amount of forage needed to maintain a cow and calf, horse, or five sheep or goats" (p. 44).

Nester asserts that there has been a change in policy outlook over time from "cornucopians" who exploit and dominate the earth's seemingly limitless bounty, conservationists who emerged in the late 1800s, and environmentalists who emerged in the mid-1900s. He lays out as his general framework an environmental policy "war" between groups that act on these three conceptions. He argues that special interests have prevailed over national interests; groups act within iron triangles to control policy; policies, such as artificial market enhancements, often create dependence; and current policy is the result of a veritable "common law" approach to governing that has historically been affected by many factors. Four case-study chapters—"Farming, Grazing, and Hunting," "Forests, Parks, and Wilderness," "Mines, Drills, and Energy," and "Dams, Irrigation, and Faucets"—provide his qualitative evidence. For the descriptive detail that will aid classroom teaching, the book is extraordinarily helpful.

If we go to the level of research, rather than undergraduate teaching, then potential for controversy is on every page. Is it true and relevant that the Bureau of Land Management field people are the sons and daughters of ranchers who have gone to the state agricultural colleges? Why is it that environmentalists and conservationists have had considerably more success in forests/parks/wilderness policy than in farming/grazing/hunting policy? Nester is aware, to judge from his bibliography, of the issue network model as an alternative to the iron triangle model. But his analysis relies explicitly upon the iron triangle, with no clarification as to why he has made this choice. The iron triangle model posits a very stable relationship between interest groups in a given policy area, the congressional committee or subcommittee having jurisdiction, and the administrative agency in the same area. However, the fact that the cornucopians attempted and failed to utilize this structure in the 104th Congress, when they should have been at maximum influence to get their major agenda adopted, suggests something further to examine. If they had twelve major pieces of legislation, and got none of them, then the interest groups, or the administrative agencies, or both must not have been cooperating. The relationship is just too unstable on the face of it to be explained by the iron triangle model. Finally, from time to time, there are references that seem to express an author's attitude more than they provide analytic guidance. This is specifically true of the references to the National Rifle Association, Christian Coalition, and Oklahoma City terrorists (pp. 230–231) as "cornucopians."

For plenitude of detail on law and policies, exceeding any other recent work we know on this subject, praise. For the weak guidance it gives to the next steps in study, criticism. Buy the book, but use with care.

MATTHEW HOLDEN, JR.
AMY K. STEWART
University of Virginia

Transnationalism from Below *edited by Michael P. Smith and Luis E. Guarnizo. Piscataway, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 1998. 316 pp. Paper, $29.95.*

This volume constitutes an extremely valuable contribution to the growing but all too often inadequately grounded literature on transnationalism. Consisting of ten chapters, divided

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equally between theoretical contributions and analytically-informed case studies of particular instances of transnationalism, the book integrates contributions from anthropologists, sociologists, and economic geographers from Canada, the United States, and Denmark. The book provides a service to political scientists and other researchers grappling with the complex implications of the spatial reconfiguration of social, economic, and political relationships that until recently were conceptualized as structured by the boundaries of nation-states.

Contributors to the volume all highlight the concrete economic, demographic, political, and cultural factors that generate and reflect transnational relationships, yet they also take seriously the subjective roots and ramifications of transnational processes as they emerge in the arena of culture and the formation of collective identities. The sensitivity of the theoretical chapters and of most of the case studies to the importance of power asymmetries within and between communities will be of particular interest to political scientists. So too will the editors' careful consideration of methodological challenges accompanying the study of social processes that take place in multiple and shifting locations, that diverge widely in terms of scale, and that disrupt but hardly eliminate the conceptions of nation and nationalism that guide individual and collective behavior at the end of the twentieth century.

The empirical sections of the book are especially strong in their consideration of transnational migration, particularly of communities that have evolved various types of networks linking members living in the United States to individuals and institutions in their lands of origin and enabling participants to construct identities and institutions rooted simultaneously in old home and new. Virtually all of the case studies involve communities that flow between the United States and the Caribbean (Belize, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic) or Mexico; a chapter on social networks linking Hong Kong and China is the exception. That a broader range of regions could not be included is unfortunate, but this is perhaps a function of the state of research on processes of transnational migration.

The focus on migration is fully consistent with the study's relative emphasis on transnationalism from below—on localities and the communities of individuals who flow in and out of them—rather than with the related phenomenon of transnationalism from above. Studies of the latter might have encompassed the organization of multinational corporations, the transnational reach of culture industries, or the operation of transnational governance institutions. Such a collection might constitute a valuable follow-up project for the editors and their colleagues. Among other potential benefits, such an inquiry might lead the editors to nuance one of their central criticisms of much of the literature on transnationalism, which they believe underestimates the enduring significance of national factors for understanding contemporary societies.

Though the authors succeed reasonably well in avoiding excessive jargon, all but the most advanced undergraduate readers may find much of the book challenging. By contrast, graduate students and scholars seeking insights into processes of globalization and their ramifications have much to gain from a reading of this volume.

It is regrettable that so few academic publications aspire to shape debates both among empirically-oriented researchers in the core social science disciplines and among postmodernists in cultural studies and related fields. This book offers an important exception to this trend and exemplifies the significant advances that can accrue from sophisticated integration of theory and data drawn from various intellectual traditions and research methodologies.

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

The Almanac of Women and Minorities in American Politics *by Mart Martin. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1999. 293 pp. $49.95.*

The Complete Wartime Correspondence of Tsar Nicholas II and the Empress Alexandra: April 1914–March 1917 *edited by Joseph T. Fuhrmann. Westport, CT, 1999. 784 pp. $125.00.*

The Gallup Poll Cumulative Index, Public Opinion: 1935–1997 *by Alex M. Gallup. Wilmington, DE, SR Books, 1999. 596 pp. $150.00.*

Issues for Debate in American Public Policy: Selections from The CQ Researcher *edited by Sandra L. Stencel. Washington, DC, Congressional Quarterly Books, 1999. 320 pp. Paper, $25.95.*

Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997 *compiled by Jacqueline A. Kalley, Elna Schoeman, and L. E. Andor. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1999. 936 pp. $145.00.*

The Status of the Aegean Sea According to International Law *by Angelos M. Syrigos. Athens, Ant. N. Sakkoulas Publishers, 1998. 520 pp. $60.00.*

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

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

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

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

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

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





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